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Abstract
This Article contends that every American law school ought to substantially
eliminate C grades by setting its good academic standing grade point average at
the B- level. Grading systems that require or encourage law professors to award
a significant number of C marks are flawed for two reasons. First, low grades
damage students’ placement prospects. Employers frequently consider a job can-
didate’s absolute GPA in making hiring decisions. If a school systematically
assigns inferior grades, its students are at an unfair disadvantage when com-
peting for employment with students from institutions that award mostly A’s
and B’s. Second, marks in the C range injure students psychologically. Stu-
dents perceive C’s as a sign of failure. Accordingly, when they receive such
grades, their stress level is exacerbated in unhealthy ways. This psychological
harm is both intrinsically problematic and compromises the educational process.
Substantially eliminating C grades will bring about critical improvements in
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both the fairness of the job market and the mental well-being of our students.
These benefits outweigh any problems that might be caused or aggravated by
inflated grades. C marks virtually always denote unsatisfactory work in Ameri-
can graduate education. Law schools are the primary exception to this conven-
tion. It is time we adopted the practice followed by the rest of the academy.
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Introduction
EVERY AMERICAN LAW SCHOOL ought to substantially eliminate
C grades by setting its good academic standing grade point average at
the B- level. Grading systems that require or encourage law professors
to award a significant number of marks in the C range are flawed.
There are two problems with such systems. First, substandard grades
damage students’ placement prospects. Employers examine more
than law school reputation and class rank in making hiring decisions.
They also frequently consider a job candidate’s absolute grade point
average. If a school systematically assigns inferior grades, its students
are at an unfair disadvantage when competing for employment with
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students from institutions that award mostly A’s and B’s.1 Second, C
marks injure law students psychologically. Students perceive C’s as a
sign of failure. Accordingly, when they receive such grades, their stress
level is exacerbated in unhealthy ways. This harm is both intrinsically
problematic and compromises the educational process.2 By substan-
tially eliminating C’s, a B- good standing GPA will rectify these
problems. It will improve the fairness of the job market and enhance
the mental well-being of law students. Given the recent reduction in
employment opportunities for our graduates and rising concerns
about law student depression, these are considerable benefits.
There are three signature objections to reducing the use of C
marks. But only one has genuine force—the contention that students
will not work as hard if law schools inflate grades. That is a critical
concern, to be sure. But there are good reasons to believe that law
students will actually work harder in the aggregate under an inflated
system. And there is compelling evidence that if a decrease in student
effort does occur, it will be sufficiently small such that the benefits of
higher grades outweigh the harms caused by the reduction in work.3
Spurred on by changes in the legal employment market, a num-
ber of law schools have raised grades over the last few years, hoping,
inter alia, to improve the job prospects of their students.4 This grade
inflation has been controversial in both the academy and beyond.5
The issue has even captured the attention of the mainstream media,
reaching the pages of publications like the New York Times.6 In my
view, the law schools that raised grades were right to do so and the
remaining institutions should follow the same path.
C-type grades virtually always denote unsatisfactory work in Amer-
ican graduate education. Law schools are the primary exception to
this convention. It is time we adopted the practices followed by the
rest of the academy.
Part I of this Article surveys the use of C grades in American grad-
uate institutions. Part II explains certain technical and empirical fea-
1. See infra Part III.A.
2. See infra Part III.B.
3. See infra Part IV.C.
4. See infra notes 90–99 and accompanying text.
5. See, e.g., Catherine Rampell, In Law Schools, Grades Go Up, Just Like That, N.Y. TIMES
(June 21, 2010), available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/06/22/business/22law.html?
pagewanted=all (“But the tactic getting the most attention—and the most controversy—is
the sudden, deliberate and dubiously effective grade inflation, which had begun even
before the job market softened.”).
6. See id.
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tures of my recommendation that law schools substantially eliminate C
marks via a B- good standing GPA. Part III presents the case for elimi-
nating C grades. And Part IV responds to the three most common and
important objections to inflating grades. The Article also has one ap-
pendix that addresses several issues regarding transitioning to a new
grading system that requires the awarding of higher marks.
I. The Use of C Grades in American Graduate Education
C grades are generally considered unsatisfactory in American
graduate education. Since 1975, most graduate schools have required
that students maintain a 3.0 grade point average to remain in good
academic standing and to graduate.7 This means that B marks (or bet-
ter) are required.8 Perhaps the most common justification for this
practice is that graduate schools admit only the best recipients of
7. Academic Grading in the United States, WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Aca-
demic_grading_in_the_United_States#Numerical_and_letter_grades (last visited Feb. 10,
2013) [hereinafter Academic Grading in the United States, WIKIPEDIA]; accord John D. Wiley,
Foreword to GRADE INFLATION: ACADEMIC STANDARDS IN HIGHER EDUCATION, at viii (Lester H.
Hunt ed., 2008) (“[A]n average ‘B’ grade is required for satisfactory progress and continu-
ation as a graduate student.”); see also Mary Biggs, Grade “Inflation” and the Professionalism of
the Professoriate, in GRADE INFLATION: ACADEMIC STANDARDS IN HIGHER EDUCATION 109,
116–17 (Lester H. Hunt ed., 2008) (explaining that “A equals A; A- equals the former B; B
plus is the former C; B is the former D; and B-, of course, is the old F . . . may even be
conservative as regards grading in many graduate programs”); HENRY ROSOVSKY & MAT-
THEW HARTLEY, EVALUATION AND THE ACADEMY: ARE WE DOING THE RIGHT THING? GRADE
INFLATION AND LETTERS OF RECOMMENDATION 4 (2002), available at http://www.amacad.
org/publications/monographs/Evaluation_and_the_Academy.pdf. (“Relatively undiffer-
entiated course grading has been a traditional practice in many graduate schools for a very
long time.”).
8. Falling below 3.0 does not always lead to immediate dismissal. Frequently, stu-
dents with GPAs under that level are placed on probation and receive a semester or two to
raise their average above 3.0. See, e.g., HOWARD UNIV., RULES AND REGULATIONS FOR THE
PURSUIT OF ACADEMIC DEGREES art. 5, § 2 (1979), available at http://www.gs.howard.edu/
rules/pdf/rules_and_regulation.pdf (“A cumulative average of 3.00 (B) is required for
graduation. . . . A student who falls below the 3.00 average shall be warned and informed
that he/she must raise his/her quality point index to 3.00 in the next two terms in resi-
dence. Students failing to do so will be dropped from the Graduate School.”); Academic
Regulations, W. MICH. UNIV., http://catalog.wmich.edu/content.php?catoid=14&na-
void=461 (last visited Feb. 17, 2013) (“Good Standing: A graduate student admitted to a
graduate degree or certification program is in good standing whenever that student’s de-
gree or certification grade point average is at least 3.0. . . . If a student’s degree program
grade point average falls below 3.0, the student will be placed on probation.”) (further
explaining that students are given time to raise their averages above 3.0, but eventually will
be dismissed if they fail to do so).
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bachelor’s degrees.9 “[O]utstanding performance and corresponding
‘A’ grades are [thus] expected.”10
The 3.0 standard is particularly common at general graduate
schools that cover multiple fields of study. For example, at the Univer-
sity of Texas Graduate School, “[t]o continue . . . beyond the first
semester . . . , the student must . . . maintain a grade point average of
at least 3.00.”11 Likewise, at Stanford University, “graduate students
must maintain a 3.0 (B) grade point average overall.”12 The 3.0 stan-
dard is also regularly used in other types of post-baccalaureate institu-
9. Wiley, supra note 7, at viii.
10. Id.; see also id. at ix (“So, in this sense, ‘grade inflation’ is not considered a defect
of graduate education, it is a design feature!”); Francesca Di Meglio, Grade Inflation: Deval-
uing B-Schools’ Currency, BUS. WEEK (Apr. 19, 2005), http://www.businessweek.com/
bschools/content/apr2005/bs20050419_8678_bs001.htm (“B-school administrators say
graduate students are self-motivated and do well because the admissions offices carefully
screen applicants. ‘Our students are used to excelling, and we expect them to excel here as
well,’ says Robert Korajczyk, Kellogg’s senior associate dean of curriculum and teaching.”)
(“Kellogg” is the name of Northwestern University’s business school).
11. Warning Status, Academic Dismissal, and Termination, UNIV. TEX. AUSTIN GRADUATE
SCH., http://www.utexas.edu/ogs/student_services/academic_policies/warning_status.
html (last visited Feb. 20, 2013).
12. Registration Enrollment and Academic Progress (GAP 3.1), STANFORD UNIV., http://
gap.stanford.edu/3-1.html (last visited Jan. 24, 2013) (applying the 3.0 standard to all grad-
uate degrees other than certain business, medical, and law degrees); see also Academic Infor-
mation, GRADUATE SCH. ARTS & SCI., HARV. UNIV., http://www.gsas.harvard.edu/
handbook/academic_information.php (last visited Jan. 24, 2013) (“The minimum stan-
dard for satisfactory work in the Graduate School is a B average in each academic year.”);
Graduate Academic Policies, BELLARMINE UNIV., https://catalog.bellarmine.edu/2011-2012/
graduate-academic-policies (last visited Jan. 24, 2013) (“The status of good standing indi-
cates that a student has a cumulative Grade Point Average of 3.00 or better and is making
satisfactory progress toward a degree.”); ILL. INST. OF TECH., IIT GRADUATE BULLETIN
2010–2012, at 37 (2010–2012), available at http://www.iit.edu/graduate_college/bulletin/
pdfs/bulletin10-12.pdf (“Satisfactory performance in the graduate divisions is defined as
the maintenance of a minimum cumulative GPA of 3.0/4.0, as reported by the registrar.
The minimum GPA for graduation is 3.0/4.0.”); Academic Progress, Graduate Catalog, GRADU-
ATE SCH., VA. POLYTECHNIC INST., http://graduateschool.vt.edu/graduate_catalog/policies.
htm?policy=002d14432c654287012c6542e38200ad (last visited Jan. 24, 2013) (“Students
whose cumulative GPA falls below a ‘B’ (3.00 GPA) will be placed on probation by the
Graduate School.”); Academic Policies and Procedures, CHAPMAN UNIV., 2011–2012 GRADUATE
CATALOG, http://www.chapman.edu/catalog/oc/current/gr/content/4848.htm#o9994
(last visited Jan. 24, 2013) (“Students are expected to achieve a ‘B’ or higher in all course
work toward a degree or credential at Chapman University. A cumulative grade-point-aver-
age of 3.000 based on all course work applicable to the graduate degree or credential is
required, excluding prerequisite courses.”).
492 UNIVERSITY OF SAN FRANCISCO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 47
tions, such as business schools,13 engineering schools,14 and schools of
education.15
At many graduate institutions, C grades can cause a loss of good
standing even if the student’s GPA does not fall below 3.0. To illus-
trate, in the College of Education at Tennessee Tech University, “[a]
grade of ‘C’ is considered a failing grade in doctoral programs.”16 Stu-
dents are “allowed to maintain a grade of ‘C’ in only one course com-
pleted toward the Ph.D. degree. If a student receives two ‘C’s they will
be dismissed from the program.”17 Similarly, at Howard University,
graduate students are expelled if they receive C grades in more than
13. See, e.g., TERRY COLL. OF BUS., THE UNIV. OF GA., MBA STUDENT HANDBOOK
2012–2013, at 14 (2012–2013), available at http://mba.terry.uga.edu/fulltime/admitted/
geninfo/mba-handbook.pdf (C- is not a passing grade in the MBA program); id. at 21
(“The minimum required grade point average is 3.00.”); Policy Grading, LEAVEY SCH. OF
BUS., SANTA CLARA UNIV., http://www.scu.edu/business/graduates/academics/policy-
grading.cfm (last visited Jan. 28, 2013) (“To qualify for the MBA or MSIS degree, a student
must maintain an overall grade point average (GPA) of at least 3.0 in all work taken at the
Leavey School of Business.”); DANIELS COLL. OF BUS., UNIV. OF DENVER, 2011–2012 GRADU-
ATE STUDENT HANDBOOK 20 (2011-2012), available at http://www.daniels.du.edu/daniels-
tomcat/docs/pdf/handbooks/2011_12_Daniels_Graduate_%20Handbook.pdf. (“Students
in the Graduate School are required to achieve a 3.0 (B) Grade Point Average (GPA) or
higher to obtain a degree. A grade lower than ‘C-’ in a course renders the credit unaccept-
able for meeting the degree requirements . . . . Any student whose overall grade point
average falls below a ‘3.0’ will be placed on probation, suspension, or dismissal, depending
on the grade point deficiency.”); see also De Meglio, supra note 10 (noting that at many
business schools “that still give old-fashioned grades, grade inflation is so bad that students
rarely get lower than a B.”).
14. See, e.g., PENN STATE UNIV., ARCHITECTURAL ENG’G GRADUATE STUDENT HANDBOOK
2011–12, at 2 (2011-2012), available at http://www.engr.psu.edu/ae/degree_programs/
GraduateHandbook.pdf (“A minimum grade-point average of 3.00 for work done at the
University is required for all graduate degrees.”); Engineering, GRADUATE COLL., UNIV. ARIZ.,
http://grad.arizona.edu/live/programs/description/46 (last visited Feb. 20, 2013) (“Aca-
demic Progress—Students enrolled in the Master of Engineering degree program must
maintain a minimum 3.000 grade-point average (GPA)[.]”); STANFORD UNIV., GUIDE TO
GRADUATE STUDIES IN AERONAUTICS AND ASTRONAUTICS 2011–2012, at 22 (2011–2012),
available at http://aa.stanford.edu/curriculum/handbook.pdf (“Candidates for the degree
of Engineer are required to have a GPA of 3.0 or higher.”).
15. See, e.g., COLL. OF EDUC., UNIV. OF WASH., GRADUATE SCH. MANUAL 2011–2012, at
14 (2011–2012), available at http://education.washington.edu/pdf/grad_manual_11-12.
pdf (“A minimum overall GPA of 3.00 is required for graduation.”).
16. Candidate Responsibilities, COLL. OF EDUC., TENN. TECH U., http://www.tntech.edu/
education/responsibilities/ (last visited Jan. 28, 2013) (emphasis added).
17. Id. (further noting that the good standing GPA is 3.25) (emphasis omitted).
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nine credit hours of course work.18 And at other graduate schools, C’s
are expressly identified as unsatisfactory grades.19
The 3.0 good standing GPA is not universal. Many graduate pro-
grams employ a higher standard—3.3 or even 3.5.20 And at some of
18. HOWARD UNIV., supra note 8 (further noting that “[a] cumulative average of 3.00
(B) is required for graduation.”); see also COLL. OF NURSING, UNIV. OF ARK. FOR MED. SCI.,
CATALOG 2004–2005, at 44 (2004–2005), available at http://nursing.uams.edu/publica-
tions/04-05%20CON%20CATALOG.pdf (“Only one (1) letter grade of ‘C’ will be allowed
for any course work toward the master’s degree. A student with a second letter grade of ‘C’
will be dismissed from the UAMS Graduate School and the College of Nursing. . . . A
cumulative grade point average of ‘B’, 3.0 (on 4.0 grade scale), must be attained for gradu-
ation. If a student has less than 3.0 cumulative grade point average on 12 or more semester
hours of graded course work, the student will be placed on academic probation.”).
19. See, e.g., Grading System, COLL. OF LIBERAL ARTS & SCI., SUFFOLK UNIV., http://
www2.suffolk.edu/2011Archive1/catalogs/2011-2012-Archive-Catalog35075.html (last vis-
ited Feb. 10, 2013) (applying the label “Satisfactory Performance” to A, A-, B+, B, and B-
grades; applying the label “Unsatisfactory Performance” to C+ and C grades); see also Aca-
demic Standing, COLL. OF LIBERAL ARTS AND SCI., SUFFOLK UNIV., http://www2.suffolk.edu/
2011Archive1/catalogs/2011-2012-Archive-Catalog35077.html (last visited Feb. 10, 2013)
(“Each semester, the appropriate Departmental Committee or Director of each Graduate
Program will review the records of Graduate students believed deficient in any of the fol-
lowing areas: 1. Cumulative grade point average below 3.0. . . . 3. Excessive grades below
the ‘B’ level.”); UNIV. OF WASH., supra note 15, at 14 (“For graduate students a minimum of
2.7 is required in each course that is counted toward a graduate degree. A minimum over-
all GPA of 3.00 is required for graduation. Correspondence between number grades and
letter grades is as follows: . . . 2.8 = B- . . . 2.4 = C+”). But see General Information and Policies,
HOFSTRA UNIV., http://bulletin.hofstra.edu/content.php?catoid=50&navoid=2554#grad
(last visited Feb. 17, 2013) (“It is necessary for graduate students to earn a 3.0 grade point
average or better, as required by the program, to be considered in good standing.”) (“C
Satisfactory . . . D Not creditable for graduate degree”); Grading System, BALL STATE UNIV.,
http://cms.bsu.edu/ Academics/CollegesandDepartments/GradSchool/Academics/
AcademicpoliciesandProcedures/GradingSystem (last visited Feb. 17, 2013) (“Although
you need to have a C or better in a course for it to count toward a degree program . . . [i]f
you are pursuing a master’s degree, you’ll need a scholastic ratio of at least 3.0 as well as a
3.0 in your major.”).
20. See, e.g., Requirements for the Master of Arts Degree, DEP’T ENG’G, FULBRIGHT COLL.
ARTS & SCI., UNIV. OF ARK., http://www.uark.edu/depts/english/grad/ma.php (last visited
Jan. 28, 2013) (“Each candidate must have a cumulative GPA of at least 3.33 on the total
number of hours presented for the degree.”); Graduate Student Handbook, DEP’T ENG’G,
UNIV. OF FLA., http://www.english.ufl.edu/resources/grad/handbook/progress.html (last
visited Jan. 28, 2013) (“A minimum 3.5 grade point average for all courses should be main-
tained.”). As these examples show, often times it is individual departments within a school
that require a higher GPA. See also Student Guide to Grades at CGU, CLAREMONT GRADUATE
UNIV., http://www.cgu.edu/pages/5081.asp (last visited Jan. 28, 2013) (“You must main-
tain a minimum grade point average (GPA) of 3.0 in all coursework taken at Claremont
Graduate University. Individual academic programs may require a higher GPA and or addi-
tional standards of progress.”); THE GRADUATE COLL., UNIV. OF ILL. AT URBANA-CHAMPAIGN,
THE GRADUATE COLL. HANDBOOK OF POLICY AND REQUIREMENTS FOR STUDENTS, FACULTY
AND STAFF - 2011 § B.2. (2011), available at http://www.grad.illinois.edu/gradhandbook/
chapteriii/section02 (“Campus policy requires a student to maintain a minimum cumula-
tive graduate GPA of 2.75 in order to continue in an advanced degree program, and to
494 UNIVERSITY OF SAN FRANCISCO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 47
these schools, B grades are considered unsatisfactory. For example, in
the English and Comparative Literature Department at Columbia
University,
[g]rades of B+ signal work that raises concerns, and in the case of
an M.A. student a pattern of B+ grades would indicate someone
who shouldn’t go on in the program unless he or she is doing sig-
nificantly better in other courses. The rare grade of B signals an
active recommendation that the student not go on.21
At other institutions, the good standing GPA is somewhat lower than
3.0. But the standard is still typically set at a level that makes C grades
unacceptable. For example, many schools use 2.75, or a GPA in that
range, as the cutoff.22
There are some graduate schools where C grades do not jeopard-
ize a student’s academic standing. For example, at Northwestern Uni-
versity’s Kellogg School of Management, students need to maintain
only a C average to continue in the program and ultimately gradu-
ate.23 But such institutions are a small minority.24
have a cumulative graduate GPA of at least 2.75 to graduate. Many departments, however,
require a minimum of 3.0 or higher. For departments with higher minima, the Graduate
College enforces the department’s minimum.”).
21. Written Work, Grades, and Evaluations, THE M.A. PROGRAM, ENG. & COMP. LITERA-
TURE DEP’T, COLUMBIA UNIV., http://english.columbia.edu/graduate/ma-program-1#Writ-
ten Work, Grades, and Evaluations (last visited Feb. 17, 2013).
22. See Academic Grading in the United States, WIKIPEDIA, supra note 7 (“Most graduate
schools have required a 3.0 grade point average since 1975 . . . but some schools still have
2.75 as their pass standard.”); UNIV. OF ILL., THE GRADUATE COLL. HANDBOOK, supra note
20, at § B.1. (“Campus policy requires a student to maintain a minimum cumulative gradu-
ate GPA of 2.75 in order to continue in an advanced degree program, and to have a cumu-
lative graduate GPA of at least 2.75 to graduate.”); Degree Requirements, BOS, UNIV. SCH. OF
MGMT., http://smgworld.bu.edu/gpo/academic/mba-program/academic-policies-grad-
ing/degree-requirements/ (last visited Feb. 17, 2013) (“To qualify for the MBA degree,
students . . . must . . . [h]ave a cumulative GPA of at least 2.70.”); Grading, BOS, UNIV. SCH.
OF MGMT., http://smgworld.bu.edu/gpo/academic/mba-program/academic-policies-
grading/grading/ (last visited Feb. 4, 2013) (2.7 = B-); Master of Engineering Degree Require-
ments, DEP’T OF COMPUTER SCI., CORNELL UNIV., http://www.cs.cornell.edu/grad/MEng
Program/DegreeRequirements/index.htm (last visited Feb. 17, 2013) (“A cumulative GPA
of at least 2.5 must be maintained to continue in the program.”); Abby Ellin, Do Grades
Matter?, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 13, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/04/15/education/ed-
life/do-grades-matter.html?emc=tnt&tntemail0=y (observing that “most grad schools re-
quire students to maintain B-minus or higher”).
23. Registration and Academic Policies, KELLOGG SCH. OF MGMT., NW. UNIV., http://www.
kellogg.northwestern.edu/stu_aff/policies/registration.htm (last visited Feb. 17, 2013) (“A
cumulative average of C in all courses attempted is required for degree conferment. . . . 2Y
students must have at least a C average to continue enrollment after the first year (three
quarters) of study. 1Y students must have at least a C average to continue enrollment after
the second quarter of study.”).
24. And at many of these schools, the 2.0 standard is a mere formality since most of
the grades awarded are in the A or B range.
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Since the vast majority of graduate schools require at least a B or
B- average to remain in school, it should come as no surprise that
grades in the C range and below are seldom awarded. “According to
Christopher Healy, an associate professor of computer science at
Furman University who compiles grade distributions, about 75 per-
cent of grades in master’s programs are A’s, 22 percent are B’s and 3
percent are C’s. Less than 1 percent are D’s or F’s.”25 For example,
Professor Healy found that eighty-three percent of grades at Furman
University’s graduate school were A’s during a representative semes-
ter, fifteen percent were B’s, one percent were C’s, and zero percent
were D’s or F’s.26 Similarly, at Indiana University in Bloomington, sev-
enty-one percent were A’s, twenty-seven percent were B’s, two percent
were C’s, 0.1 percent were D’s, and 0.3 percent were F’s.27
Like other graduate programs, medical schools have substantially
eliminated C grades. But they have done so in a different way. Most
colleges of medicine use a type of Pass/Fail grading.28 Some operate
with only Pass and Fail marks.29 Others use a “modified Pass/Fail” sys-
tem that includes additional grade levels, such as Honors, High Pass,
and Low Pass.30 Given this implementation of Pass/Fail assessment,
25. Abby Ellin, Failure Is Not an Option, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 15, 2012), http://www.ny-
times.com/2012/04/15/education/edlife/failure-is-not-an-option.html?emc=tnt&
tntemail0=y.
26. Id. (Furman’s data is contained in a graphic that lists the percent breakdown of
graduate school grades for six schools).
27. Id. (Indiana’s data is contained in the same graphic as Furman’s; there is also a
second graphic that lists the percent breakdown of graduate school grades for eight addi-
tional schools).
28. Medical School in the United States, WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Medi-
cal_school_in_the_United_States (last visited Feb. 20, 2013); accord Robert A. Bloodgood et
al., A Change to Pass/Fail Grading in the First Two Years at One Medical School Results in Improved
Psychological Well-Being, 84 ACAD. MED. 655, 655 (2009) (“The most recent data available
from the Association of American Medical Colleges Web site (http://services.aamc.org/
currdir/section1/grading1.cfm) show the following breakdown of the grading system used
by medical schools for the required basic sciences portion of the curriculum: two intervals
(usually pass/fail) = 40 schools, three intervals (usually pass/fail/honors) = 35 schools,
four intervals (usually pass/fail/honors/high honors) = 32 schools, and five intervals (usu-
ally A, B, C, D, F) = 26 schools.”).
29. See, e.g., STANFORD SCH. OF MED., MD PROGRAM HANDBOOK AND POLICY MANUAL:
ACADEMIC YEAR 2011–2012 at 101 (2011–2012), available at http://med.stanford.edu/md/
policies/MD%20Handbook%202011-12.pdf (Pass/Fail grading).
30. See e.g., Student Manual 2011–2012, IND. UNIV. SCH. OF MED. - FORT WAYNE, http://
fortwayne.medicine.iu.edu/curriculum-academics/student-information/ (last visited Feb.
17, 2013) (Honors/High Pass/Pass/Fail grading); CREIGHTON UNIV. SCH. OF MED., STU-
DENT HANDBOOK 23–24 (2011), available at http://medschool.creighton.edu/fileadmin/
user/medicine/Departments/student_affairs/SA_docs/StudentHandbook.pdf (Honors/
Satisfactory/Unsatisfactory grading). Some other graduate programs use modified pass/
fail grading systems. See, e.g., UNIV. OF N.C.-CHAPEL HILL, THE GRADUATE SCH. HANDBOOK
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medical schools have generally ceased awarding not only C’s, but
other letter grades as well.31
A number of medical schools still use letter marks.32 Such institu-
tions are divided in their approach to C grades. At some, C’s are effec-
tively unsatisfactory. For example, at the University of Kentucky
College of Medicine, students with a grade point average under 2.5
are placed on probation and “must improve their academic perform-
ance in the subsequent academic year or risk dismissal.”33 Similarly, at
the University of Central Florida College of Medicine, while
“[m]inimal competency in each module/clerkship is a composite
score of 70 or above (A, B or C grade),” students with “one or more C
grades” may be placed on probation.34 Other schools, however, treat
C’s as acceptable marks. To illustrate, at the University of South Caro-
lina School of Medicine, students must maintain a 2.0 grade point
8–9 (2012), available at http://handbook.unc.edu/pdf/handbook.pdf (High Pass/Pass/
Low Pass/Fail grading); PMBA FAQs, OLIN BUS. SCH., WASH. UNIV. ST. LOUIS, http://
www.olin.wustl.edu/ academicprograms/pmba/faq/Pages/default.aspx (last visited Feb.
20, 2013) (“We operate on a modified pass/fail system (HP, P, LP, NP) in both the full-
time MBA and the PMBA programs.”). But such systems appear to be far more common in
medical schools than elsewhere.
31. Of course, under modified Pass/Fail grading policies, there are often as many
grade intervals as in letter grade systems. For example, a policy with Honors, High Pass,
Pass, and Fail is quite similar to one that uses A, B, C, and F grades without + and – distinc-
tions. But one important difference remains: Schools that use a modified Pass/Fail ap-
proach generally do not compile those grades into a grade point average or calculate a
class rank, while most institutions that employ letter systems determine at least GPA, and
often class rank.
32. See supra note 28.
33. Student Progress and Promotions Committee, UNIV. OF KY. COLL. OF MED., http://www.
mc.uky.edu/meded/student_affairs/progress_and_promotions.asp (last visited Feb. 20,
2013) (noting also that a grade point average under 2.0 leads to automatic dismissal).
34. UNIV. OF CENT. FLA. COLL. OF MED., M.D. PROGRAM STUDENT HANDBOOK
2010–2011, at 41, 45 (2010–2011) available at http://med.ucf.edu/media/2011/08/stu-
dent_handbook_2010.pdf. Note that for degree-conferring programs at medical colleges
other than M.D. programs, 3.0 is typically the good standing GPA. See, e.g., Welcome to Microbi-
ology and Immunology!, UNIV. OF ILL. CHI. COLL. OF MED., http://www.uic.edu/depts/mcmi/
newstudent.htm (last visited Oct. 22, 2012) (in the Ph.D. program in Microbiology & Im-
munology, if a student’s GPA falls below 3.0, the student is put on probation and may not
graduate until the GPA is brought back above that level); SCH. OF HEALTH SCI. & PRACTICE,
N.Y. MED. COLL., SATISFACTORY ACADEMIC PROGRESS POLICY 1 (2012), available at http://
www.nymc.edu/academics/schoolofhealthsciencesandpractice/assets/policyonsatisfactory
academicprogress.pdf (setting the good academic standing GPA at 3.0 in multiple
programs).
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average to continue in the program.35 The same is true at the Univer-
sity of South Dakota’s Sanford School of Medicine.36
Law schools differ from other graduate institutions.37 The vast
majority require only a 2.0 grade point average—or something in that
range—to remain in good standing and graduate.38 Indeed, based on
data provided to the National Association of Law Placement (“NALP”)
for 2012,39 140 out of 142 reporting schools set their good standing
GPA in the C range or lower, and ninety-three use 2.0 specifically.40 C
35. UNIV. OF S.C. SCH. OF MED., POLICIES FOR CURRICULUM ADMIN. 15 (2012), available
at http://ca.med.sc.edu/curriculum_policies.pdf.
36. SANFORD SCH. OF MED., UNIV. OF S.D., MED. STUDENT AFFAIRS HANDBOOK 21
(2010), available at http://www.usd.edu/medical-school/medical-doctor-program/
upload/Student-Affairs-Handbook-2010-2012-final-1.pdf (also providing that students must
earn a C or better in all required courses); see also MARSHALL UNIV. JOAN C. EDWARDS SCH.
OF MED. POLICY REGARDING ACADEMIC AND PROFESSIONALISM STANDARDS, LEAVES AND AP-
PEALS 2 (2010), available at http://musom.marshall.edu/students/documents/Policies/
ASC-FINAL-POLICY.pdf (“Students are considered in good academic standing if they
maintain at least a 2.0 grade point average each semester.”); COLL. OF MED., HEALTH SCI-
ENCE CTR., TEX. A&M UNIV., STUDENT HANDBOOK FOR COLL. OF MED. STUDENTS 10 (2012),
available at http://medicine.tamhsc.edu/student-affairs/pdf/handbook.pdf (“Good aca-
demic standing is defined as having an overall grade point average of 2.0 or above.”).
37. Academic Grading in the United States, WIKIPEDIA, supra note 7 (“American law
schools are notoriously out of step with mainstream graduate level education.”) (the quota-
tion is actually from an older version of the Wikipedia entry and is on file with the author);
see also Lawrence S. Krieger, Human Nature as a New Guiding Philosophy for Legal Education
and the Profession, 47 WASHBURN L.J. 247, 299 (2008) (observing that “[l]aw schools with low
set points or ranges for grades differ” from other graduate schools).
38. Harvey Gilmore, To Failure and Back: How Law Rescued Me From the Depths, 10 FLA.
COASTAL L. REV. 567, 581 (2009) (“However, the grading chart of a typical law school lists a
C as average, and a 2.0 is usually the minimum grade point average required for a student
to continue in good standing.”); Kristen Booth Glen, To Carry It On: A Decade of Deaning
After Hayword Burns, 10 N.Y. CITY. L. REV. 7, 13 n.29 (2006) (observing that most law
schools use a cutoff GPA of 2.0); Academic Grading in the United States, WIKIPEDIA, supra note
7 (“Most American law schools require no more than a 2.0 grade point average to qualify
for the professional doctorate in law.”); see, e.g., MISS. COLL. SCH. OF LAW, COURSE CATALOG
2011–2012 ACADEMIC YEAR 26 (2011–2012), available at http://law.mc.edu/academics/
course-catalog/ (2.0 good standing GPA); THOMAS JEFFERSON SCH. OF LAW, STUDENT HAND-
BOOK 2012–2013, at 3 (2012–2013), available at http://www.tjsl.edu/student-life/student-
handbook (2.0 good standing GPA). But see Academic Regulations, SHEPARD BROAD LAW CTR.,
NOVA SE. UNIV., http://www.nsulaw.nova.edu/online/edl/regulations.cfm (last visited
Feb. 20, 2013) (3.0 good standing GPA).
39. All data was collected from NAT’L ASS’N OF LAW PLACEMENT, 2012–2013 DIRECTORY
OF LAW SCH. (last visited Feb. 20, 2013), available at http://www.nalplawschoolsonline.org/
.
40. 128 of the reporting schools use a 4.0 scale. Of those, the good standing GPAs are
as follows: 2.4 = one school, 2.33 = six schools, 2.3 = eleven schools, 2.25 = two schools, 2.2 =
six schools, 2.15 = one school, 2.0 = ninety-three schools, 1.9 = two schools, 1.835 = one
school, 1.67 = one school, 1.67 = one school, and 1.667 = one school. Two schools use 2.5,
but one of these institutions expressly identifies a 2.5 as the bottom of the C range. The
other implicitly defines 2.5 as a B-. Finally, one school uses 2.6. Eleven reporting schools
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grades are thus generally satisfactory in legal education. Moreover, C
grades are regularly awarded. In their survey of law school grading
practices, Professors Robert Downs and Nancy Levit received mean
grade data from forty-eight schools operating on a 4.0 or 4.33 scale.41
The combined first-year mean grade at these institutions was 2.82,42
which is only slightly higher than a B- average (2.7 or 2.67). Accord-
ingly, teachers at these schools awarded a significant number of
grades below B- to first-year students.43 It is also noteworthy that law
schools generally still employ D grades, “whereas the industry stan-
dard is to eliminate it from the graduate-level quality index.”44
While C (and D) marks remain in general usage in legal educa-
tion, grading practices across institutions vary significantly. In another
survey of law school grading practices, Professor Nancy Kaufman
found a correlation between the level of grades awarded by an institu-
tion and the index scores of its students:45 “As might have been ex-
pected, law school class means and medians tend to decrease on the
employ a 100-point scale. Each of those indicated that the GPA necessary to graduate is in
the 70s or lower, with all but two expressly defining grades in the 70s as falling within the C
range. Three reporting schools use a non-traditional scale. Each of those expressly identi-
fied the good standing GPA as being at a level that constitutes a C or C-.
41. See Robert C. Downs and Nancy Levit, If It Can’t Be Lake Woebegone . . . A Nationwide
Survey of Law School Grading and Grade Normalization Practices, 65 UMKC L. REV. 819, 841
(1997).
42. Id.
43. The mean grade was somewhat higher for the graduating classes: 2.97. Id. Thus, it
is likely that fewer C grades were awarded to second- and third-year students at these insti-
tutions. For additional data on schools that reported median grades to Downs and Levit, or
that use a 100-point grade scale, see id. (explaining, for example, that the mean grade at
the seven reporting schools that used a 100-point grade scale was 80.40, which is at the
bottom of the B range).
44. Academic Grading in the United States, WIKIPEDIA, supra note 7. Compare Registration,
FORDHAM UNIV., http://www.fordham.edu/academics/summer_session/welcome/regis-
tration/ (last visited Feb. 20, 2013) (“There is no grade D in the graduate school.”), with
Grading and Ranking, UNIV. OF WASH. SCH. OF LAW, http://www.law.washington.edu/Stu-
dents/Academics/Grading.aspx (last visited Feb. 20, 2013) (explaining that the D grade
“indicates that the level of performance is below that which on average is required for the
award of the degree.”). But see TOURO COLL. JACOB D. FUCHSBERG LAW CTR., STUDENT
HANDBOOK 2011–2012, at 26 (2011), available at http://www.tourolaw.edu/pdf/Student_
Handbook.pdf (starting in the fall of 2011, there are no D grades); WILLIAM H. BOWEN
SCH. OF LAW, UNIV. OF ARK. AT LITTLE ROCK, GRADING SCALE AND GRADE NORMALIZATION
POLICY 1 (2011), available at http://ualr.edu/law/files/2010/11/Grade-Scale-and-
Mandatory-CurveforWebsite.doc.pdf (same).
45. In law school admissions, an “index score” is a compilation of a student’s score on
the Law School Admission Test and the student’s undergraduate GPA. Marjorie M. Shultz
& Sheldon Zedeck, Predicting Lawyer Effectiveness: Broadening the Basis for Law School Admis-
sions Decision, 36 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 620, 621 (2011).
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whole as the index of the incoming students decreases.”46 Generally,
the higher a school is ranked in U.S. News & World Report, the higher
its index score is.47 Thus, more prestigious schools tend to give better
grades to their students than less prestigious schools.
To obtain a clearer picture of law school grading practices, it is
helpful to break down institutions by U.S. News ranking “tier.” The
first tier contains those schools ranked in the top fifty.48 Many of these
schools have adopted grade normalization policies that essentially
eliminate the use of C grades.49 Some policies do so explicitly. For
example, under New York University’s mandatory curve in first-year
classes and recommended curve in upper-level classes, grades below B-
are set at “0-5%” of those awarded.50 And in actual practice, C and D
46. Nancy H. Kaufman, A Survey of Law School Grading Practices, 44 J. LEGAL EDUC. 415,
422 (1994). Interestingly, there appears to be a similar pattern among undergraduate
schools. See Stuart Rojstaczer & Christopher Healy, Grading in American Colleges and Universi-
ties, TEACHERS COLL. RECORD 2 (Mar. 4, 2010) [hereinafter Rojstaczer & Healy, Grading in
American Colleges and Universities], available at http://www.tcrecord.org/content.asp?con-
tentid=15928 (“[W]e find that colleges and universities have, without any collective consul-
tation or external pressure, collectively created an ad hoc national grading scale based on
school selectivity.”) (explaining that the more selective the school, the higher the grades
awarded); see also Stuart Rojstaczer & Christopher Healy, Where A is Ordinary: The Evolution
of American College and University Grading, 1940–2009, 114 TEACHERS COLL. RECORD, no. 7, at
8 (2012) [hereinafter Rojstaczer & Healy, Where A is Ordinary], available at http://www.
tcrecord.org/content.asp?contentid=16473 (“Our simple regression model . . . indicates
that the average percentage of A plus B grades at a school correlates significantly with the
median SAT score of its student body . . . .”).
47. This is partly because median undergraduate GPA and median LSAT score consti-
tute 22.5 percent of the weighted average used to establish each school’s rank. See Methodol-
ogy: Law School Rankings, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, available at http://www.usnews.com/
education/best-graduate-schools/top-law-schools/articles/2012/03/12/methodology-law-
school-rankings (last visited Feb. 20, 2013).
48. U.S. News superficially uses three categories—“The Top 100 Schools,” “Third
Tier” schools, and “Fourth Tier” schools. See Best Law Schools, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT,
available at http://grad-schools.usnews.rankingsandreviews.com/best-graduate-schools/
top-law-schools/ law-rankings (last visited Feb. 20, 2013). But as is abundantly clear, given
the last two labels, the top fifty schools are “first tier” and schools fifty-one through 100 are
“second tier.” See Robert Steinbuch, On the Leiter Side: Developing a Universal Assessment Tool
for Measuring Scholarly Output by Law Professors and Ranking Law Schools, 45 LOY. L.A. L. REV.
87, 91, 105 (2011) (referring to the top fifty schools in the U.S. News ranking as “Tier 1”
and schools fifty-one through 100 as “Tier 2”). Indeed, that is how U.S. News categorized
the schools from 1997 through 2002. See Law-School Rankings: A Short History, PRE-LAW
HANDBOOK, http://www.prelawhandbook.com/law_school_ranking__usn_history (last vis-
ited Feb. 20, 2013).
49. Several first-tier institutions—such as Yale, Harvard, and Stanford—have elimi-
nated letter grades altogether by moving to modified Pass/Fail systems. See List of Law
School GPA Curves, WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_law_school_GPA_
curves (last visited Feb. 20, 2013) [hereinafter List of Law School GPA Curves, WIKIPEDIA].
50. Memorandum from Liam Murphy, Vice Dean, N.Y.U. Law Sch., on Grade Reform
(2008) (on file with the author).
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marks are virtually unheard of at NYU.51 Similarly, the University of
Washington’s mandatory curve provides that zero to ten percent of
grades must fall below B-, and such grades are capped at 5% in first-
year courses.52 Other grading policies substantially dispense with C’s
by implication. To illustrate, Cornell University applies a mandatory
mean of 3.2 to 3.5 on a 4.33 scale.53 As a practical matter, such a sys-
tem significantly restricts the number of grades under B- that a profes-
sor may award. Moreover, in five hypothetical grade distributions
circulated to teachers to guide their grading, the percentage of grades
below B- were, respectively, four percent, eight percent, two percent,
zero percent, and zero percent.54 At the University of Minnesota,
there is a mean range of 3.0 to 3.333 that is mandatory in first-year
courses and advisory in upper level courses.55 In language, this policy
creates significant room for awarding grades under B-. In reality, such
grades are rare: For the class of 2011, the median GPA was 3.428 and
the twenty-fifth percentile GPA was 3.279.56
Other first-tier schools award C’s somewhat more often. For ex-
ample, the University of Texas has (1) a mandatory mean of 3.25 to
3.35 in all courses, (2) a mandatory curve in first-year classes which
51. I attended NYU when the grade normalization policy was less generous than to-
day. During my time, grades below B- were incredibly rare.
52. UNIV. OF WASH. SCH. OF LAW, supra note 44; see also Grading Policy Statement, LAW
SCH., UNIV. OF NOTRE DAME, http://law.nd.edu/careers/employers/policies/grading-pol-
icy/ (last visited Feb. 20, 2013) (implementing a mandatory curve under which zero to ten
percent of grades must fall below B-; in the fall of 2011, the median GPAs for first-year and
third-year law students were 3.287 and 3.349, respectively, indicating that relatively few low
grades are awarded at Notre Dame).
53. CORNELL UNIV. LAW SCH., CORNELL LAW SCH. GRADING POLICY FOR J.D. STUDENTS
(2012), available at https://support.law.cornell.edu/students/forms/view_grading_expla-
nation_January_2012.pdf (last visited Feb. 20, 2013) (the target mean is 3.35).
54. Memorandum from Stephen P. Garvey Circulated to Cornell University Law
Faculty on Grading Policy (Nov. 2009) (on file with the author); see also UNIV. OF VA. SCH.
OF LAW, ACADEMIC POLICIES 8, available at http://www.law.virginia.edu/pdf/academics/pol-
icies_nov2011.pdf (2.3 good standing GPA on 4.3 scale); id. at 7 (mandatory 3.3 mean on a
4.3 scale); Posting of Professor Richard D. Balnave, Professor of Law, Univ. of Va. Sch. of
Law, to lawclinic@lists.washlaw.edu (Feb. 25, 2009, 23:09 EST) (on file with author) (ex-
plaining that the mandatory mean is actually a range from 3.25 to 3.35).
55. UNIV. OF MINN. LAW SCH., STANDARDS, WRITING REQUIREMENTS, GRADES, HONORS
AND RANKS/QUARTILES FALL OF 2009: CLASS OF 2010 AND 2011 (2009), available at http://
www.law.umn.edu/uploads/38/Oj/38OjnFnbnGNDMGNjzm6o3A/quartiles-July-2009.pdf
(last visited Feb. 20, 2013); see also Forms – Letter of Good Standing, U. MINN. L. SCH., http://
www.law.umn.edu/current/forms.html#JsJ7aCNdDn9lU1EHgMq50A (last visited Feb. 20,
2013) (good standing GPA is 2.0).
56. UNIV. OF MINN. LAW SCH., UNIV. OF MINN. LAW SCH. QUARTILE INFO. 1990–2011
(2011), available at http://www.law.umn.edu/uploads/da/ac/daac7cf62ebee3500946959a
0e0e5f12/University-of-Minnesota-Law-School-Quartiles-1990-2011.pdf.
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requires that at least five percent of grades fall below B-, and (3) a
recommended curve in upper-level courses which provides that
“about 10% of grades” should be under B-.57 According to the
school’s fall 2011 grade distribution reports, roughly ten percent of
grades were C+ or worse in non-seminar courses.58 Similarly, the Uni-
versity of Iowa applies a mandatory median of 3.3 and a mandatory
grade distribution under which marks below B- should be roughly ten
percent of those awarded.59
A few schools in the first tier appear to award a significant num-
ber of grades below B-. The University of Wisconsin Law School is
illustrative. It has (1) a recommended mean of 2.85 to 3.1 on a 4.3
scale in first-year courses and in upper-level courses with more than
thirty students, and (2) a recommended distribution for courses with
more than thirty students which provides that seven to seventeen per-
cent of grades are expected to be a C+ or a C and zero to thirteen
percent of grades are expected to be from C- down to F.60
Fourth-tier schools—those ranked below 145th in U.S. News—op-
erate differently from most first-tier institutions. These schools award
large numbers of C grades. Indeed, their grade normalization policies
often require or strongly encourage it. Whittier Law School is a good
example. In first-year, doctrinal classes, Whittier’s grade normaliza-
tion policy mandates that at least seventy percent of grades be in the C
57. Grading Policy, UNIV. OF TEX. AUSTIN SCH. OF LAW, http://www.utexas.edu/law/
sao/academics/gradingpolicy.html (last visited Feb. 20, 2013) (also providing that the tar-
get mean is 3.3).
58. In the fourteen Fall 2011 seminars, there was only a single grade below B—a C+.
See UNIV. OF TEX. SCH. OF LAW, DISTRIBUTION OF GRADES FOR FALL 2011 (2011), available at
http://www.utexas.edu/law/sao/academics/distributions/119seminardist.pdf.
59. THE UNIV. OF IOWA COLL. OF LAW, STUDENT HANDBOOK 2006–2007, at 22–23
(2006–2007), available at http://www.law.uiowa.edu/documents/2006-07_handbook_web-
final.pdf; see also id. at 9–10 (“To be eligible for a J.D. degree, a student must: . . . Achieve a
cumulative GPA of 2.0.”); Grading, FORDHAM UNIV. SCH. LAW, http://law.fordham.edu/
adjunct/21621.htm (last visited Feb. 20, 2013) (explaining that “3 to 10 percent must re-
ceive a grade of C- to C+”) (this policy is mandatory in first year courses and recommended
in upper level courses, but “the school has a policy that the curve is followed absent an
exceptional reason for [not] doing so”); J.D. Program Grading System, FORDHAM UNIV. SCH.
OF LAW, http://law.fordham.edu/career-planning/1416.htm (last visited Feb. 20, 2013 (B
= “Very good, the standard expected of the majority of students.” C = “Good.” D = “Per-
formance at a level that if consistently repeated would be insufficient to advance”).
60. Law School Rules: Grading Rules for 2005 and Later Matriculants, UNIV. OF WIS. LAW
SCH. 2.07–2.08, http://law.wisc.edu/current/rules/chap2.htm (last visited Feb. 20, 2013);
see also id. at rule 2.05 (The “Conversion Scale for Intra-University Use” is as follows: A+, A,
A-, and B+ in the law school equal an A elsewhere in the university. B and B- = AB. C+ and
C = B. C- and D+ = BC. And D = C.).
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range or below.61 In upper-level, doctrinal courses with more than
twenty students, at least sixty percent must be C grades or lower.62
And the actual number of C, D, and F grades awarded by Whittier
professors is often well above these percentages.63 St. Thomas Univer-
sity in Florida operates under similar parameters. That school employs
a mandatory mean of 2.25 to 2.5 in first-year, doctrinal courses.64 2.5 is
considered a C+ under St. Thomas’s grading scale.65 Thus, the aver-
age grade may be no higher than a C+. Under such a system, a major-
ity of the grades awarded will almost always fall below B-. For example,
in the fall of 2009, twenty-eight percent of grades in first-year, doctri-
nal courses were in the A or B range, sixty-eight percent were in the C
range, and seventy-two percent were in the C range or below.66 In
required upper-level courses, the mean range is broader—2.25 to
2.75.67 However, in all required courses at St. Thomas, at least fifteen
percent of grades must be a C- or lower.68 Finally, under Northern
Kentucky University’s recommended curve, thirty to sixty percent of
grades in most required courses should be either a C+ or a C.69 In
addition, between sixteen and thirty-five percent should be a C- or
below in Torts, Contracts, Property, and Civil Procedure, and between
61. WHITTIER LAW SCH., LAW SCHOOL POLICIES 2009–2010, (2009–2010), at B10, avail-
able at http://www.law.whittier.edu/pdfs/cstudents/Whittier-Law-School-Policies-2009-
2010.pdf.
62. Id. Whittier also has a mandatory mean of roughly 2.5 to 2.75 in first-year, doctri-
nal courses and roughly 2.5 to 2.875 in upper-level classes other than seminars. Id. at
B11–B12. It should be noted that Whittier uses a somewhat unique grade scale under
which 2.9 is considered a C grade. Id. at B5.
63. See, e.g., Grade Distribution Report – Fall 2010, WHITTIER LAW SCH., http://www.law.
whittier.edu/resources/pdfs/registrar-Grade_distribution_201090.pdf (last visited Feb. 20,
2013) (for example, in the first section of Civil Procedure 1, over 80% of the grades were
in the C range or below).
64. ST. THOMAS UNIV. SCH. OF LAW, 2011–2012 CATALOG 52 (2011–2012), available at
https://www.stu.edu/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=nRKTJKIUVpo=&tabid=1168.
65. Id. at 51.
66. Grade Distribution Report, ST. THOMAS UNIV. SCH. OF LAW, (on file with author).
Note that these grade distributions reflect St. Thomas’s prior grading policy, which was
slightly less generous than the current system. See E-mail from Professor Dennis S. Corgill,
Associate Professor of Law, St. Thomas University School of Law, to Author (Apr. 17, 2012,
8:12 EST) (on file with author).
67. ST. THOMAS UNIV. SCH. OF LAW, supra note 64, at 52.
68. Id. In electives, the mean range is 2.25 to 2.75, and in legal writing, seminars,
clinics, and skills classes, there is no required mean. Id.
69. SALMON P. CHASE COLL. OF LAW, N. KY. UNIV., STUDENT HANDBOOK – SECTION XIII.
GRADES AND GRADING POLICIES 5, available at http://chaselaw.nku.edu/documents/stu-
dent_affairs/Student_Handbook/ch13.pdf.
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ten and forty percent should be a C- or below in most other required
courses.70
Not all fourth-tier institutions award a majority of grades at the C
and D levels. For example, at South Texas College of Law, sixteen to
thirty percent of grades must be a C+ or lower in first-year required
courses with forty or more students.71 But virtually every fourth-tier
law school gives a substantial number of marks below B-.72
Schools ranked in the third tier of U.S. News grade somewhat
more generously than their fourth-tier counterparts. But most of them
still award a large number of grades under B-. Cleveland State Univer-
sity is paradigmatic. It has a recommended curve that borders on
mandatory. In the “required core curriculum,” the curve has the fol-
lowing parameters: (1) eleven to fifteen percent of grades should be a
C+, with a target of thirteen percent; (2) ten to fourteen percent
should be a C, with a target of twelve percent; (3) three to seven per-
cent should be a C-, with a target of five percent; (4) two to ten per-
cent should be a D+, with a target of five percent; (5) two to eight
percent should be a D, with a target of five percent; and (6) zero to six
percent should be an F, with a target of three percent.73 Aggregating
the targets for these grades, forty-three percent of marks are supposed
to be below B-. Higher grades are permitted in upper-level classes, but
70. Id.
71. S. TEX. COLL. OF LAW, STUDENT HANDBOOK 2011–2012, at 84 (2011–2012), availa-
ble at http://www.stcl.edu/registrar/StudentHandbk2011-12revOct2011.pdf; see also Grade
Distribution Report – Fall of 2011, S. TEX. COLL. OF LAW, http://www.stcl.edu/registrar/
grade_distribution_201210.pdf (last visited Feb. 20, 2013) (C grades regularly awarded in
first-year and upper-level courses).
72. See, e.g., TOURO COLL. JACOB D. FUCHSBERG LAW CTR., STUDENT HANDBOOK
2011–2012, at 28 (2011–2012), available at http://www.tourolaw.edu/pdf/Student_ Hand-
book.pdf (mandatory mean in all required classes of 2.91 to 3.09, and “8% to 15% of all
grades for Required First Year Courses . . . initially submitted to the registrar shall consist
of grades of C- . . . or lower”; mandatory mean of 2.90 to 3.36 in all electives with thirty or
more students); THE JOHN MARSHALL LAW SCH., STUDENT HANDBOOK 2011–12, at 12
(2011–2012), available at http://www.jmls.edu/students/handbook/2011-2012-student-
handbook.pdf (In first-year, doctrinal courses, fifteen to twenty-five percent must receive a
C+, C, or C-, ten to twenty percent must receive a D or F, and there is a mandatory mean of
2.4 to 2.8; in most upper-level courses with thirty or more students, ten to twenty-five per-
cent must receive a C+, C, or C-, zero to ten percent must receive a D or F, and there is a
mandatory mean of 2.70 to 3.10.); MISS. COLL. SCH. OF LAW, supra note 38, at 26 (first-year,
doctrinal course have a required mean of 2.500-2.7999); THOMAS JEFFERSON SCH. OF LAW,
supra note 38, at 19–20 (starting in the fall of 2012, sixty percent of grades must be a 2.5 or
below on a 4.3 scale in first-year classes; in upper-level classes, twenty-eight percent of
grades must be 2.5 or below on a 4.3 scale).
73. CLEVELAND-MARSHALL COLL. OF LAW, CLEVELAND STATE UNIV., FACULTY MANUAL 45
(2011), available at https://www.law.csuohio.edu/sites/default/files/facultystaff/manuals/
facultymanual2011.pdf.
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the overall target for grades under B- is still twenty-six percent in those
courses.74 Washburn University has a recommended curve with a simi-
lar structure to Cleveland State’s, though its targets for grades below
B- are somewhat smaller.75 And numerous other third-tier schools op-
erate using grade normalization policies that require or recommend
the awarding of large numbers of C grades, particularly during the
first year.76
The University of Arkansas at Little Rock, where I teach, is in the
third-tier of U.S. News. We recently adopted a formal, grade normaliza-
74. Id. ((1) eight to fourteen percent range for C+, with a target of eleven percent;
(2) six to twelve percent range for C, with a target of nine percent; (3) zero to six percent
range for C-, with a target of two percent; (4) zero to seven percent range for D+, with a
target of two percent; (5) zero to seven percent range for D, with a target of two percent;
and (6) zero to five percent range for F with no target).
75. See Grading Guidelines for Average Grades and Grade Distribution, WASHBURN UNIV.
SCH. OF LAW, http://washburnlaw.edu/policies/gradingguidelines.php (last visited Feb.
20, 2013) (first-year, doctrinal courses: 2.70 to 2.90 mean range; C+ = 14% target, 9-19%
range; C = 11% target, 6-16% range; C- = 4% target, 1-7% range; D+ = 2% target, D = 2%
target, and F = 1% target, and together D+, D, and F have a combined range of 2-10%)
(upper-level courses: C+ = 11% target, 6-16% range; C = 10% target, 5-15% range; C- = 3%
target, D+ = 2% target, D = 1% target, and F = 0% target, and C-, D+, D, and F together
have a combined range of 0-10%); see also Grade Distribution, WASHBURN UNIV. SCH. OF LAW,
http://washburnlaw.edu/students/grades/ (the grade distribution reports establish that
Washburn faculty generally follow the recommended curves).
76. See, e.g., CHAPMAN UNIV. SCH. OF LAW, STUDENT HANDBOOK, at 4-12 to 4-13 (2012),
available at http://www.chapman.edu/law/_files/students/studenthandbook-fall2012-
ver16a.pdf. Chapman uses a 4.0 grade scale and awards number grades to the tenth of a
point: 2.3, 2.4, 2.5, and 2.6 are C+ grades and 2.7, 2.8, and 2.9 are B- grades. Id. at 4-12. In
first-year, required courses, there is mandatory maximum median of 2.8 and at least ten
percent of grades must be a 1.9 or below. Id. at 4-13. In all other courses, there is a
mandatory maximum median of 3.0, and in exam courses with twenty or more students,
twenty percent of the grades must be 2.4 (i.e., a C+) or lower. Id.; see also UNIV. OF S.C. SCH.
OF LAW, LAW STUDENT HANDBOOK § VIII(D)(2) (2011), available at http://law.sc.edu/regis-
trar/handbook/handbook.pdf (for first-year, doctrinal courses, there is a mandatory mean
of 2.7-3.0; in upper-level classes with more than twenty-five students, there is a recom-
mended mean—the average grade should fall within 0.25 of the class’s incoming mean
GPA); Office of Law Registrar and Academic Services, UNIV. OF S.C. SCH. OF LAW, http://law.sc.
edu/registrar/academic.shtml#class_rank_percentiles (last visited Feb. 20, 2013) (contain-
ing links for six years of grade distribution reports; the reports indicate that C grades are
regularly given). But see VILLANOVA UNIV. SCH. OF LAW, STUDENT HANDBOOK 2011–2012, at
10 (2011–2012), available at http://www.law.villanova.edu/Current%20Students/Policies
%20and%20Handbooks.aspx (Villanova is a third-tier institution that awards fewer grades
below B- than most others. For example, in exam classes with thirty or more students, there
is a recommended curve which provides that ten percent of grades should be a C+, five
percent should be a C, and zero to five percent should be a C- or below); Grade Distribu-
tions, VILLANOVA UNIV. SCH. OF LAW, http://www.law.villanova.edu/current%20students/
registrar/grade%20distributions.aspx (last visited Feb. 20, 2013) (containing twelve years
of grade distribution reports).
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tion policy that went into effect in the fall of 2011.77 Prior to that
semester, we had no such policy; grading was unregulated.78 Under
the old system, and before several years of inconsistent grade inflation
that lead to the adoption of the current policy,79 C marks were quite
common. To pick a representative school year, in the fall of 2004,
thirty-nine percent of grades awarded in first-year courses were in the
C range, with another four percent constituting D’s and F’s.80 If the
legal writing and legal research courses are removed, the number of
C+, C, and C- marks balloons to over forty-eight percent, with D’s and
F’s comprising another 4.5%. In upper-level classes, C-type grades
were just under twenty-seven percent of the total, with roughly one
percent being D’s and F’s. The following spring, over forty-seven per-
cent of grades in first-year, doctrinal courses were C+’s, C’s, or C-’s,
and almost twenty-three percent were in those ranges in upper-level
courses.
Second-tier schools seem to fall into two basic camps. Some oper-
ate using practices more comparable to first-tier schools. These insti-
tutions award a moderate number of grades below B-, generally
between ten and twenty percent. For example, at Arizona State Uni-
versity, in first-year courses and upper-level courses with twenty or
more students, eleven to nineteen percent of grades must be C+ or
below, with a target of fifteen percent.81 And the same numbers are
recommended in upper-level classes with fewer than twenty stu-
dents.82 Other second-tier schools grade like those in the third-tier,
77. See WILLIAM H. BOWEN SCH. OF LAW, supra note 44, at 1.
78. WILLIAM H. BOWEN SCH. OF LAW, UNIV. OF ARK. AT LITTLE ROCK, ACADEMIC RULES
11–12 (Nov. 9, 2009) (on file with author).
79. See Joshua M. Silverstein, In Defense of Mandatory Curves, 34 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L.
REV. 253, 259–62, 336 (2012).
80. This data is taken from the grade distribution report provided by our Associate
Dean and a spreadsheet created to analyze the data. Both documents are on file with the
author.
81. SANDRA DAY O’CONNOR SCH. OF LAW, ARIZ. STATE UNIV., STATEMENT OF STUDENT
POLICIES – ACADEMIC YEAR 2012–2013, at 31 (2012–2013), available at http://www.law.asu.
edu/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=wNxrp-WbgMo%3D&tabid=965.
82. Id.; see also Grading Policy, SEATTLE UNIV. SCH. OF LAW, http://www.law.seattleu.
edu/x1924.xml (last visited Oct. 24, 2012) (in first-year courses other than legal writing:
(1) five to fifteen percent of grades must be a C or below, with a target of ten percent; (2)
seventy to eighty percent must be a B or above, with a target of seventy-five percent; and
(3) five to twenty-five percent must be a B- or C+, with a target of fifteen percent) (the
same numbers are recommended in upper-level courses taught in multiple sections by
more than one professor in the same school year); Grades and Grade Averages, UNIV. OF
CINCINNATI COLL. OF LAW, http://www.law.uc.edu/current-students/register/general-grad-
ing-information/grades-and-grade-averages (last visited Feb. 20, 2013) (in all first-year
courses, five to ten percent of grades must be a C+, five to ten percent must be a C, and
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typically awarding more than twenty percent of marks in the C range
or lower. Seton Hall University is illustrative. That institution has a
mandatory curve that applies the following parameters to virtually all
required courses: (1) ten to twenty-five percent of grades must be C’s
and C-’s, (2) five to fifteen percent must be D+’s and below, and (3)
ten to twenty-five percent must be B-’s and C+’s. Under the mandatory
curve applicable in elective courses, ten to twenty-five percent of
grades must be a B- or C+ and ten to twenty-five percent must be a C
or below.83
Recall that Professors Downs and Levit’s findings demonstrate
that C grades are regularly awarded at American law schools.84 The
examples from each of the U.S. News tiers presented above explain
why: Grade normalization policies in legal education frequently re-
quire or encourage professors to award a substantial number of such
marks. Recall also that Professor Kaufman found that index score cor-
relates with grade level across law schools.85 The examples above help
to explain this point as well: Lower-ranked schools—i.e. those with
lower index scores—generally operate under grade normalization pol-
zero to five percent must be a C-; there is also a mandatory B+ median in upper-level
courses with twenty or more students and sectioned courses with fewer than twenty stu-
dents; the B+ median is recommended in courses with under twenty pupils that are not
sectioned).
83. Examinations, SETON HALL UNIV. SCH. OF LAW, http://law.shu.edu/Students/aca-
demics/examinations/Grading-Curves.cfm (last visited Feb. 20, 2013); see also WILLIAM S.
BOYD SCH. OF LAW, UNIV. OF NEV., LAS VEGAS, STUDENT POLICY HANDBOOK 2011–2012, at 25
(2011–2012), available at http://portal.law.unlv.edu/files/portal/Student%20Handbook.
11-12Rev1211.pdf (at least twenty percent of grades in classes with twenty or more students
must be a C+ or lower); Grade Curve, LOYOLA UNIV. CHI. SCH. OF LAW, http://www.luc.edu/
law/registrar/records_documents/grades.html (last visited Feb. 20, 2013) (all courses with
twenty-five or more students, except for certain skills classes, seminars, and clinics, must
meet the following curve: C+ = 10-25%; C = 5-20%, C- = 0-10%; D = 0-10%; F = 0-5%); Class
Rank & Grading Policy, BEASLEY SCH. OF LAW, TEMPLE UNIV., http://www.law.temple.edu/
Pages/Current_Students/Current_Class_Rank.aspx (last visited Feb. 20, 2013) (recom-
mended curve under which at least twenty percent of grades should be a C+ or below in all
exam courses and in the legal writing course); What’s What Student Handbook – Grading
System, Probation and Dismissal, LEWIS & CLARK LAW SCH., http://law.lclark.edu/academics/
whats_what/grading_system_probation_and_dismissal/ (last visited Feb. 20, 2013)
(mandatory maximum mean of 3.0 on a 4.3 scale in first-year courses and upper-level
courses with more than twenty students where the assessment is only “by means of an ex-
amination”); Academic Regulations, UNIV. OF KAN. SCH. OF LAW, http://www.law.ku.edu/reg-
ulations (last visited Feb. 20, 2013) (2.8 to 3.0 mandatory mean in first-year courses; 2.9 to
3.1 mandatory mean in upper-level, required courses; 2.8 to 3.4 mandatory mean in all
other courses).
84. See supra text accompanying notes 41–43.
85. See supra text accompanying notes 45–46.
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icies that mandate the awarding of far more C grades (and below)
than the policies used by their higher-ranked counterparts.
The information I have provided so far is anecdotal. To more
carefully confirm the findings of Professors Downs, Levit, and Kauf-
man, I gathered data on class rank and grade point average from
every law school that provided this information to NALP for the 2011
graduating class.86 I then compiled the data of all reporting schools by
U.S. News tier based on the 2011 law school rankings.87 Set forth below
is the average GPA necessary to achieve a class rank at the seventy-
fifth, fiftieth, and twenty-fifth percentiles in each of the four U.S. News
tiers, as well as the figures for all reporting schools:
75th 50th 25th
First Tier 3.49 3.28 3.03
Second Tier 3.40 3.17 2.96
Third Tier 3.34 3.06 2.83
Fourth Tier 3.20 2.91 2.66
All 3.35 3.09 2.84
This data establishes that law schools award far more grades in
the C range and below than other graduate institutions, consistent
with the results of Professors Downs and Levit’s study.88 Indeed, the
median grade point average for all law schools (3.09) is only slightly
higher than the good standing GPA in most other graduate programs
(3.0); and the median at fourth-tier institutions (2.91) is under that
86. All data was collected from THE NAT’L ASS’N OF LAW PLACEMENT, 2012–2013 DI-
RECTORY OF LAW SCH., supra note 39.
87. I used the rankings released in March of 2011 which technically are the “2012”
rankings.
88. A few additional notes about the NALP data: First, it is not comprehensive. Not all
law schools are members of NALP. In addition, some NALP members reported no class
rank or grade point average data. Finally, some NALP members only reported selected
data—for example, the fiftieth percentile but not the seventy-fifth or twenty-fifth. However,
more than half of the schools in the second, third, and fourth tiers reported all three
figures. For the first tier, thirteen reported all three, nine reported two, and six reported
one. Twenty-three reported no data. And two reported data that could not be converted to
a four-point scale.
Second, as I just implied, not all reporting schools use a four-point scale. For schools
using a 100-point scale, I generally was able to convert the data to a 4.0 system. However,
some schools use a unique type of 100-point scale that made such conversion impossible
without the danger of distortion. Likewise, a small group of schools use entirely different
scales—e.g., a twelve point scale. I did not include institutions from the latter two groups in
the compiled data.
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level.89 Even first- and second-tier institutions award much lower
marks than other graduate schools: Nearly a quarter of students at
first-tier law schools have a GPA beneath 3.0 and more than a quarter
of second-tier students do.
The data is also consistent with Professor Kaufman’s findings.
There is an approximately linear decrease in grades as one moves
from the first tier down to the fourth tier. Note further that the num-
bers likely understate the disparity between first-tier and other schools
because a disproportionate number of institutions ranked in the top
thirty of U.S. News do not report class rank statistics to NALP.
While grading practices in legal education remain anomalous, a
recent trend has brought some law schools closer to the approach of
other graduate programs. Faced with changing conditions in the legal
employment market since the financial crisis,90 many institutions have
inflated grades in the hope of improving the placement prospects of
their students.91 For example, New York University raised its curve in
the fall of 2008 so that the marks it awards “more accurately represent
the achievements of our students to the outside world.”92 A faculty
committee there “concluded that the [old] curve appears to be some-
what out of line with our peer schools, and expressed concern that an
unintended effect could be that it systematically disadvantages our stu-
89. See supra notes 7–8 and accompanying text (good standing GPA at most other
graduate institutions is 3.0).
90. See David C. Yamada, Therapeutic Jurisprudence and the Practice of Legal Scholarship, 41
U. MEM. L. REV. 121, 153 (2010) (“The severe recession marked by the Fall 2008 stock
market meltdown continues to wreak havoc on the employment opportunities of today’s
law students and may well have triggered systemic changes in the legal profession, which in
turn will impact the economic viability of many law schools.”); Daniel Thies, Rethinking
Legal Education in Hard Times: The Recession, Practical Legal Education, and the New Job Market,
59 J. LEGAL ED. 598, 599–608 (2010) (explaining the changes in the market for legal
services).
91. See Rampell, supra note 5 (“In the last two years, at least 10 law schools have delib-
erately changed their grading systems to make them more lenient. . . . Law schools seem to
view higher grades as one way to rescue their students from the tough economic climate.”);
L.J. Jackson, Is My School Next? Examining the Growing Trend of Law School Grade Reform, STU-
DENT LAW, April 2011, at 31 (noting growing trend among law schools to “do away with
letter grades altogether” or “bump up GPAs and institute more lenient grading”). The
recent trend is reflective of a longer pattern. Schools have been raising grades to help
students with placement—often by attempting to match the grades of peer institutions—
since at least the mid-1990s. See Downs & Levit, supra note 42, at 844 (noting that, in re-
sponse to a 1996 survey, several schools stated that they a adopted mandatory curve in
order to (1) raise the mean GPA to the level of peer schools, or (2) “inflate grades to meet
prevailing market norms”).
92. Memorandum from Liam Murphy, NYU Law School on Grade Reform (on file
with author).
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dents applying for clerkships and some other jobs.”93 Similarly, the
University of Southern California (“USC”) raised its mean grade in
first-year courses from 3.2 to 3.3 (1) to match other schools, some of
which had also recently elevated grades, and (2) because of the diffi-
cult job market law students face today.94 Perhaps most notoriously,
Loyola of Los Angeles both prospectively and retroactively raised its
grades because the “information conveyed [to employers] by the old
grading curve did not accurately convey the high quality of [their]
students.”95 After concluding that its marks in first-year courses were
lower than most other accredited, California law schools, Loyola be-
came concerned that, “[w]ithout adjusting our curve, we send an inac-
curate message to employers about the comparative quality of our
students and put them at an unfair competitive disadvantage.”96
Highly-ranked schools like NYU and USC, which are in the first
tier of U.S. News, have received most of the publicity resulting from
law school grade inflation. But the adoption of higher marks is not
restricted to such institutions. Schools at every level have raised
93. Memorandum from Richard Revesz, NYU Law School regarding Grade Curve
(Oct. 17, 2008) (on file with author), available at http://abovethelaw.com/2008/10/nyu-
law-grade-reform-another-law-school-loses-its-fastball/#more-9544 (last visited Feb. 20,
2013).
94. See Elie Mystal, Grade Reform at USC Gould School of Law: Here is a Free .1, ABOVE THE
LAW (Dec. 1 2008), http://abovethelaw.com/2008/12/grade-reform-at-usc-gould-school-
of-law-heres-a-free-1/ (last visited Feb. 20, 2013) (containing an excerpt of an internal
memo outlining the reasons for raising the mean); Deborah Cassens Weiss, USC Law School
Considers Boosting Average Grade to B-Plus, ABA JOURNAL (Dec. 3 2008), http://www.
abajournal.com/news/article/usc_law_school_considers_0.1_boost_to_grade_curve/ (last
visited Feb. 20, 2013) (discussing USC’s proposal to raise the mean grade at the school
from 3.2 to 3.3); List of Law School GPA Curves, WIKIPEDIA, supra note 49 (indicating that
USC in fact raised the mean to 3.3); The University of Southern California School of Law
(Gould), TOP-LAW-SCHOOLS.COM, http://www.top-law-schools.com/usc-school-of-law.html
(last visited Feb. 20, 2013) (same).
95. Elie Mystal, Loyola Law School (L.A.) Retroactively Inflates Grades, ABOVE THE LAW,
http://abovethelaw.com/2010/03/loyola-law-school-la-retroactively-inflates-grades/ (last
visited Feb. 20, 2013) (the quotation is from a statement by Dean Victor J. Gold, Loyola
Law School of Los Angeles, excerpted in Mystal’s posting). Under the change, every grade
on a then-current student’s transcript was raised by one third (e.g., B up to B+). Id.
96. Id. (the quotation is from a statement by Dean Victor J. Gold, Loyola Law School
of Los Angeles, excerpted in Mystal’s posting; the statement further explains that “many
other schools already have moved their curves higher than ours to give students an advan-
tage in this difficult job market”). The retroactive element of Loyola’s change was some-
what famously parodied by The Colbert Report. See I’s on Edjukashun – Loyola, Texas
Textbooks & Wal-Mart, COMEDY PARTNERS, http://www.colbertnation.com/the-colbert-re-
port-videos/340896/july-06-2010/i-s-on-edjukashun—-loyola—texas-textbooks—-wal-mart
(last visited Feb. 20, 2013).
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grades.97 The change at the University of Missouri, a second-tier
school, is particularly noteworthy. When Missouri amended its grad-
ing policy in 2007 to shift the expected median grade from 77.5 to
83.5 in first-year courses and from 79 to 84 in required, upper-level
courses, it explained that the “New Grading Scale has more of a ‘Grad-
uate School’ feel to it.”98 I contend that all American law schools
should follow in Missouri’s footsteps and attempt to replicate a “grad-
uate school feel.” Many first-tier law schools have done so already. It is
time for the rest of us to join them.99
97. See, e.g., Grading, UNIV. OF ALA. SCH. OF LAW, http://www.law.ua.edu/academics/
curriculum/grading/ (last visited Feb. 20, 2013) (in the spring of 2010 and earlier, Ala-
bama, a first tier school, had a recommended curve in the first-year under which at least
22.5 percent of grades were expected to fall below B-; starting in the fall of 2010, however,
Alabama adopted a mandatory mean in first-year courses of 3.2 with a recommended grade
distribution providing that roughly fifteen percent of grades should fall below B-); BEASLEY
SCHOOL OF LAW, TEMPLE UNIV., supra note 83 (Beasley, a second tier school, raised the
recommended target mean from 2.85 in exam courses to 3.05, effective January 1, 2009);
DEPAUL UNIV. COLL. OF LAW, 2011–2012 STUDENT HANDBOOK § 7.2 (2011–2012), available
at http://www.law.depaul.edu/students/pdf/student_handbook.pdf (at DePaul, a second
tier school, in first-year and required classes with fifty or more students, twenty to thirty
percent of grades must be B- and C+ and ten to fifteen percent must be a C or below;
under the old system, on file with the author, twenty to twenty-five percent of grades had to
be C+ and fifteen to twenty percent had to be a C below); STETSON UNIV. COLL. OF LAW,
GRADE NORMALIZATION POLICY (2009), available at http://justice.law.stetson.edu/policies/
GradeNormalization.pdf (last visited Feb. 20, 2013) (at Stetson, a third tier school, there is
a mandatory mean of 2.90 to 3.10 in most course; in classes with twenty or fewer students
and in skills and paper classes, the mandatory mean is 2.90 to 3.35); STETSON UNIV. COLL.
OF LAW, GRADE NORMALIZATION POLICY (2004), available at http://justice.law.stetson.edu/
policies/GradeNormalization.pdf (last visited Feb. 20, 2013) (in first-year courses, the
mandatory mean was 2.70 to 2.90; in doctrinal, upper-level courses, the mandatory mean
was 2.90 to 3.10; and in seminar and skills classes, the mandatory mean was 2.90 to 3.25); S.
TEX. COLL. OF LAW, supra note 71, at 84 (at South Texas, a fourth tier school, in first-year,
required courses with forty or more students, sixteen to thirty percent of grades must be
C+ or below and the class average must be between 2.85 and 3.15; prior to the fall of 2011,
the mandatory mean range was 2.50 to 2.80). But see THOMAS JEFFERSON SCH. OF LAW, supra
note 38, at 19–20 (sixty percent of grades must be a 2.5 or below on a 4.3 scale in first-year
classes; under the system in effect through the spring of 2012, only forty percent of grades
had to be a 2.5 or below).
98. UNIV. OF MO. SCH. OF LAW, A WORD OF EXPLANATION ABOUT THE LAW SCH. GRAD-
ING SCALE (2007), available at http://www.law.missouri.edu/students/pdf/gradingscale.pdf
(last visited Feb. 20, 2013) (further explaining that the new grading policy was intended to
make the median grade look like a “mid-B” rather than a “C”).
99. It is not entirely clear why law schools grade differently from the rest of the acad-
emy. One possible explanation is our history of flunking out large numbers of students.
Early on, most law schools had relatively open admissions. Screening for competency oc-
curred during the first year, with up to a third of students suffering academic dismissal. See
Martin H. Belsky, Law Schools as Legal Education Centers, 34 U. TOL. L. REV. 1, 4 (2002);
Edward J. Littlejohn & Leonard S. Rubinowitz, Black Enrollment in Law Schools: Forward to the
Past?, 12 T. MARSHALL L. REV. 415, 426 & n.55 (1987); Parham Williams, Comments from a
Former Dean, 74 MISS. L.J. xi, xviii–xix (2004). Under such a system, lower grades are useful.
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II. Substantially Eliminating C Grades Via a B- Good
Standing GPA
My recommendation is that every law school set its good standing
GPA at the B- level. On a 4.33, 4.3, or 4.0 scale, that level is generally
2.7 or 2.67, though it can be as low as 2.5 and as high as 3.0. On a 100-
point scale, a B- is typically equated with eighty-two, but it often ap-
plies to a range from eighty to eighty-three. To be precise, I believe
that the good standing GPA in legal education should be 2.7 at institu-
tions that employ a four-point system and eighty-two at institutions
that use a 100-point system.
When B- is the good standing line, C grades constitute unaccept-
able or unsatisfactory performance. Students should still get credit for
courses in which they earn a C, as they typically do now if they receive
a D; but C’s ought to be used only to denote performance that fails to
satisfy minimum competency. Additionally, D grades should either be
eliminated entirely or treated the same as F’s.
Setting the good standing GPA at B- will substantially eliminate C
grades in legal education. Under such a system, C’s can lead to aca-
demic dismissal the way D’s currently do at most schools. Therefore,
law professors will probably award C’s about as often as they currently
award D grades. In other graduate programs with a high good stand-
ing GPA, C grades are exceptionally rare.100 There is no reason to
believe that law schools will operate differently, particularly since our
accreditation standards forbid us from admitting “applicants who do
not appear capable of satisfactorily completing” our educational
programs.101
For example, it is probably easier to explain academic dismissals to law school constituen-
cies when a dismissed student earned C’s, D’s, and F’s than it would be if the student
earned B’s and C’s. With the development of the Law School Admissions Test and soaring
applications, law schools adopted selective admissions practices designed to screen out can-
didates who would not be successful. See Williams at xix. The change in admissions ap-
proach was also driven by a reexamination of the ethics of flunking out so many students.
Indeed, the accreditation standards currently state that a “law school shall not admit appli-
cants who do not appear capable of satisfactorily completing its educational program and
being admitted to the bar.” ABA STANDARDS AND RULES OF PROCEDURE FOR APPROVAL OF
LAW SCHOOLS standard 501(b) [hereinafter ABA STDS.], available at http://www.ameri-
canbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/legaled/standards/20082009StandardsWebCon-
tent/Chapter_5.authcheckdam.pdf. Perhaps the lower grades awarded in legal education
are simply a holdover from the era of open admissions and high attrition. Cf. Barbara
Glesner Fines, Competition and the Curve, 65 UMKC L. REV. 879, 891 (1997) (observing that
some law faculties may still be “operating in the ‘look to your left, look to your right’ days
of open admissions and high attrition”).
100. See supra text accompany notes 25–27.
101. ABA STDS., supra note 99, standard 501(b).
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Most colleges of law use some type of grade normalization to reg-
ulate grades.102 While I am a staunch proponent of this practice,103
my proposal here is conceptually distinct from normalization and
rests on somewhat different justifications.104 Grade normalization is
concerned with equalizing and standardizing the pot of grade wealth
that each teacher allocates to his or her students at a particular
school.105 Grade inflation and deflation are concerned with the size of
the pot of grade wealth the instructors are given. To illustrate, grade
normalization is about whether to have a policy like a mandatory
mean. Grade inflation and deflation are about where to set such a
mean—for example, at 2.5, 3.0, or 3.3. This Article advocates for in-
creasing the size of the grade-wealth pot that professors distribute, not
for equalization or standardization among teachers.
To be sure, one of my justifications for raising grades is fairness
across law schools (as opposed to fairness among teachers at a specific
institution). I argue below that schools that award lower grades disad-
vantage their students in the labor market.106 And if most institutions
eliminate C grades, it will likely produce a significant homogenizing
of grading in legal education. Thus, I am advocating for increased
grade equalization across institutions; but I am offering no argument
here that individual law schools should adopt some form of normaliza-
tion. I believe each school should set its good standing GPA at the B-
level regardless of whether it has a mandatory curve, a mandatory
mean, or no grade normalization at all.
To explain this point another way, there is a difference between
advocating for a mandatory 3.3 mean and advocating for a 2.7 good
standing GPA. I support the former. And in a previous article, I set
forth in detail what a grading system that contains both a 3.3 mean
and a 2.7 good standing GPA should look like.107 In this piece, how-
ever, I am arguing only for the latter—for the B- good standing level.
Of course, in practice, because the top grade at most law schools
is worth either 4.0 or 4.3, a 2.7 good standing GPA will likely lead to
102. See Silverstein, supra note 79, at 305 & n.206.
103. See id. at 253–336.
104. See Downs & Levit, supra note 41, at 854 (“Suggesting that grades fall within cer-
tain ranges [(grade normalization)] is an entirely different matter than suggesting that
higher grades be given [(grade inflation)].”).
105. In this paragraph, I am using “equalization” principally to refer to mandatory and
recommended means and “standardization” principally to refer to mandatory and recom-
mended distributions, curves, and standard deviations. Throughout the rest of the article, I
use these terms in a more generic sense.
106. See infra Part III.A.
107. See Silverstein, supra note 79, at 332–35.
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an average grade in the 3.3 to 3.4 range, regardless of whether a given
school has a normalization policy. This type of inter-school consis-
tency is something I am hoping will result from the adoption of a B-
good standing level, as I explained two paragraphs above.108 But that
is not the only basis for my 2.7 proposal. Since the median GPA at all
American law schools according to NALP data is about 3.09,109 the
implementation of my proposal will both substantially eliminate C
marks and raise the mean grade at the vast majority of institutions. I
maintain that these changes are worth accomplishing independent of
any equalizing of grades across schools because of the psychological
benefits they will have for students.110
III. Arguments in Support of Substantially Eliminating C
Grades
There are two principal reasons that law schools should set their
good standing GPAs at 2.7. First, low grades lead to unfairness in the
placement market. Second, C grades cause students to suffer unneces-
sary psychological harm. Part III explains these points in detail.
A. Substantially Eliminating C Grades Will Improve the Fairness of
the Job Market
As noted above, substantially eliminating C grades by raising the
good standing GPA to B- will result in considerable grade inflation in
legal education. Moreover, it will likely lead to increased standardiza-
tion of mean grades among law schools. This standardization will criti-
cally improve the fairness of the labor market for new attorneys
because employers often consider the absolute grade levels of job can-
didates in making hiring decisions. Obtaining a position after gradua-
tion is the primary reason people attend law school. Accordingly,
greater labor market fairness is a compelling reason to substantially
eliminate C grades.
108. See Deborah Waire Post, Power and the Morality of Grading–A Case Study and a Few
Critical Thoughts on Grade Normalization, 65 UMKC L. REV. 777, 786 (1997) (explaining that
“[s]tudents are proposing that in the absence of any mechanism for collective control, law
schools in the same market should act voluntarily to ensure uniformity of grading
practices”).
109. See supra text accompanying notes 88–89.
110. See infra Part III.B. This explains why a 3.3 mean, alone, is neither necessary nor
sufficient to bring about my desired results. If all schools adopted such a mean, there
would be equalization across institutions, but schools could still award C grades for satisfac-
tory work. I want C grades to be used only for performance that falls below minimum
competency. A 3.3 mean, alone, will not ensure this result.
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Grades play a central role in the legal employment market. First,
they determine a student’s class rank, which is perhaps the most im-
portant metric used to screen job applicants.111 Second, employers
consider absolute GPA. For example, many private and public employ-
ers list a minimum GPA in their job postings.112 Based on a brief sur-
vey of the resources available through my school’s placement office, I
found multiple job postings from (1) law firms, (2) federal agencies,
(3) state agencies, (4) local agencies, (5) and non-profit organiza-
tions, that require applicants to have achieved a certain GPA—typi-
cally 3.0, though sometimes higher.113 The evidence does suggest that
class rank is more important than GPA per se, but there is little doubt
that the latter plays a significant role in hiring.114 This should not be
surprising given that the belief that grades are an objective measure of
absolute performance is deeply embedded in our society.115 At the
very least, the view that absolute grade levels matter to employers is
common among faculty and administrators. As noted above, multiple
law schools have raised grades recently for the express purpose of
helping their students in the job market.116 Implementing such a
111. See Douglas A. Henderson, Uncivil Procedure: Ranking Law Students Among Their
Peers, 27 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 399, 405 (1994) (“Empirical research confirms that employ-
ers do use class rank to select students: the firms studied consistently used ranking as the
key indicator of law school success.” (citing Emily Cambell & Alan J. Tomkins, Gender, Race,
Grades, and Law Review Membership as Factors in Law Firm Hiring Decisions: An Empirical Study,
18 J. CONTEMP. L. 211, 235 (1992)); Fines, supra note 99, at 886 (observing that most pres-
tigious employers screen applications using class rank).
112. See Jeffrey Evans Stake, Making the Grade: Some Principles of Comparative Grading, 52
J. LEGAL EDUC. 583, 584 (2002) (“Many of the most prestigious and high-paying firms limit
their hiring to students above a specified grade point average or class rank.”).
113. All materials are on file with the author. See also Ashley Marchand, A California
Law School Will Raise All Students’ Grades, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC. (Apr. 1, 2010), available at
http://chronicle.com/article/A-California-Law-School-Will/64949/ (“‘There are employ-
ers that have GPA cutoffs,’ [Professor Stuart Rojstaczer] said, ‘and by inflating grades, you
increase the number of students who meet those GPA cutoffs.’”); id. (“Although employers
often gauge law students’ academic achievements based on their class rank, [Dean Victor J.
Gold of Loyola Law School of Los Angeles] said, some governmental agencies will not
consider hiring students with less than a B average.”).
114. See Heather S. Woodson, Evaluation in Hiring, 65 UMKC L. REV. 931, 931–32
(1997) (“Most lawyers to whom I spoke [with during a survey of Kansas City law firms of
varying sizes] said they look at class rank rather than grade point average as a barometer of
academic achievement.”); Daniel Keating, Ten Myths About Law School Grading, 76 WASH. U.
L.Q. 171, 179 (1998) (observing, based on conversations with employers and career service
professionals, that while most employers only give weight to class rank, “some employers do
attach significance to the grade average number for its own sake,” particularly employers
beyond the large law firms).
115. See infra notes 254–255 and accompanying text; see also infra Part IV.A. (criticizing
the belief that grades objectively measure absolute performance ).
116. See supra notes 90–99 and accompanying text.
Winter 2013] A CASE FOR GRADE INFLATION 515
change only makes sense if one believes that lower absolute grades
disadvantage students in the eyes of prospective employers.117 Moreo-
ver, I suspect that law students almost universally hold the view that
absolute GPA matters in hiring.118 Finally, note that many schools do
not publish or even calculate class rank. In particular, sixty institutions
did not report class rank statistics to NALP for 2011.119 This elevates
the importance of absolute grade levels when hiring officials evaluate
job candidates from these schools because rank cannot be used as a
screening device.
The consideration of absolute GPA in placement decisions leads
to unfairness in the employment market. Law schools grade in differ-
ent ways. And students at schools with lower mean grades compete for
positions with students from institutions that award higher marks. Job
candidates in these two groups often have identical class ranks, but
dramatically different grade point averages. For example, assume that
Student X attends Law School B. The mean grade there is 3.2. X is
ranked at the seventy-fifth percentile and has a 3.5 GPA. Student Y
attends Law School C. That school is substantially identical to B in all
respects save one: The mean grade at C is 2.8. Y is also ranked at the
117. See Keating, supra note 114, at 178–79 (“The fact that some employers buy into the
non-relativity myth [—the myth that grades convey absolute rather than relative mean-
ing—] helps explain why there has been such a trend toward grade inflation in law schools
nationally.”).
118. See Post, supra note 108, at 786 (“Students at regional law schools are aware of
competition not only with their classmates but also with the students from other schools.
Grades, they have divined, play a large part in the competitive process.”); id. at 798 (“The
students [at Touro Law School] cited the competition among students from regional
schools for a rapidly declining number of jobs [in seeking to raise grades at the school]. If
employers were comparing the grades of students from different schools, shouldn’t there
be some sort of normalization among schools or at least a conscious attempt at consis-
tency?”); Jackson, supra note 91, at 32 (quoting law student Graham Ryan of Louisiana
State University: “ ‘The old [grading] policy forced our students to compete for law firm
clerkships, government employment, and alternative career opportunities against students
from competitor schools with much higher median GPAs,’ Ryan explains”); Rampell, supra
note 5 (“Students and faculty say they are merely trying to stay competitive with their peer
schools, which have more merciful grading curves. Loyola, for example, had a mean first-
year grade of 2.667; the norm for other accredited California schools is generally 3.0 or
higher. ‘That put our students at an unfair disadvantage, especially if you factor in the
current economic environment,’ say Samuel Liu, 26, president of the school’s Student Bar
Association.”); Posting of Wanda G. Hoover, Assistant Dean of External Relations, Univ. of
Ark. at Little Rock, William H. Bowen School of Law, to LAWFAC-L@UALR.EDU (June 22,
2010, 11:17 CST) (on file with author) (explaining that during exit interviews with gradu-
ating third-year students, many students complain that the grades at our law school are too
low).
119. See THE NAT’L ASS’N OF LAW PLACEMENT, 2012–2013 DIRECTORY OF LAW SCHOOLS,
supra note 39.
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seventy-fifth percentile, but has a GPA of only 3.1. If X and Y apply for
the same jobs, X will have a critical advantage to the extent employers
are concerned with absolute grade levels.120 This advantage is unfair
because it results from the fact that Law School B grades more gener-
ously than Law School C, and allocating placement opportunities
based on institutional grading philosophy rather than student merit
violates the norms of distributive justice.121
Many of my students have related stories to me that illustrate the
pertinence of the above hypothetical. Job interviewers regularly ask
them how their grades can be so low given their class rank. The inter-
viewers often expressly compare my students to those from other
schools where the same class rank is accompanied by a much higher
GPA. This is important evidence that employers are unfairly influ-
enced by absolute GPA when making comparative assessments about
applicants from institutions that grade differently.
The problematic role of absolute grade levels is aggravated when
one or both of the students competing for a position attend a school
that does not report class rank. Continuing with my illustration, sup-
pose that Law School B is one such institution. An employer might
mistakenly conclude that Student X has a much higher rank than Stu-
dent Y because X’s GPA is substantially better.122 This mistake is more
likely if Law School C also does not report rank. In these scenarios, an
employer might falsely believe both (1) that X’s higher absolute GPA
reflects superior achievement rather than a variation in the grading
philosophies of schools B and C, and (2) that X’s class rank is better
than Y’s. In short, when institutions inconsistently disclose class rank,
or do not disclose it at all, comparisons of students across schools be-
comes far more difficult, which causes further unfairness.123 As ex-
plained by Douglas Henderson, “[m]any employers may not be aware
120. See Fines, supra note 99, at 892–93 (“Moreover, in the intra-institutional competi-
tions for placement of our graduates, these strict graders have an impact. If the student
who graduates at the twenty-fifth percentile from hard grader’s school has only a 3.5 GPA,
one can surmise that she will be competitively disadvantaged over the student from a com-
peting school with the same rank in class but a higher GPA.”).
121. Cf. Silverstein, supra note 79, at 264 (“Thus, it is critical that grades reflect aca-
demic merit. Allowing faculty to award widely divergent marks based on their individual
grading philosophies unfairly substitutes grading approach for merit. Put more generally,
grade disparities caused by differences in teacher grading philosophy violate the norms of
distributive justice.” (emphasis added)); id. at 258–59 (explaining the concept of “grading
philosophy”).
122. See Henderson, supra note 111, at 423 (offering a similar example).
123. See id. (arguing that recruiters “cannot hope to compare [the] achievements [of
law students] accurately” when class rank is disclosed inconsistently).
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of, or may not have the time to take into account, the differences in
law school grading and ranking. The interschool differences in rank-
ing [thus] works [sic] inevitably to disadvantage some students.”124
The problem of unfair GPA comparisons across institutions is
also magnified when the law schools at issue do not have similar rank-
ings in U.S. News. Assume that Law School B is in the first or second
tier and Law School C is in the third or fourth tier. When students X
and Y embark on the job search now, prospective employers will likely
perceive X to be the superior candidate both because X has higher
grades and because X achieved those marks at a more prestigious insti-
tution.125 Faculty at third- and fourth-tier schools have limited control
over their schools’ U.S. News ranking. But we certainly can make
changes to eliminate the disadvantage our students face as a result of
the grading disparities between more and less prestigious schools.
Let me emphasize that my desire is for fairness in the job-market
competition among students from different schools. I am not recom-
mending that individual institutions raise their grades to obtain an
advantage over other law schools. That would simply reproduce the
type of unfairness that exists now.
Nor am I advocating that institutions elevate grades to meet the
GPA cutoffs that employers use. This would likely work only until em-
ployers realize grading practices have changed and amend their cutoff
lines. To put the point more broadly, there is a finite number of legal
jobs. Inflating grades is not going to change that number. What it will
do is standardize grades, making the allocation of the existing jobs
fairer. Professor Daniel Keating summarizes this idea well:
A more ‘defensive’ and less crude justification for grade inflation is
that it responds to a collective action problem: if lots of other
schools are inflating their grades, we had better follow suit or our
students will be relatively disadvantaged in a marketplace where
some employers attach weight to absolute grade letters or
numbers.126
124. Id.; see also Downs & Levit, supra note 41, at 842 (offering an example of two
students from separate schools in the same city that have different mean grades and are
competing for the same job) (“Will the recruiting employer take the time to learn the
comparative scales of measurement at the two schools?”).
125. This is definitely a concern of students. See Post, supra note 108, at 804 (explaining
that students at Touro Law School requested an increase in the curve there because they
saw inequality in “the ability of students from more established or more prestigious schools
to get jobs while they could not”).
126. Keating, supra note 114, at 179 n.5. A similar problem has been identified in the
undergraduate setting. See Rojstaczer & Healy, Grading in American Colleges and Universities,
supra note 46, at 1 (explaining that there is “so much variability in grading from one school
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There are five important counter-arguments one might press
against my contention that grade inflation will enhance the fairness of
the labor market. The first goes as follows: It does not matter that
some law schools award higher grades or fail to disclose class rank
because employers are aware of the grading practices used by differ-
ent schools. Recruiters keep track of the grading protocols at the insti-
tutions where they interview and consider them when judging
candidates from different law schools.127 As a result, the job market
already operates under fair conditions.128
There are two problems with this argument. First, as explained
above, some employers believe that absolute grade levels are impor-
tant. When they see students with equivalent class ranks and different
grade point averages, they often conclude that the student with the
higher GPA is more qualified. The problem with these employers is
not a lack of information about variations in law school grading prac-
tices. It is more fundamental: They wrongly believe that grades have
enough objective meaning across institutions to warrant concluding
that the student with the higher GPA is genuinely more qualified.129
Without grade standardization, this belief undercuts the fair distribu-
tion of employment opportunities.
Second, only a subset of employers have the resources and expe-
rience to properly assess grading practices among law schools when
class rank is not reported. “It is well known among those involved in
law firm hiring . . . that the great majority of big firms have adopted
sliding scales that set rule-of-thumb grade thresholds at each school
the firm selects from.”130 But smaller firms, government agencies, and
non-profit organizations are not similarly situated. They have fewer
resources to devote to recruiting and they interview, and review the
resumes of, far fewer job candidates. This prevents such employers
to the next and between various major areas of study” that employers and graduate schools
commonly make mistakes in evaluating applications for jobs and admission).
127. See Rampell, supra note 5 (“Some recruiters at law firms keep track of [grade pol-
icy] changes and consider them when interviewing, and some do not.”); Jackson, supra
note 91, at 31 (“[G]rading machinations aren’t lost on recruiters who often take a school’s
historical performance into account when assessing each new crop of candidates.”).
128. See Jackson, supra note 91, at 31 (“‘I don’t think the system can be ‘gamed’ to
somehow give an advantage or disadvantage to students based upon a particular grading
system, at least not from a recruiting standpoint,’ says James N. Bierman, Foley & Lardner
LLP partner and chair of the firm’s National Recruiting Committee.”).
129. For more on the non-objectivity of grades, see infra Part IV.A.
130. Richard Sander & Jane Yakowitz, The Secret of My Success: How Status, Prestige
and School Performance Shape Legal Careers 17 (July 29, 2010) (unpublished manu-
script), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1640058.
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from obtaining the comprehensive picture of law school assessment
practices that large firms receive.131 Even if law schools try to keep
prospective employers informed about current grading protocols—
something I strongly favor—the limits faced by most organizations are
likely too great when class rank is not reported. Small and govern-
ment employers are simply unable to keep sufficient track of grading
practices to ensure fairness in the job market.132
The second argument against my position is that grade inflation
will have no impact because employers will simply raise their hiring
standards in response. This criticism also has two problems. First, it
actually supports my contention that inflation will increase fairness.
Many institutions have already raised grades to enhance their stu-
dents’ competitiveness in the job market. If employers are adopting
more rigorous hiring standards to compensate for these changes, then
students at law schools that have not inflated are at an increasing dis-
advantage in the competition for employment. Second, this objection
is properly directed only at the strategy of inflating grades to meet
grade-point-average cutoffs. If all law schools raise their mean to 3.3, it
seems very likely that employers concerned with absolute grade level
will elevate their GPA limits to 3.5 or higher. This would nullify the
impact of grade inflation designed to satisfy employer GPA thresh-
olds. But it would have no impact on the utility of my recommenda-
tion. Remember, my argument is about fairness in the inter-school
competition for employment. I am not suggesting that raising grades
will somehow make substantially more American law students eligible
131. See Rampell, supra note 5 (“Smaller firms, however, may not have the resources to
research every school’s curve, and may see too few students from any given school to track
changes from year to year.”); Paul L. Caron, Law School as Lake Wobegone: The Gentleman’s C
Becomes the Gentleman’s B, TAXPROF BLOG (Feb. 27, 2008), http://taxprof.typepad.com/tax-
prof_blog/2008/02/law-school-as-l.html (comment noting that while large firms can keep
track of grading changes, mid-size and small firms may not have the resources to do so;
thus “these bottom 65% students look a lot worse compared with students with similar class
ranks from [other schools]”); Jackson, supra note 91, at 31 (“Large law firms are better able
than smaller firms to stay on top of law school grading trends.”); see also Downs & Levit,
supra note 41, at 842–43 (“But what about schools which do not release class rank? . . . Will
the initial impression of the GPA alone . . . leave the potential employer with the ineffable
sense that the UMW student has better grades?”). But see Sander & Yakowitz, supra note
130, at 32–33 (in this study, the authors found that the market corrects for some of the
grade variation between high- and low-ranked schools).
132. As implied in the text, I have no sympathy for any institution that raises grades in
a “stealth” manner to try and deceive employers and provide its students a temporary edge
in the labor market. When I proposed inflating grades at my law school, I also recom-
mended that we place a summary of the new grade policy on every student’s transcript and
post the full policy in a prominent location on our website. See Silverstein, supra note 79, at
335.
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for—or able to obtain—jobs. I am only asserting that grade inflation
and the resulting standardization will make the distribution of jobs
amongst our students more just.
The third criticism of my proposal is that it will increase the im-
portance of class rank in the assessment of job applicants.133 To elabo-
rate, grade inflation causes grade “compression”—the concentration
of marks into the high end of the grading scale. This can limit the
usefulness of absolute grades as a tool for distinguishing among stu-
dents.134 Employers will thus shift their focus from absolute grade
level to class rank in making hiring decisions. But assuming this to be
true, any such change would be a welcome development. Class rank is
much more difficult to manipulate than absolute grades. It is not hard
for a law school to structure its grading policy so that every student has
a GPA in the A range. But it is a mathematical certainly that no more
than ten percent of the students in a class will rank in the top ten
percent of that class (unless there are ties). As such, class rank is a
more valuable tool for assessing candidates than GPA, and any in-
crease in the importance of class rank vis-a`-vis GPA would constitute
an improvement in job-market fairness.135
The fourth counter-argument is that my proposal could lead to
grade inflation spiraling out of control. Some commentators have ob-
served that the recent moves to increase grades
can create a vicious cycle like that seen in chief executive pay: if
every school in the bottom half of the distribution raises its marks
to enter the top half of the distribution, or even just to become
average, the average creeps up. This puts pressure on schools to
keep raising their grades further.136
In other words, rather than improving labor market fairness, my pro-
posal will lead to a never-ending competition among law schools as
they elevate grades to obtain a strategic advantage in the placement
arena. This is not a significant concern.
The danger of spiraling grade inflation would be considerable if I
were proposing that individual law schools try to get an edge over
their peers by awarding higher marks. But that is not what I am advo-
133. See Rampell, supra note 5 (“Employers say they also press law schools for
rankings.”).
134. For more on grade compression, see infra Part IV.B.
135. It should be noted that a greater emphasis on class rank might lead to more com-
petition between students, which could inhibit learning. See Silverstein, supra note 79, at
296–97; id. at 299 & n.178.
136. Rampell, supra note 5; accord Stake, supra note 112, at 615 (“With time, there is
pressure on other schools to inflate their grades so that their graduates have a fair shot in
the competitive education and employment markets. Thus, grade inflation spirals.”).
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cating. Instead, my recommendation is that all law schools adopt the
same good standing GPA—2.7 or B-. I am pushing for uniformity at the
good standing level in legal education. And this uniformity should in-
crease grading standardization more generally—i.e., it should pro-
mote consistency in mean grades across schools.
Of course, some colleges of law might seek to maintain their fa-
vored position by raising grades still further. Thus, grade inflation
could continue. But there are practical limits. To illustrate, assume
that all second-, third-, and fourth-tier schools follow my recommen-
dation and adopt grading practices that are largely consistent with
first-tier institutions. Assume further that some first-tier universities
desire to maintain the strategic advantage that comes from awarding
better marks. Such schools cannot go much higher at this point. The
median GPA in the first tier is already at least 3.3. On a 4.0 or even a
4.3 scale, this number cannot be raised significantly without causing
problematic grade compression. Could such schools inflate anyway,
ignoring any compression issues? Alternatively, could they combine
grade inflation with an expanded grading scale, setting the top mark
at 4.5 or even 5.0 to avoid the compression? Yes, these moves are pos-
sible. But frankly, I doubt first-tier law schools would adopt either one.
After all, our first-tier colleagues are just as concerned with fair grad-
ing as the rest of us. Moreover, even if I am wrong, the mere fact that
some institutions might try to keep their unfair competitive advantage
is no reason for the rest of us to do nothing.137
The fifth objection is that grade inflation is not necessary because
the existing grade disparities among law schools are justified. There-
fore, the labor market is already operating under fair conditions. To
elaborate, the data presented above showed a correlation between
U.S. News ranking and grade level. More prestigious schools tend to
award better marks than less prestigious schools.138 In addition, stu-
dents at higher-ranked institutions generally have superior undergrad-
uate GPAs and LSAT scores than their counterparts at lower-ranked
137. Note also that raising the top of the grade scale would undercut the value of a
higher mean GPA. Employers, including those who believe in the absolute meaning of
grades, are much more likely to apply a discount factor to marks earned under an abnor-
mal scale. That is because the usage of such a scale is transparent to employers in a way
that current differences in grading practices are frequently not. For example, if Law
School A raises its mean from 3.3 to 3.6 and the top of its scale from 4.0 to 4.5, employers
will see these changes much more easily than they would perceive a rise in the mean grade
from 3.3 to 3.5 without a corresponding change in the scale. Thus, many employers would
probably apply a 0.2 to 0.5 discount to grades listed on the transcript of students from
School A.
138. See supra text accompanying notes 87–88.
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schools.139 This suggests that they are stronger students and thus per-
form better in law school. If the students at more prestigious institu-
tions are in fact superior performers, then they deserve better marks.
Accordingly, the grade differential between higher- and lower-ranked
schools is justified, and any competitive advantage in job placement
accruing to students from the former set of institutions is fair. There
are multiple problems with this reasoning.
First, the objection assumes that grading practices vary strictly by
prestige and student credentials. But that is not the case. As I demon-
strated above, there are significant grade disparities among schools
within each of the U.S. News tiers. For example, there is substantial
variation in the grading practices of first-tier institutions.140 The same
is true for second, third, and fourth-tier schools.141 Thus, while there
is some correlation between institutional grade levels and students’ en-
tering qualifications, the correlation is far from universal. This means
that there are numerous examples of schools with similar entering
classes, but divergent grade levels.142
Second, we lack the evidence necessary to accurately compare the
performances of students across law schools. Index scores are only
predictive. They are not a measure of actual outcomes. And numerous
other factors impact student achievement as well, such as teaching
quality, class size, assessment practices, academic support programs,
and resource allocation. Without a direct measure of student learn-
ing, grade disparities are not justified. Hypothesized differences in ac-
ademic performance based on variations in index scores are
insufficient.143
139. See infra text accompanying note 178.
140. See supra notes 48–60 and accompanying text.
141. See supra notes 61–83 and accompanying text.
142. Indeed, there is often an inverse correlation between entering credentials and law
school grade levels. To illustrate, the University of Alabama’s UGPA and LSAT scores for
the 75th, 50th, and 25th percentiles of its 2010 entering class were 3.92/167, 3.80/165, and
3.50/159. For American University, the numbers were 3.58/164, 3.39/163, and 3.13/158.
See LAW SCH. ADMISSION COUNCIL & AM. BAR ASS’N SECTION OF LEGAL EDUC. & ADMISSIONS
TO THE BAR, ABA-LSAC OFFICIAL GUIDE TO ABA-APPROVED LAW SCHOOLS 56–57 (2012 ed.
2011) [hereinafter LSAC/ABA]. Based on my review of previous years, these numbers are
representative of a typical entering class at each institution. Now, compare this to the law
school GPAs for the 75th, 50th, and 25th percentiles of their 2011 graduating classes. For
Alabama, the numbers were 3.39, 3.11, and 2.85; for American, the numbers were 3.62,
3.45, and 3.27. See THE NAT’L ASS’N OF LAW PLACEMENT, 2012–2013 DIRECTORY OF LAW
SCHOOLS, supra note 39. This means that Alabama’s students consistently have higher in-
dex scores but lower law school GPAs than students at American.
143. One might respond that we can use bar exam results to compare achievement
across institutions. But that is not an appropriate measure. First, the bar exam is merely
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Third, the counter-argument assumes that grades should strictly
reflect academic results across institutions. However, this is fundamen-
tally inconsistent with the way teachers approach assessment. In
awarding grades, we almost never judge our students against those at
other schools. Rather, we adapt our grading standards to the students
around us.144
Fourth, even if the higher grades at some schools do reflect
greater student achievement levels, the grade disparities still cause un-
fairness in the labor market. To illustrate, assume that Student X
earns a 3.5 GPA at a third-tier school and Student Y earns a 3.5 at a
first-tier school. Each is ranked at the ninetieth percentile of his law
school class. But given the student quality at the two institutions, Y’s
academic performance is better. Assume further that X and Y apply
for the same job. The employer will likely give Student Y’s GPA and
class standing more weight than X’s because Y attended a first-tier in-
stitution with superior students. In other words, employers treat nu-
merically equivalent grades differently depending on whether they are
received at a high-ranking or a low-ranking school, on the assumption
that students at the former institution are better. Call this the “pres-
tige bump.”145 Now assume that the first-tier school awards higher
grades. As a result, Y earned a 3.7 GPA with the same class rank, rather
than a 3.5. Since many employers grant significant weight to absolute
pass/fail. And there is no clear or fair way to translate bar passage rates into letter or
number grade equivalents. For example, assume that Law Schools Q and R have 90% and
83% bar passage rates, respectively. What does that actually tell us about the mean grade
the schools should award on a four-point scale? Very little, if anything. Second, the content
and structure of the bar exam makes it a poor proxy for overall student learning. See gener-
ally Denise Riebe, A Bar Review for Law Schools: Getting Students on Board to Pass Their Bar
Exams, 45 BRANDEIS L.J. 269, 275-82 (2007) (setting forth multiple criticisms of the bar
exam); Andrea Curcio, et al., Society of American Law Teachers Statement on the Bar Exam, 52 J.
LEGAL EDUC. 446, 446–51 (2002) (same); Lorenzo A. Trujillo, The Relationship Between Law
School and the Bar Exam: A Look at Assessment and Student Success, 78 U. COLO. L. REV. 69, 77-
85 (2007) (same).
144. It could be argued that our current practices are not a good benchmark. Perhaps
legal educators should develop national grading standards that can be applied consistently
to all law students, allowing for more accurate inter-school comparisons of legal aptitude.
Unfortunately, that is not practical. Implementing uniform grading standards is not even
realistic at a single institution. See Silverstein, supra note 79, at 289–95. Yet doing so nation-
wide would be exponentially harder (if not truly impossible). Moreover, if it turns out that
the top students at third- and fourth-tier schools never earned A’s under the national stan-
dards, would professors at those institutions really be willing to stop awarding high marks?
I suspect not.
145. See Sander & Yakowitz, supra note 130, at 20–21 (concluding that school ranking is
correlated with the salary earned by recent graduates); see also id. at 26–35 (setting forth
statistical analysis regarding the impact of law school ranking on post-graduation salaries).
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grade levels, this will often provide Y with another benefit when com-
peting with X for a job—an “absolute grade bump.” Accordingly, if
first-tier schools award higher marks than third-tier schools, students
from the former receive both a prestige bump and an absolute grade
bump for the same superior achievement. That constitutes double
counting; Y’s accomplishment justifies either one bump or the other,
but not both. Put another way, Y’s superior performance is already
accounted for by the prestige bump. If Y also obtains higher marks
and the associated absolute grade bump for the same performance,
then Y is receiving two benefits for the same accomplishment. This is
unfair.
In sum, (1) index scores do not perfectly correlate with grade
levels, (2) even if they did, index scores are an insufficient measure of
achievement levels, (3) grading students across institutions is inconsis-
tent with the nearly universal assessment practices of teachers, and (4)
when more prestigious law schools award higher absolute marks, the
superior performances of their students are improperly double
counted in comparisons with students from less prestigious institu-
tions. These points fatally undercut the proposition that the existing
grade disparities are justified and do not cause unfairness in the com-
petition for job placement.146
One final point is worth noting. My recommendation is that law
schools that currently award lower marks inflate their grades to match
the assessment practices of their high-grading counterparts because
this will make the labor market fairer. But inflation is not the only way
to accomplish increased grade standardization among institutions.
The same result would be achieved if the high-grading schools deflated
their grades. In other words, fairness in the placement market is pro-
moted by increasing grade uniformity, but there is no necessary connec-
tion between uniformity and inflation; deflation would work just as
well. With that said, there is a practical connection between uniformity
and inflation: There is essentially no chance that high-grading institu-
146. A sixth counter-argument one might press against my position is that if we inflate
grades for current and future students, recent graduates with lower grades will be unfairly
disadvantaged. See Jackson, supra note 91, at 32 (explaining that not everyone was happy
about grade inflation at one law school—“particularly recent grads who fear the deprecia-
tion of their hard-earned GPAs”); see also Shouping Hu, Beyond Grade Inflation: Grading
Problems in Higher Education, 30 ASHE HIGHER EDUC. REP., No. 6, 1, 19 (2005) (“Grade
inflation favors recent generations over previous ones because it violates horizontal equity
criteria.”). But avoiding inflation on this ground puts the interests of a few, recent graduat-
ing classes ahead of the interests of years and even decades of future graduates. Given the
numbers in each group, any harm or unfairness to recent alumni is easily trumped by the
benefits to future students.
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tions are going to lower their grade scales. Grade inflation by the rest
of us is thus the only plausible way to achieve the requisite, industry-
wide grade equalization.
Given the relevance of grades in the employment market and the
importance of jobs to our students, a fairer distribution of placement
opportunities and outcomes is a powerful justification for grade
inflation.
B. Substantially Eliminating C Grades Will Improve the
Psychological Well-Being of Law Students
Law school is stressful, and the first year particularly so. Indeed,
research indicates that law students suffer disproportionate levels of
psychological distress generally and depression specifically.147 Law stu-
dent anxiety has many causes,148 but one of the most significant is
grades.149 This makes sense. Grades are critically important in the
lives of our students.150 They determine academic honors, scholarship
147. See Lawrence S. Krieger, Institutional Denial About the Dark Side of Law School, and
Fresh Empirical Guidance for Constructively Breaking the Silence, 52 J. LEGAL EDUC. 112, 113–15
(2002) (surveying the literature); Grant H. Morris, Preparing Law Students for Disappointing
Exam Results: Lessons from Casey at the Bat, 45 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 441, 442–44 (2008)
(same); Todd David Peterson & Elizabeth Waters Peterson, Stemming the Tide of Law Student
Depression: What Law Schools Need to Learn from the Science of Positive Psychology, 9 YALE J.
HEALTH POL’Y L. & ETHICS 357, 365–70 (2009) (same).
148. See Nancy J. Soonpaa, Stress in Law Students: A Comparative Study of First-Year, Second-
Year, and Third-Year Students, 36 CONN. L. REV. 353, 367 (2004) (identifying the following
factors as causes of stress in the first year of law school: (1) students’ high expectations, (2)
law school teaching methods, (3) the limited amount of feedback, (4) the unfamiliar sub-
ject matter, (5) lack of familiarity with effective methods for studying law, (6) the impor-
tance of first semester grades, (7) the way that “law school shatters the illusion that a
student is in control by challenging how she thinks, writes, and interacts with [the]
world”).
149. Gerald F. Hess, Heads and Hearts: The Teaching and Learning Environment in Law
School, 52 J. LEGAL EDUC. 75, 78 (2002) (explaining that grades are a primary source of
stress in law students); Morris, supra note 147, at 449 (asserting that “undoubtedly” exams
and grades “‘are the dominate source of anxiety and preoccupation among the first-year
class’”) (quoting Note, Making Docile Lawyers: An Essay on the Pacification of Law Students, 111
HARV. L. REV. 2027, 2033 (1998)) [hereinafter Making Docile Lawyers].
150. Downs & Levit, supra note 41, at 819 (“It is undeniable that grades matter . . . .”);
Stake, supra note 112, at 585 (“We can argue about the degree to which grades matter, but
few doubt that grades do matter.”); Emily Zimmerman, Do Grades Matter?, 35 SEATTLE U. L.
REV. 305, 326–27 (2012) (“In each survey year, almost all students indicated that they ei-
ther agreed or strongly agreed with [the statement, ‘It is important to me to get good
grades during my first year of law school’], with a large majority indicating that they
strongly agreed . . . .”); id. at 322–24 (setting forth the parameters of this three-year study
of the law students at a school that opened in 2006).
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eligibility, placement prospects, and career paths.151 Given the objec-
tive importance of grades, some grade-based anxiety is rational and
healthy. However, the use of C grades to denote competent perform-
ance exacerbates the stress students experience in unhealthy ways.
This additional stress is both injurious to the learning environment
and intrinsically harmful to students. Therefore, substantially elimi-
nating C grades by adopting a B- good standing GPA will bring about
critical improvements in our students’ psychological well-being.
C grades are common in legal education.152 They are generally
awarded to students whose performance is satisfactory. In other words,
C marks indicate that one has achieved basic proficiency and should
continue in the program. But that is not how many—and perhaps
most—law students see such grades. Large numbers of students (and
often their families) perceive C’s as a sign of poor performance or
even failure. And this is so despite regular explanations from faculty
that C marks are acceptable.
To illustrate, under my school’s previous grading system, students
regularly stopped by during my office hours in January and February
for the sole purpose of asking whether they should stay in school
given their C-type marks. This is deeply troubling. Under the grading
system then in place, these students demonstrated that they were on
the path to becoming effective lawyers. They should not have felt like
failures, or been contemplating discontinuing their studies. But no
matter what I told them—including anecdotes about C students who
are now happy and successful attorneys—some were inconsolable,
which caused them to leave school and give up on a promising career.
Numerous others stayed in school but ceased putting serious effort
into their studies. Some of these students consciously chose to do the
151. Henderson, supra note 111, at 405-06 (“Without question, grades are universally
perceived to determine the direction of legal careers no matter the specialty or the set-
ting. . . . Other research demonstrates the important effect of grades later in life, not just in
school.”); Hess, supra note 149, 78 (“Grades and class rank are significant gatekeepers to
the reward system during and after law school—law review membership, research or teach-
ing-assistant positions, internships, and jobs.”); Fines, supra note 99, at 883 n.19 (“For ex-
ample, Dean’s list, Latin honors, Law Review membership, probation & dismissal are all
often based on grades or rank.”); id. at 886 (“Financial aid may be based on maintaining or
achieving a particular grade average.”); Downs & Levit, supra note 41, at 819 (“In addition,
grades often are important in the determination of which students receive scholarships or
other forms of financial aid.”); Sander & Yakowitz, supra note 130, at 3–4 (“The consistent
theme we find throughout this analysis is that performance in law school—as measured by
law school grades—is the most important predictor of career success. It is decisively more
important than law school ‘eliteness.’”).
152. See supra notes 41–43, 87–89, and accompanying text.
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minimum level of work because they did not believe that greater dedi-
cation would be rewarded.
A former Assistant Dean for Student Affairs at my institution had
similar experiences. He explained that, during his tenure, numerous
C+ students came to his office in such a dejected state after the release
of first semester grades that they were ready to withdraw from
school.153 He believes that B’s are usually a sufficient wake-up call for
most students at our institution. C grades, however, go too far. Rather
than providing an incentive for increased effort, C’s are more likely to
cause students to scale back their studying because such marks lead
them to believe that higher grades are out of reach. In the Dean’s
words, “a B is a hit, but a C is truly discouraging.”154
The reaction of students at my school to C grades is consistent
with national trends in higher education. Today’s college students re-
gard grades in the C range as “loathsome and a sign of failure,”155 a
“devastating insult,”156 and an indication that the student “has disap-
pointed the teacher.”157 Parents and other constituencies frequently
hold the same view.158 Accordingly, students today expect A and B
grades for average work.159 In fact, they sometimes challenge even B
grades via university grievance procedures.160 Law students come from
153. Interview with Andrew M. Taylor, Assistant Dean for Student Affairs, Univ. of Ark.
at Little Rock, William H. Bowen Sch. of Law (May 28, 2009) (on file with the author).
154. Id.
155. Stephen Goode & Timothy W. Maier, Inflating the Grades, UPI INSIGHT MAG., May
25, 1998, at 8.
156. Biggs, supra note 7, at 111.
157. Richard Kamber, Understanding Grade Inflation, in GRADE INFLATION: ACADEMIC
STANDARDS IN HIGHER EDUCATION 45, 66 (Lester H. Hunt ed., 2008) (further noting that
“Bs and Cs have become marks of disapproval”).
158. Richard Kamber, Combating Grade Inflation: Obstacles and Opportunities, in GRADE
INFLATION: ACADEMIC STANDARDS IN HIGHER EDUCATION 171, 172 (Lester H. Hunt ed.,
2008) (“A C+ signified average performance in 1960, but today it signifies below-average
performance. It is no easy thing to convince students, parents, employers, graduate
schools, and so on that a C+ in your class or at your institution means average rather than
below average.”).
159. Kamber, supra note 157, at 58 (“In a fascinating study, R. Eric Landrum found
that ‘[s]tudents performing average work, who acknowledge themselves that their work is
average, expect a grade of B or A more than 70% of the time, even though they realize that
the grade for average work is C.’” (quoting R. Eric Landrum, Student Expectations of Grade
Inflation, 32 J. RES. AND DEV. IN EDUC. 126 (1999))). Kamber further notes that he “con-
ducted similar studies in [his] classes and obtained compatible results.” Kamber, supra
note 157, at 58; see also VALEN E. JOHNSON, GRADE INFLATION: A CRISIS IN EDUCATION 235
(2003) (“In today’s college environment, a professor cannot assign grades of C or D with-
out tangible justification. Students become indignant when they receive such
grades . . . .”).
160. Kamber, supra note 157, at 59.
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this cohort. Moreover, they are among the most successful of college
graduates. Thus, they probably think worse of C grades than the bulk
of their undergraduate peers.
Students often define themselves by their grades.161 Disap-
pointing marks can therefore have a profoundly negative psychologi-
cal impact. And research indicates that when students receive such
marks, they are more likely to withdraw than to work harder to im-
prove their performance.162 More generally, anxiety “is a significant
inhibitor” of learning.163 And psychological well-being is “strongly as-
sociated with academic success.”164 As a result, when we award large
numbers of disappointing C grades to law students, we harm them in
ways that are intrinsically bad and undercut our pedagogical
aspirations.
Why do C grades cause such distress among law students? Why is
it so difficult for law professors to convince their students that C’s are
acceptable under the grading systems generally in operation in legal
education? Because our students are raised in an “A and B world.”
More specifically, they receive mostly A’s and B’s in high school and
college. As a result, they are conditioned to expect marks above the C
level.
Before elaborating on this point, I want to explain the parameters
of my argument. Grade inflation in high school and college is a fre-
quent topic in the popular press. Such inflation is regularly taken as a
given. But the scholarly literature on this issue is complicated. While
many education researchers believe that both secondary and under-
graduate schools have experienced inflation, dissenting voices have
161. Fines, supra note 99, at 883; see also Stake, supra note 112, at 584 (“Grades can
influence the way students think about themselves, swelling their heads or shaking their
confidence.”).
162. Fines, supra note 99, at 901 (citing RAYMOND J. WLODKOWSKI, ENHANCING ADULT
MOTIVATION TO LEARN 98 (1993)); see also Richard H. Sander, A Systemic Analysis of Affirma-
tive Action in American Law Schools, 57 STAN. L. REV. 367, 452 (2004) (citing STEPHEN COLE &
ELINOR BARBER, INCREASING FACULTY DIVERSITY: THE OCCUPATIONAL CHOICES OF HIGH-
ACHIEVING MINORITY STUDENTS 208–09 (2003)) (“[Cole and Barber] find that the use of
racial preferences by liberal arts colleges tends to place blacks in schools where they per-
form poorly. Low grades, in turn, sap student self-confidence and may produce still lower
grades by feeding ‘stereotype threat.’”).
163. Fines, supra note 99, at 902; accord B.A. Glesner, Fear and Loathing in the Law
Schools, 23 CONN. L. REV. 627, 635–38 (1991) (setting forth a survey of the literature on the
ways that stress inhibits learning).
164. Henderson, supra note 111, at 427 (citing Janice M. Livengood, Students’ Motiva-
tional Goals and Beliefs about Effort and Ability As They Relate To College Academic Success, 33 RES.
HIGHER EDUC. 247, 256–57 (1992)).
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raised powerful counterarguments.165 Critically, I do not need to take
165. For sources concluding that grade inflation has occurred at the college level, see
GEORGE C. LEEF, DEGRADED CURRENCY: THE PROBLEM OF GRADE INFLATION 2–6 (American
Council of Trustees and Alumni 2003), available at https://www.goacta.org/publications/
downloads/GradeInflationFinal.pdf (summarizing the results of fifteen studies); ROSOVSKY
& HARTLEY, supra note 7, at 4–7 (reviewing about a dozen studies); Rojstaczer & Healy,
Grading in American Colleges and Universities, supra note 46, at 1–2 (finding that the average
grade has risen from roughly 2.3 in the 1930s to roughly 3.1 in 2006). For sources conclud-
ing that the existence of grade inflation has not been established, see Clifford Adelman,
Undergraduate Grades: A More Complex Story Than “Inflation”, in GRADE INFLATION: ACADEMIC
STANDARDS IN HIGHER EDUCATION 13, 13-44 (Lester H. Hunt ed., 2008) (challenging the
existence of grade inflation on conceptual and empirical grounds; summarizing his prior
studies on the subject for the U.S. Department of Education); id. at 39 (“Neither the litera-
ture nor the national time series data proves that U.S. higher education is paying a higher
price [in grades] for lower quality product [in student performance], or a higher price for
a stable quality product, or even a higher price for a product that has risen in quality at a
lower rate”); Alfie Kohn, The Dangerous Myth of Grade Inflation, in GRADE INFLATION: ACA-
DEMIC STANDARDS IN HIGHER EDUCATION 1, 1–5 (Lester H. Hunt ed., 2008) (also challeng-
ing the existence of grade inflation on conceptual and empirical grounds). For an
outstanding survey of the college grade inflation literature, see HU, supra note 146; see also
id. at 42 (concluding that college grades have increased, but that most of the increase
appears to have resulted from causes other than “inflation”).
For studies of high school grade, compare KELLY E. GODFREY, THE COLL. BD., INVESTI-
GATING GRADE INFLATION AND NON-EQUIVALENCE, RESEARCH REPORT 2011-2 (2011), available
at http://professionals.collegeboard.com/data-reports-research/cb/gradeinflation_non-
equivalence (finding that grade inflation has occurred); DAVID J. WOODRUFF & ROBERT L.
ZIOMEK, ACT INC., HIGH SCHOOL GRADE INFLATION FROM 1991 TO 2003, ACT RESEARCH
REPORT SERIES 2004-4 (2004), available at http://www.act.org/research/researchers/re-
ports/index.html (same); ROBERT L. ZIOMEK & JOSEPH C. SVEC, ACT, HIGH SCHOOL GRADES
AND ACHIEVEMENT: EVIDENCE OF GRADE INFLATION, ACT RESEARCH REPORT SERIES 95-3
(1995), available at http://www.act.org/research/researchers/reports/91index.html
(same), with DANIEL KORETZ & MARK BERENDS, RAND EDUCATION, CHANGES IN HIGH
SCHOOL GRADING STANDARDS IN MATHEMATICS, 1982–1992 (2001), available at http://www.
rand.org/pubs/monograph_reports/MR1445.html (finding no grade inflation in high
school mathematics departments for the study period).
Part of the complexity in debates over the existence of grade inflation results from the
fact that scholars disagree at a definitional level. Grade inflation has been defined as either
(1) any increase in grades, see, e.g., Kamber, supra note 157, at 46–47, or (2) an increase in
grades without a comparable increase in student performance, see, e.g., HU, supra note 146,
at 15 (defining grade inflation as an increase in grades without a comparable increase in
student performance); ROSOVSKY & HARTLEY, supra note 7, at 4; see also HU, supra note 146,
at 29 (distinguishing between “grade increase” (i.e., the first definition) and “grade infla-
tion” (i.e., the second definition)). The difference here is critical. If grades are going up
because, for example, student performance is improving or because students are more
often registering for courses where grades have always been higher, see HU, supra note 146,
at 34–35, then grade inflation would exist under the first definition but not under the
second.
The second definition is more well accepted. But proving the existence of grade infla-
tion using that standard is extremely difficult because it raises fundamental conceptual and
empirical problems. As explained by Clifford Adelman, if grade inflation only occurs when
a higher grade is awarded in the present than was awarded in the past for the same “de-
fined level of academic achievement,” then we need a method for accurately measuring
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sides in this debate. That is because the evidence proffered by both
camps supports the conclusion that A’s and B’s dominate high school
and university grading.
Let me begin with undergraduate education. Professors Stuart
Rojstaczer and Christopher Healy, two of the most prominent advo-
cates of the hypothesis that grade inflation is real, gathered historical
and contemporary statistics on letter grades awarded at over 200 four-
year colleges and universities.166 Based on their research, in 2008, C’s
constituted only 14.9% of college grades, while D’s and F’s were a
mere 8.3%. A’s and B’s, on the other hand, constituted an extraordi-
nary 76.8% of marks:167
School Type Avg. % A’s Avg. % B’s Avg. % C’s Avg. % D’s Avg. % F’s
Private Non-Profit 48.2 35.8 11.4 2.2 2.3
Universities
Private Non-Profit 47.7 36.6 11.3 2.4 1.9
Colleges
Public Flagship 42.3 34.5 15.5 4.1 3.6
Universities
Public Satellite 41.7 32.0 16.0 4.8 5.4
Universities
Public Commuter 39.0 31.8 17.5 5.4 6.3
Universities
Totals 43.0 33.8 14.9 4.1 4.2
Clifford Adelman, a leading inflation skeptic, who for thirty years
served as a researcher at the United States Department of Education,
arrived at similar conclusions. His data is from The National Educa-
tion Longitudinal Study of 1988, which gathered and reviewed college
achievement over time. But, Adelman argues, educators lack such a method; there is no
way to accurately determine whether student performance today is the same as, or differ-
ent from, performance in the past—either via direct measurement or by the use of proxies
(such as standardized tests). Adelman, supra note 165, at 19–22; see also Kamber, supra 157,
at 62–64 (agreeing with Adelman that measuring grade inflation using the second defini-
tion “runs into insurmountable obstacles,” but arguing that this demonstrates the need for
a better definition—the first one). But see Rojstaczer & Healy, Where A is Ordinary, supra
note 46, at 12–13 (explaining that because SAT scores are down, students study less, the
literacy of graduates has declined, and student engagement is at all-time lows, “[t]here is
no indication that the rise in grades at public and private schools has been accompanied by
an increase in student achievement”).
166. Rojstaczer & Healy, Where A is Ordinary, supra note 46, at 1.
167. Id. at 4–6.
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transcripts from 8,900 members of the high school class of 1992.168
These students received the following grades:169
Institutional W/
Selectivity A’s B’s C’s D’s F’s Pass NCR
Highly Selective 31.4 33.6 14.8 2.6 1.2 14.9 1.7
Selective 30.4 33.8 16.9 3.8 2.5 8.3 4.2
Nonselective 29.2 30.8 19.0 5.0 4.1 5.6 6.4
Open Door 23.4 24.7 18.4 4.9 7.2 5.4 16.0
Not Rated 36.1 33.1 14.4 3.1 2.1 6.9 4.3
Totals w/o Pass 28.1 29.9 18.2 4.6 4.5 6.4 8.3
w/NCR
Totals 32.9 35.1 21.3 5.4 5.3 — —
Adelman’s results for A’s and B’s are different from Rojstaczer
and Healy’s (57% vs. 76.8%), but his results for C’s (18.2% vs. 14.9%),
D’s (4.6% vs. 4.1%), and F’s (4.5% vs. 4.2%) are substantially the
same. This comparison is not precisely apples-to-oranges because
Adelman collected Pass, Withdrawal, and No-Credit Repeat grades,
whereas Rojstaczer and Healy did not. But even with those grades re-
moved from Adelman’s numbers, C marks still account for only 21.3
percent of college grades, and D’s and F’s are a mere 10.5%.170 In
addition, A’s and B’s balloon to 68%, which is more in line with Roj-
staczer and Healy’s findings. Other comprehensive research also
shows that C’s are substantially less common than A’s and B’s at Amer-
ican universities.171
168. CLIFFORD ADELMAN, INST. OF EDUC. SCIENCES, U.S. DEPT. EDUC., PRINCIPAL INDICA-
TORS OF STUDENT ACADEMIC HISTORIES IN POSTSECONDARY EDUCATION, 1972–2000, at iii
(2004), available at http://www2.ed.gov/rschstat/research/pubs/prinindicat/prinindicat.
pdf.
169. Id. at 78 (the totals); id. at 80 (the breakout by the selectivity of the institution).
170. There are two immediately apparent differences between the two data sets that
might explain the divergent results. First, as explained in the body, Adelman’s numbers are
from the mid-1990s, whereas Rojstaczer’s and Healy’s are from 2008. Second, Adelman’s
data includes grades from community colleges and vocational schools. See ADELMAN, supra
note 168, at vii. Rojstaczer’s and Healy’s data, however, is exclusively from four-year institu-
tions. See Rojstaczer & Healy, Where A is Ordinary, supra note 46, at 1; see also LEEF, supra note
165, at 5 (contending that this difference between Adelman’s work and other studies ex-
plains why Adelman’s results are inconsistent with much of the literature).
171. See, e.g., NAT’L SURVEY OF STUDENT ENGAGEMENT, STUDENT ENGAGEMENT: PATHWAYS
TO COLLEGIATE SUCCESS 13 (2004), available at http://nsse.iub.edu/2004_annual_report/
pdf/annual_report.pdf (“About two-fifths of all students reported that they earned mostly
A grades, another 41% reported grades of either B or B+, and only 3% of students re-
ported earning mostly Cs or lower.”); id. at 10 (survey of 620,000 students at 850 different
four-year colleges and universities). For a study concluding that low grades might be some-
what more common, see LAURA HORN ET AL., NAT’L CTR. EDUC. STATISTICS, U.S. DEPT. OF
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Turning to high schools, the College Board gathers data each
year from over one million students who register for the SAT. Accord-
ing to this information, the mean GPA for college-bound seniors in
both 2010 and 2011 was 3.34—roughly a B+ level.172 Moreover, in
both years, forty-four percent of reporting students said they had an
A+, A, or A- average, and another forty-five percent said they earned a
B average.173 Data collected by the ACT is consistent with these re-
sults.174 Students who register for the SAT and ACT are not represen-
tative of all secondary school students.175 As a group, they have
somewhat better grades than the overall student population. But the
U.S. Department of Education conducted a study of 2005 high school
graduates designed to measure the average GPA of all students, rather
than just those who registered for the college entrance exams.176 The
EDUC., PROFILES OF UNDERGRADUATES IN U.S. POSTSECONDARY INSTITUTIONS: 1990-2000, at
68 (2002), available at http://nces.ed.gov/pubsearch/pubsinfo.asp?pubid=2002168. This
report is “based on institutional records of approximately 50,000 undergraduates from ap-
proximately 1,000 institutions and on telephone interviews with about 35,000 undergradu-
ates.” Id. at 4. It found that students received the following grades:
Mostly A’s A’s & B’s Mostly B’s B’s & C’s Mostly C’s D’s or Lower
Public 9.7 9.7 25.1 26.7 17.9 11.0
Private 15.0 14.4 30.1 22.0 11.7 6.9
All 11.3 11.1 26.6 25.3 16.0 9.7
Id. at 68. But these findings are based on reported grade point averages, not (1) direct
counting of letter grades from grade distributions or transcripts, nor (2) questions to stu-
dents about the types of grades they received. Id. at 142. And there is greater division in the
literature over the level of college grade point averages than over how typical grades below
B- are. Compare ADELMAN, supra note 168, at 78 (finding that the average undergraduate
GPA was 2.74 in the 1990s), with Rojstaczer & Healy, Grading in American Colleges and Univer-
sities, supra note 46, at 1, 4 (finding that the average undergraduate GPA was roughly 3.1 as
of the mid-2000s).
172. COLLEGEBOARD, 2011 COLLEGE-BOUND SENIORS—TOTAL GROUP PROFILE REPORT 5
(2011), available at http://professionals.collegeboard.com/profdownload/cbs2011_total_
group_report.pdf [hereinafter 2011 COLLEGE-BOUND SENIORS]; COLLEGEBOARD, 2010 COL-
LEGE-BOUND SENIORS—TOTAL GROUP PROFILE REPORT 5 (2010), available at http://profes-
sionals.collegeboard.com/profdownload/2010-total-group-profile-report-cbs.pdf
[hereinafter 2010 COLLEGE-BOUND SENIORS].
173. 2011 COLLEGE-BOUND SENIORS, supra note 172, at 5; 2010 COLLEGE-BOUND SE-
NIORS, supra note 172, at 5.
174. See WOODRUFF & ZIOMEK, supra note 165, at 3, 10 (2003 mean GPA of 3.20 for
those registering for the ACT).
175. WAYNE CAMARA ET AL., COLLEGEBOARD, WHOSE GRADES ARE INFLATED?, RESEARCH
REPORT NO. 2003-4, at 11 (2004), available at http://professionals.collegeboard.com/data-
reports-research/cb/whose-grades-inflated.
176. NAT’L CTR. FOR EDUC. STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., THE NATION’S REPORT
CARD: AMERICA’S HIGH SCHOOL GRADUATES: RESULTS FROM THE 2005 NAEP HIGH SCHOOL
TRANSCRIPT STUDY 2 (2005), available at http://nces.ed.gov/pubsearch/pubsinfo.asp?
pubid=2007467.
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Department of Education concluded that the mean GPA for the en-
tire 2005 cohort of 2.7 million high school graduates was 2.98—a B
average.177
What about data with respect to law students specifically? I found
no source that has compiled the high school grades of our students.
But given the numbers presented in the previous paragraph, most law
students likely received very few marks below B- during their secon-
dary education. After all, they generally were superior performers in
high school and were college bound.
Data is available with respect to our students’ college careers. The
American Bar Association (“ABA”) and Law School Admission Coun-
cil (“LSAC”) gather comprehensive statistics on the undergraduate
grade point averages of law students.178 I compiled this information
for the fall 2010 entering class by 2011 U.S. News tier:
75th Percentile 50th Percentile 25th Percentile
First Tier 3.81 3.68 3.45
Second Tier 3.68 3.47 3.20
Third Tier 3.61 3.38 3.11
Fourth Tier 3.45 3.17 2.88
All 3.64 3.44 3.17
These numbers paint a clear picture: Law students receive high grades
in college. The median GPA for all such students is well above B+
(3.44). Indeed, the median at third-tier schools is above that level
(3.38). And even students ranked at the twenty-fifth percentile attend-
ing fourth-tier schools have an average undergraduate GPA of 2.88,
which has been equated to earning “[m]ostly B’s” by researchers at
the U.S. Department of Education.179 When these numbers are com-
bined with the data collected by Rojstaczer, Healy, and Adelman dis-
cussed above, it appears quite likely that virtually all American law
students receive mostly A’s and B’s in college; C grades and below are
a rarity.180
177. Id. at 12.
178. See LSAC/ABA, supra note 142, at 56–61.
179. See HORN, supra note 171, at 142.
180. To confirm this point more directly, I requested that my law school provide me
with a representative sample of our students’ undergraduate transcripts. However, despite
the fact that I stated that the school could redact every identifying piece of information
from the transcripts and thus produce documents with nothing but a series of letters, the
university counsel’s office denied my request, claiming the transcripts are exempt from the
Arkansas Freedom of Information Act (“AFOIA”). See E-mail of Mandy Hull Abernathy to
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Given our students’ academic records in high school and college,
is it any wonder that so many are crushed when they receive C’s in law
school? The admission credentials of most law students are excel-
lent.181 These students “have succeeded in their prior academic en-
deavors, and they expect to succeed in law school.”182 Professor Emily
Zimmerman’s three-year study of the students at one law school sup-
ports this point.183 According to her data, just over eighty-five percent
of the law students surveyed “responded that their first-year law school
grades would either be better than their college grades or about the
Professor Robert Steinbuch, UALR Bowen School of Law (Feb. 22, 2012, 17:33 CST) (on
file with author) (stating that the Arkansas “FOIA specifically exempts from disclosure edu-
cational records as defined by [the Federal Educational Rights and Privacy Act” (citation
omitted)). This email to a colleague of mine served as the basis for denying my request.
The counsel’s office is plainly incorrect, as Professor Steinbuch and I explained in a letter
we subsequently sent to the state attorney general. See Letter of Associate Professor Joshua
M. Silverstein and Professor Robert Steinbuch to Arkansas Attorney General Dustin Mc-
Daniel (Jun. 26, 2012) (on file with author). Perhaps realizing the flaw in its position, the
counsel’s office subsequently proffered two new arguments: (1) the watermarks on tran-
scripts make it impossible to redact every piece of information but the grades, and (2)
transcripts with nothing but grades are not public records. See Letter of Mandy Abernethy
to Arkansas Attorney General Dustin McDaniel 6–8 (Jul. 9, 2012) (on file with author).
Once again, the counsel’s office is clearly wrong. Professor Steinbuch and I demonstrated
in a second letter that (1) it is quite easy to redact a college transcript in such a way as to
make it impossible to see any distinguishing features of the watermark, and (2) there is no
question that redacted transcripts are public records. See Letter of Professor Joshua M.
Silverstein and Professor Robert Steinbuch to Arkansas Attorney General Dustin McDaniel
10–13 (Jul. 16, 2012) (on file with author) [hereinafter July 16 Letter]. Unfortunately, the
Attorney General subsequently opined that an Arkansas court would likely conclude that I
am not entitled to the transcripts. Ark. Op. Att’y Gen. 2012-083 at 12. The Attorney Gen-
eral reasoned that the letter grades on a transcript are not “reasonably segregable” from
the information on the document that is exempt from AFOIA because the grades alone
would be “‘essentially meaningless.’” Id. at 11–12 (quoting ARK. STAT. ANN. § 25-19-
105(f)(2) and Mo. Coal. for the Env’t Found. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 542 F.3d 1204,
1212 (8th Cir. 2008)). However, as the reader knows by now, this is clearly false. The letter
grades on transcripts are, by themselves, highly meaningful to anyone researching grading
practices generally and grade inflation specifically. Professors Steinbuch and I explained
this in one of our letters. See July 16 Letter at 12–13. Nevertheless, the Attorney General
ignored our analysis as well as every other point we set forth in our two letters. See Ark. Op.
Att’y Gen. 2012-083 at 1–12.
181. Ann L. Iijima, Lessons Learned: Legal Education and Law Student Dysfunction, 48 J.
LEGAL EDUC. 524, 527 (1998) (“Most students enter law school with superior academic
records.”); Morris, supra note 147, at 449 (“Even at law schools that are not among the
fifteen or so that claim to be ranked in the top ten, or in the next group of fifteen or
twenty law schools that assert some claim to being ‘prestigious,’ admissions credentials of
students are excellent.”).
182. Morris, supra note 147, at 449.
183. See Zimmerman, supra note 150, at 322–24 (setting forth the parameters of the
study).
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same as their college grades.”184 In short, our pupils arrive seeing
themselves as A and B students. And because they have experienced
so few C’s in life, they perceive such grades as unsatisfactory and often
a sign of failure.185 The C marks we award frequently demolish their
expectations, eroding their self-esteem and discouraging future
effort.186
These impacts are intensified by students’ belief that law school
grades are more important than those they earned at previous stages
of their education—a justifiable conclusion. Once they enter law
school, students have chosen a career path, and they are acutely aware
that their grades will profoundly impact the available opportunities
along that path. In addition, law school is the first time that many
students have been seriously challenged in their schooling. Given the
environment in which they were raised, the stakes of law school
grades, and the intensity of the one-L year, it should come as no sur-
prise that the C grades awarded in legal education critically damage
the self-image of countless students.
I take no position here on the issue of whether the transforma-
tion of America into an “A and B nation” is positive or negative over-
all. That is not pertinent to my thesis. What is pertinent is that our
students were born and raised in a world in which C’s are regularly
184. Id. at 329; see also id. at 371 (indicating that in all three of the survey years, the
number of students in the “better” category and the number of students in the “about the
same” category were roughly equal—just over forty percent in each category every year).
But cf. id. at 346 n.174 (“In all three survey years, a statistically significant correlation was
not found between expected law school grade point average and reported undergraduate grade
point average. This result suggests that incoming law students are not basing their law
school grade expectations on their undergraduate grade point averages.” (emphasis
added)).
185. See Rojstaczer & Healy, Where A is Ordinary, supra note 46, at 17–18 (“Given that
many students now have never seen a C and rarely a B before entering college, there is a
tendency on the part of some students to equate B’s with substandard performance and
C’s with failure.”); Biggs, supra note 7, at 117 (observing that in college, “C is reserved for
deeply defective performance”).
186. See Harry Brighouse, Grade Inflation and Grade Variation: What’s All the Fuss About?,
in GRADE INFLATION: ACADEMIC STANDARDS IN HIGHER EDUCATION 73, 76–77 (Lester H.
Hunt ed., 2008) (“An overall inflation of grades . . . enculturat[es] students to receiving
higher grades so that lower grades are more likely (than in a noninflated regime) to de-
press their self-esteem.”); Lester Hunt, Preface, in GRADE INFLATION: ACADEMIC STANDARDS
IN HIGHER EDUCATION, at xiii, xvii (Lester H. Hunt ed., 2008) (“[I]f Cs become rare, then
they are more likely (when they are given) to discourage students and crush their desire to
try harder.”); see also Iijima, supra note 181, at 527 (observing that in law school, many
students receive below-average grades for the first time in their lives); Making Docile Lawyers,
supra note 149, at 2035 (“After years of constant academic success, receiving average grades
for the first time can be extremely destabilizing and an intense blow to [law students’] self-
esteem.”).
536 UNIVERSITY OF SAN FRANCISCO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 47
viewed as failing grades. I believe that this goes a long way towards
explaining why so many of them are deeply distressed by the C’s we
administer in law school.
I am not the first person to criticize the low grades common in
legal education. Professor Laurence Krieger, one of the leading ex-
perts on law student stress and depression, has reached similar conclu-
sions. According to Krieger, if the overall grades at a law school are
lower than the grades students at the institution received prior to ma-
triculating, then the “[s]tudents will reasonably experience disso-
nance, and often anxiety or excessive pressure.”187 In comparing law
schools to other graduate programs, Krieger observes that graduate
schools outside of law “typically grade in ways that reflect the high
capability of their students and that allow all students who learn well
to grade well.”188 Most law schools do not follow this approach. In-
stead, we award low grades that send a negative signal to students
about their capabilities and performance, which inhibits learning:
The message from the [law] faculty is simple: we presume that you
will learn and perform poorly here compared to your previous achievement.
Whether the faculty believe this or not matters little; the percep-
tion in students that faculty have low expectations for their learn-
ing undermines the very educational purpose of the institution,
since perceived autonomy support—which includes a sense of re-
spect—is the primary determinant of . . . positive motivation, well-
being, and learning performance.189
Additionally, grading requirements that set the standard lower
than pre-law school performance lead students to believe that only a
small portion of each graduating class is successful—namely, the ten
to twenty-five percent who actually receive high marks.190 Such per-
ceptions are corrosive to the learning process, impede the develop-
ment of a healthy professional identity, and cause psychological
damage:
Students often tell me that they resent such grading systems, which
effectively create a sense of resignation and mediocrity across a
large segment of the class. Such systems encourage some students
to “tune out” and stop trying, a classic example of learned helpless-
ness. Others feel compelled to compete, often to excess, for the
limited cache of good grades and other resume points. The former
response, amotivation, can lead to depression; the latter can create
distortions in attitude and lifestyle, and reinforces a concept of the
187. Krieger, supra note 37, at 299.
188. Id.
189. Id.
190. Id. at 300.
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profession that may be reflected in the problems of overwork, in-
sensitivity, and hyper-competition among lawyers today.191
In short, Krieger concludes that when a law school awards grades
that are lower than those students have come to expect given their
previous levels of achievement, “competence and self-esteem needs are
likely to be compromised unnecessarily.”192 Krieger thus recommends that
“the overall grading parameters at a school should be, at a minimum,
consistent with the lifetime experience of grade achievement of the
students at the school.”193
At present, law schools fall well short of Krieger’s recommenda-
tion. Set forth below is the data I collected from ABA/LSAC and
NALP on undergraduate and law school grade point average. Once
again, the information is broken down by U.S. News tier.
75th Percentile 50th Percentile 25th Percentile
Avg. Avg. Law Avg. Avg. Law Avg. Avg. Law
Undergrad School GPA Undergrad School GPA Undergrad School GPA
GPA GPA GPA
First Tier 3.81 3.49 3.68 3.28 3.45 3.03
Second Tier 3.68 3.40 3.47 3.17 3.20 2.96
Third Tier 3.61 3.34 3.38 3.06 3.11 2.83
Fourth Tier 3.45 3.20 3.17 2.91 2.88 2.66
Total 3.64 3.35 3.44 3.09 3.17 2.84
As the data make clear, at every level, law schools are awarding lower
grades to their students than these same students earned in college.194
If Krieger’s analysis is correct, these numbers explain a critical portion
of law student psychological distress and the related damage to our
educational effectiveness.
At this point, the reader might wonder why I am advocating for
the universal adoption of a B- good standing GPA in legal education.
Such a policy will not have that much impact at first- and second-tier
institutions because they already award relatively high grades. But the
191. Id. at 301.
192. Krieger, supra note 37, at 298 (emphasis added); see also Jay M. Feinman, Law
School Grading, 65 UMKC L. REV. 647, 651 (1997) (“In the general view, . . . a C or C+
indicates mediocrity; the law school that uses C+ for its mean grade ensures that many of its
students will be regarded as mediocre. . . . This unintended result can be avoided by . . .
shifting [the school’s] grading practices . . . . (For example, by using something like a bell-
shaped curve, but with a B rather than a C+ average grade).”).
193. Krieger, supra note 37, at 302 (emphasis added).
194. Just to clarify, this data actually reflects two different groups of students. But the
size and timing of the data sets justify my conclusion.
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gaps between law school and undergraduate GPA are greater overall
at those schools than at third- and fourth-tier schools. Under Krieger’s
analysis, these larger gaps suggest that the psychological harm caused
by lower grades is greater at more prestigious institutions.195 In addi-
tion, students at schools in the upper tiers are more accustomed to
receiving good marks. This too might imply that they suffer from
greater mental distress when they receive grades below what they are
accustomed to earning.
There are four reasons why I am recommending a 2.7 good
standing line rather than a policy more consistent with Krieger’s rec-
ommendation. First, and most importantly, if every law school awards
grades comparable to those their students received as undergradu-
ates, then significant grade disparities across institutions will continue
to exist. As I explained in the previous section, such disparities cause
unfairness in the employment market. Between the equitable distribu-
tion of placement opportunities and enhanced mental well-being, I
think the former is more important. Second, a 2.7 good standing line
should eliminate the gap between undergraduate and law school GPA
at third- and fourth-tier schools and largely do so at second-tier
schools. It will also raise the grades somewhat at many first-tier institu-
tions. Thus, my proposal will largely, though not entirely, address
Krieger’s concerns about grade levels in legal education without un-
dercutting my goal of enhancing fairness in the labor market. Third,
many schools in the upper tiers of U.S. News cannot raise their grades
to match the undergraduate marks of their students without risking
problematic grade compression. For example, the median undergrad-
uate GPA at first-tier institutions is around 3.7. Setting that as the
mean grade on a 4.0 scale would likely compress grades too much.
And the same might be true even with the use of a 4.3 scale. Fourth,
my principal concern in this section is with the psychological impacts
of C marks, not low grades per se. The latter is an important issue, to
be sure, but it is secondary. Setting the good standing GPA at B- will
substantially eliminate C grades.
As with the placement-based justification presented in the last
part, there are several counter-arguments one might offer against the
claim that grade inflation will improve the psychological well-being of
law students. The first is that law school grades are not that much
lower than the marks our students received as undergraduates. Based
195. However, it bears repeating that a disproportionate number of schools in the top
half of the first-tier do not report class rank, and thus the GPA gap for this group of institu-
tions is likely overstated.
Winter 2013] A CASE FOR GRADE INFLATION 539
on the data presented above, the difference is roughly 0.25 GPA
points at the median level. Given this, will raising grades in legal edu-
cation make a significant difference? There are four reasons to think
so. First, if a 2.7 good standing line is uniformly adopted, a majority of
the resulting grade inflation will take place at third- and fourth-tier
schools. The average GPA at fourth-tier institutions will likely rise
from 2.9 to 3.3 or 3.4, and in the third tier, it will move from 3.06 up
to the same level. Those are sizeable increases.196 Second, the GPA
gaps I presented are composites of every reporting school within each
tier. The gaps at many individual institutions are greater, and thus
raising the good standing line to B- will lead to larger grade increases
at those places than the mean gaps suggest. Third, as I noted at the
end of the last paragraph, GPA levels are not my central concern.
While I share Professor Krieger’s belief that the average grade in law
school is too low, my primary claim is that grades in the C range are a
critical problem independent of mean GPA. Setting good standing at
2.7 will both significantly raise the average GPA at most institutions
and substantially eliminate C marks at all law schools. Fourth, there is
anecdotal evidence that raising grades and eliminating C’s each, inde-
pendently, improve psychological well-being. To illustrate the former,
the Associate Dean for Academic Affairs at UC Davis School of Law
concluded that when his school raised its curve, the mood on campus
improved.197 To illustrate the latter, at my institution, we adopted a
mandatory mean and amended our grading scale, effective the fall of
2011.198 By design, these changes significantly reduced the number of
C-type grades awarded without altering the mean grade point average.199
Critically, the spring of 2012 was the first spring semester in my eight
years of teaching that no first-year law student came to my office in
January or February asking whether his or her C marks warranted
196. Note that such grade inflation will not impact the ability of a school to flunk out a
larger percentage of its students, if it chooses to follow that approach. See Theodore P.
Seto, Understanding the U.S. News Rankings, 60 SMU L. Rev. 493, 528 (2007) (observing that
some schools academically dismiss a higher portion of their first-year classes in order to
boost bar passage rates); see also Sander, supra note 162, at 437 (setting forth attrition rates
for various groups of law schools). All the school will have to do is adjust its grading prac-
tices so that the same number of students earn Cs or lower under the inflated system as
receive Ds or lower under the current grading policy.
197. See Caron, supra note 131.
198. See Silverstein, supra note 79, at 332–36.
199. We did this by keeping the mean at roughly 3.05, but altering the grade scale such
that each letter grade is now worth a lower grade point value than before. For example, B
and B- were valued at 3.25 and 3.0 under our old scale, but are worth 3.0 and 2.7 under the
new scale. Compare UNIV. OF ARK. AT LITTLE ROCK, supra note 44, at 1, with UNIV. OF ARK. AT
LITTLE ROCK, supra note 78, at 12.
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dropping out of school. As I said, such evidence is anecdotal. But it is
telling nonetheless.
The second objection to my claim that grade inflation will help
our students psychologically is that we really do not know what per-
centage of law student mental distress flows from marks in the C range
and low GPAs and what percentage flows from other causes.200 For
example, Professor Grant Morris explains that “for students who have
previously scored highly on examinations as undergraduates, anything
less than competitive success on law school exams is interpreted by them
as failure.”201 “Competitive success” means relative success—students
expect a high class rank, not just high absolute grades.202 If one-hun-
dred percent of our students are convinced that they will finish in the
top ten percent of their class, then ninety-percent of them are des-
tined for disappointment. It is clear that a 2.7 good standing GPA will
not help law students to the extent that their psychological health is
contingent upon class rank.
This objection can be expanded further. I have discussed or cited
scientific studies, research compilations, and other reliable evidence,
for most of the points in this section. But I have not yet proffered any
scientific research directly supporting the three hypotheses that con-
stitute the essence of my argument: (1) marks in the C range and low
absolute GPAs each, independently, cause mental distress in law stu-
dents; (2) such mental distress results, in large part, because the
grades awarded in law school are not consistent with the students’
grade expectations flowing from their prior schooling; and (3) such
distress is pedagogically harmful. Instead, I have supported these
points by drawing inferences from valid research on related proposi-
tions and with anecdotal evidence that is directly relevant. The skepti-
cal reader might reasonably conclude that this is not sufficient.
There are two recent scientific studies that directly address my
hypotheses. The first study was conducted by Professor Krieger and
Professor Kennon M. Sheldon, a psychologist.203 It analyzed changes
200. For a list of some of these causes, see supra note 148.
201. Morris, supra note 147, at 451.
202. See LINDA F. WIGHTMAN, LSAC NATIONAL LONGITUDINAL BAR PASSAGE STUDY 5, 70
(1998), available at http://www.unc.edu/edp/pdf/NLBPS.pdf (in this comprehensive
study that contains five years of data from 163 law schools, thirty-four percent of beginning
law students predicted that they would finish in the top ten percent of their graduating
classes and ninety-nine percent predicted that they would finish in the top half).
203. Kennon M. Sheldon & Lawrence S. Krieger, Understanding the Negative Effects of
Legal Education on Law Students: A Longitudinal Test of Self-Determination Theory, 33 PERSONAL-
ITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 883 (2007).
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in subjective well-being and psychological needs satisfaction of law stu-
dents during their three years in law school.204 The study involved one
class of students at Florida State University and one class from an-
other, unidentified institution.205 Krieger and Sheldon found statisti-
cally significant positive correlations between third-year GPA and both
third-year subjective well-being and two other psychological variables
that influence educational outcomes.206 This supports my first hypoth-
esis that low grades damage mental health and my third hypothesis
that such distress hinders student learning.207
204. Id. at 883; see also id. at 884–87 (explaining the theoretical framework underlying
the study).
205. Id. at 886–87 (explaining the parameters of the study and noting that these two
schools were also the subjects of the authors’ prior study); Kennon M. Sheldon & Law-
rence S. Krieger, Does Legal Education Have Undermining Effects on Law Students? Evaluating
Changes in Motivation, Values, and Well-Being, 22 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 261, 265 (2004) (explain-
ing that the two law schools in the study were Florida State University and another, uniden-
tified institution).
206. Sheldon & Krieger, supra note 203, at 889. The correlation between third-year
GPA and third-year subjective well-being was .15, with a p-value of .05. Id.; see also id. at
887–88 (describing how subjective well-being was measured in the study). But see Zimmer-
man, supra note 150, at 314 n.45 (stating that this correlation in the Sheldon/Krieger study
“was not strong”). The correlation between third-year GPA and third-year “competence”
was .25, with a p-value of .01. Sheldon & Krieger, supra note 203, at 889; see also id. at 885,
888 (describing “competence” and how it was measured in the study). The correlation
between third-year GPA and “autonomy support” was .16, with a p-value of .05. Id. at 889;
see also id. at 884, 886–88 (describing “autonomy support” and how it was measured in the
study).
207. A few points about Sheldon and Krieger’s previous study are worth noting. That
paper assessed changes in subjective well-being, motivation, and values for one class of law
students at Florida State University during their legal education. Sheldon & Krieger, supra
note 205, at 261, 265–66. The authors found that during the first year of law school, the
students in the study “experienced large reductions in positive effect, life satisfaction, and
overall SWB [subjective well-being], and large increases in negative affect, depression, and
physical symptoms.” Id. at 272. However, Sheldon and Krieger also found “that these main
effects were not moderated by . . . first-semester GPA.” Id. (emphasis added); see also id. at 275
n.2 (“To evaluate the effects of first-semester GPA we conducted a separate regression
analysis for each SWB variable . . . . In no cases was the GPA effect significant.” (emphasis
added)). These findings appear to undercut my first hypothesis that low grades negatively
impact mental health. If GPA were correlated with well-being and other psychological vari-
ables, one would reasonably expect a higher GPA to moderate changes in well-being et al.
But that did not happen in the study. See Zimmerman, supra note 150, at 314 (offering the
following description of the results quoted above from the Sheldon and Krieger study: “In
fact, one empirical research project found that law students’ first-semester grade point
average was unrelated to decreases in well-being that occurred during the first year of law
school.” (emphasis added)). However, when I contacted Sheldon and Krieger to discuss
their paper, they expressed important reservations about the relevancy of their findings to
my first hypothesis.
First, they explained that the unpublished data gathered for this study did show a corre-
lation between first-year GPA and subjective well-being in the fall of the second year. See E-
mail from Professor Kennon M. Sheldon, Professor of Psychology, University of Missouri,
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The second study is Professor Zimmerman’s three-year survey of
the students at one law school.208 Multiple parts of Zimmerman’s pa-
per are salient. To start with, Zimmerman investigated “whether there
was any relationship between students doing better or worse than they
expected and students’ attitudes regarding their law school experi-
ence.”209 To assess this, she compared selected survey responses of stu-
dents who earned lower grades than they expected to receive during
the first year (those with a “negative grade gap”) to the responses of
students who earned higher grades than they expected to receive dur-
ing the first year (those with a “positive grade gap”).210 On average,
the students with a positive grade gap agreed more strongly with all of
the survey items, but only some of their differences from the other
group were statistically significant.211 Zimmerman found statistically
significant differences for the following survey questions:
(1) “My first year of law school has been interesting”;
(2) “In general, I have received grades during my first year of law
school that I felt reflected my judgment as to the quality of my work”;
(3) “I have been satisfied with my grades during my first year of law
school”; and
(4) “I have gotten good grades during my first year of law school.”212
There was no statistically significant difference for any other survey
items compared, including the following:
to Author (Sep. 26, 2012, 15:25 CST) (on file with author) (“I just took a quick look at
the . . . data and it appears that [time 3] SWB is positively correlated with [time 3] GPA (p
< .05).”); see also Sheldon & Krieger, supra note 205, at 267 (explaining that “time 3” in the
study was in November of the students’ second year of law school); E-mail from Professor
Lawrence S. Krieger, Professor of Law, Florida State University, to Author (Sep. 27, 2012,
9:47 EST) (on file with author) (“I agree with Ken, that [time 3] correlation is solid.”).
Second, Professor Sheldon explained that the statistical test used to reach the findings
quoted in the previous paragraph does not address the correlation of GPA with the various
psychological factors, and thus it is methodologically improper to draw conclusions about
correlations (or a lack thereof) from the findings. See E-mail from Professor Kennon M.
Sheldon, Professor of Psychology, University of Missouri, to Author (Sep. 26, 2012, 17:01
CST) (on file with author); E-mail from Professor Kennon M. Sheldon, Professor of Psy-
chology, University of Missouri, to Author (Sep. 27, 2012, 9:37 CST) (on file with author).
Given these points, I believe that the first study by Sheldon and Krieger does not suffi-
ciently support or undercut my position to warrant discussion in the body of the article.
208. See Zimmerman, supra note 150, at 322–24 (setting forth the parameters of the
study).
209. Id. at 340.
210. Id. at 340. For additional details on precisely which students were included in the
two categories, see id. at 338–40.
211. Id. at 341–42.
212. Id. at 342 (emphasis added to all four survey questions). But see id. at 354 n.212
(explaining that with respect to the survey item about whether the first year was interesting
(item (1)), “[b]oth groups’ average response . . . was over four . . . indicating that on
average both groups agreed that the first year of law school had been interesting”).
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(5) “I have enjoyed my first year of law school”;
(6) “I enjoy studying law in law school”;
(7) “I am looking forward to continuing to study law in law school”;
(8) “I am looking forward to returning for my second year of law school”;
(9) “I will enjoy being a lawyer”; and
(10) “I am glad that I decided to attend law school.”213
Zimmerman concluded that these results suggest the following:
(a) “although many students come to law school with unrealistically
optimistic grade expectations, law students are relatively resilient in
the face of this potentially disappointing situation,”214 (b) “law stu-
dents’ unrealistically high grade expectations may not necessarily per-
vade all aspects of their law school experience,”215 and (c) “contrary
to some of the suggestions in the literature regarding law students and
grading, students may not disengage from law school upon receiving
disappointing grades.”216 Zimmerman’s findings regarding the lim-
ited impact of grade expectations plainly cut against my second hy-
pothesis that the psychological harm induced by low marks results
primarily from law schools awarding worse grades than the students
are accustomed to receiving. Less obviously, her findings also under-
cut my third hypothesis that mental distress compromises student
learning. Recall my argument: Disappointing grades damage student’s
psychological health, which causes students to disengage, frustrating
the educational process. But again, Zimmerman’s findings suggest
that “students may not disengage from law school upon receiving dis-
appointing grades.”217 Accordingly, perhaps low marks do not inhibit
student learning.
Zimmerman further analyzed whether students’ attitudes about
law school are related to their absolute GPA. To do this, she grouped
the respondents with a grade gap into three categories based on GPA
levels, and then compared their answers to the same survey items.218
Here, Zimmerman found statistically significant differences for more
of the survey questions—using the numbering above, for items (1),
213. Id. at 342 & n.158 (emphasis added to all six survey questions). There were two
other survey items—(11) “Law school courses should be graded on a curve” and (12) “The
courses that I have taken in my first year of law school have helped prepare me to be a
lawyer”—and no statistical difference was found for these items either. Id. at 340–41.
214. Id. at 354.
215. Id. at 355.
216. Id.
217. Id. (emphasis added).
218. Id. at 343 (category 1 = students with a GPA of 3.33 or higher, category 2 = stu-
dents with a GPA under 3.33 and above 2.67, and category 3 = students with a GPA of 2.67
or below).
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(2), (3), (4), (5), and (6).219 Higher GPA correlated with stronger
agreement with each of these survey questions.220 The key difference
from the expectations results in the previous paragraph was for items
(5) and (6), which concern enjoyment of law school.221 Zimmerman
observed that this variation raises “the possibility that students’ actual
law school grades might be a more salient factor in students’ enjoy-
ment of law school than students’ grades relative to their expecta-
tions.”222 This supports my first hypothesis concerning the
relationship of GPA to psychological well-being. But once again, there
was no statistically significant difference between the three groups for
items (7), (8), (9), and (10).223 Zimmerman explained that these re-
sults suggest that “grades might not be as salient with respect to stu-
dents’ overall satisfaction with their law school attendance or
anticipated satisfaction with their future professional life.”224 And this
undercuts my first and third hypotheses.225
The findings from these studies are contradictory. This calls for
further research, as Krieger, Sheldon, and Zimmerman recom-
mend,226 and limits the studies’ value in determining the accuracy of
my three hypotheses. I also have another, deeper concern with the
studies: Neither controls for class rank in assessing the impacts of
grade expectations and actual grades. Recall Professor Morris’s point
that students expect to achieve “competitive success,”227 which I inter-
preted to mean relative success.228 If class rank is significantly more
important to students than absolute grade levels, then it is possible
219. Id. at 343–44.
220. Id. at 376. The results are actually more complicated than this. For a complete
explanation and breakdown, see id. at 344, 376.
221. There was also a difference for item (11) regarding whether law school grading
should be on a curve. Id. at 344 (explaining that there were statistically significant differ-
ences in the students’ responses to this survey question).
222. Id. at 361.
223. Id. at 344 & n.163.
224. Id. at 364.
225. There is one other piece of Zimmerman’s study worth noting. In response to the
question asking students whether they agreed with the statement “I have been satisfied with
my grades during my first year of law school” (item (3)), a majority of all students (not just
those with a grade gap) responded that they strongly disagreed, disagreed, or neither
agreed or disagreed— roughly 64% in survey year 1, 60% in survey year 2, and 56% in
survey year three; the rest of the students answered that they either strongly agreed or
agreed with the statement. Id. at 332, 373 (emphasis added). In other words, only around
40% of the students were satisfied with their grades.
226. See Sheldon & Krieger, supra note 205, at 282–83; Sheldon & Krieger, supra note
203, at 895; Zimmerman, supra note 150, at 355, 366.
227. Morris, supra note 147, at 451.
228. See supra text accompanying note 202.
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that all of the correlations (or lack thereof) that Zimmerman, Shel-
don, and Krieger identify are capturing class rank effects instead of
absolute grade effects. Of course, it may be quite difficult to design a
study that measures the significance of grade levels independent of
class rank. But definitive conclusions on my three hypotheses cannot
be reached without such work.
Where does all of this leave the second objection? That depends
on one’s disposition. I concede that the lack of scientific evidence di-
rectly and definitively supporting my three hypotheses is an important
limitation. For those only willing to make policy changes in the educa-
tional setting when such evidence is proffered, my argument should
be unconvincing. But when operating in a context where there is little
or no reliance interest, this approach grants too much weight to the
status quo. Remember, the scientific evidence here is essentially
equally divided. And it is only two studies involving three law schools.
Moreover, because both studies do not control for class rank, their
findings may be of questionable value regarding my three hypotheses.
Thus, neither my opponents nor I can claim a scientific mandate for
our positions. But I am willing to amend most law school rules with
less support, such as the type of evidence I presented above: Extensive
anecdotal evidence and inference from a large body of valid research
on related propositions. Given that standard, the objection fails.
The third argument against my view is that students will eventu-
ally figure out that B grades are “average” or “low.” Once that hap-
pens, such grades will be as upsetting as C marks are now. I have two
responses. First, even if this is true, it is not a significant concern. If
law schools can get five, four, or even three years of improved mental
well-being out of grade inflation, that would be a valuable accomplish-
ment. In addition, law faculty will have learned that we possess limited
control over the psychological distress caused by absolute grade levels.
We can then focus our energies elsewhere in the quest to improve the
mental well-being of our students.
Second, based on my review of the literature, there is little evi-
dence that undergraduate and graduate students are starting to view B
grades with the same loathing that they have for C marks. This is so
despite the fact that B’s have been particularly common throughout
higher education for at least forty-years.229 Indeed, at the graduate
level, B-type grades have been the lowest passing marks since the
229. See, e.g., Adelman, supra note 165, at 24 (noting that B’s made up 31.2% of grades
in the mid-1970s, 32.8% of grades in the mid-1980s, and 29.9% of grades in the mid-1990s;
B was the most common grade in every time period).
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1970s.230 If law schools adopt similar grading practices, there is no
reason to believe that our students will react differently from their
counterparts throughout the academy.
Remember, the problem with C grades in legal education is not
that they are viewed as “average” or “low.” It is that they are viewed as
“unsatisfactory” or even “failing.” Our students perceive C marks in
this way principally because of the disjunction between law school and
undergraduate grading practices. Under my proposal, this disjunction
will disappear: There will no longer be any passing grade in law school
that sends a failing signal to students because the grade was viewed as
unsatisfactory in college. As long as grade inflation does not reach the
point where B’s become rare in undergraduate and law school set-
tings, such grades will likely never be viewed with the same contempt
that C marks are today.
The fourth counter-argument against my position is that law stu-
dents are adults, and as adults they should have the mental fortitude
to handle receiving grades in the C range. Indeed, the disappoint-
ment of low grades is beneficial; it is a useful tool for weeding out
students who will not be able to manage the pressures of practicing
law. For example, if Student X is inclined to drop out of school over C
marks, how might X react when his client faces the possibility of signif-
icant civil damages, a failed business transaction, the loss of child cus-
tody, a prison sentence, or execution for capital murder? The
signature problem with this line of reasoning is that the premise is
wrong: Most of our students are not adults; they are adolescents. A ma-
jority of those who enroll in law school are between the ages of twenty-
one and twenty-four.231 And it is now well accepted that adolescence
continues into the mid-twenties.232 Given that the bulk of our pupils
have not yet reached full maturity, I question the efficacy of C grades
as a tool for measuring law students’ capacity to handle challenges
they will face after graduation. Moreover, C’s inaccurately convey to
230. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
231. See KIMBERLY DUSTMAN & PHIL HANDWERK, LSAC, ANALYSIS OF LAW SCHOOL APPLI-
CANTS BY AGE GROUP 3, 9 (2010), available at http://www.lsac.org/LSACResources/Data/
PDFs/Analysis-Applicants-by-Age-Group.pdf. According to the LSAC report, persons from
age twenty-two to twenty-four make up nearly fifty percent of all law school applicants, and
those who are twenty-one or younger constitute another 4.5 percent. Id. at 3. Those two
categories also have the highest admittance rate and the highest enrollment rate among
admittees. Id. at 9. From these points, it follows that a majority of law students must be
twenty-five or younger when they begin law school. And it is quite likely that a majority are
actually twenty-four or younger.
232. Seymour Moskowitz, Save the Children: The Legal Abandonment of American Youth in
the Workplace, 43 AKRON L. REV. 107, 150 & n.312 (2010) (collecting authorities).
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students that they lack the skills necessary to be competent practition-
ers. Whether students are adolescents or full adults, that is a signifi-
cantly more devastating message than just about any they will receive
in legal practice.233 This further limits the value of low marks as a
proxy for future stressors. I thus believe that any benefit to using C’s
as a screening tool is outweighed by the intrinsic and pedagogical
harms such grades cause young and old students alike. Finally, our
students must deal with stress induced by numerous aspects of legal
education. To the extent we want to test their mettle, we can ade-
quately do so without C marks.234
The last counter-argument is that grade inflation will cause the
opposite of my intended effect: Rather than helping our students, it
will actually lower their psychological well-being. Clifford Edwards, a
former professor of education, contends that students need “earned
self-esteem,” the type of esteem that “results from students working hard
to achieve goals,” not from “being given credit for poor work for fear
that expecting excellence may interfere with self-concept develop-
ment.”235 Edwards explains that the latter actually promotes pessi-
mism and depression.236 “The emphasis on self-esteem and its
companion grade inflation have created conditions in the schools
where students no longer have to meet challenges, overcome frustra-
tion, or demonstrate persistence in order to be successful.”237 This
deprives students of experiences that bolster “their sense of accom-
plishment and [improve] the quality of their performance.”238 To the
extent Edwards is focused on the harmful impacts of grade inflation
in high schools and colleges, I am certainly in no position to dispute
his conclusions. But I do not think his reasoning can be extended to
legal education. By the time our students reach law school, they have
internalized a grading framework under which C marks reflect poor
233. The author of the student note, Making Docile Lawyers, explains that law students
often “receive their grades as a definitive statement regarding their legal academic ability
and their potential as lawyers.” Making Docile Lawyers, supra note 149, at 2036. First-year
grades are “experienced as a personalized message informing them of their future pros-
pects. For the majority of students, this means a considerable lowering of their expecta-
tions, an adjustment that cannot help but be psychologically painful.” Id.
234. A related counter-argument is that the stress of C grades helps to prepare our
students for the rigors of practice. According to this viewpoint, rather than serving as a
screening device, low marks are good training for the challenges to come. This viewpoint is
unpersuasive for essentially the same reasons as the position I critique in the body.
235. Clifford H. Edwards, Grade Inflation: The Effects on Educational Quality and Personal
Well Being, 120 EDUCATION 538, 541 (2000).
236. Id.
237. Id.
238. Id. at 542.
548 UNIVERSITY OF SAN FRANCISCO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 47
and often failing performance. As a result, when law professors award
large numbers of such grades, we create the converse of the problem
Edwards identifies: Law students who receive C’s believe they failed
when in fact they succeeded.
A fairer placement market is the most tangible benefit our stu-
dents will receive under a B- good standing GPA. But the positive im-
pact on our students’ psychological well-being is almost as important,
both as a facilitator of greater learning and as an end in itself. “Stress,
depression, anxiety, chemical dependency, substance abuse, and
other mental health conditions and impairments among law students
are problems that have begun to spark a national dialogue amongst
faculty, staff, and students.”239 A movement to humanize legal educa-
tion has emerged in response to the growing body of research on law
student well-being.240 The central purpose of this movement is the
creation of “ ‘positive learning environments for students’ by reducing
or eliminating, to the extent possible, the ‘undue and unnecessary
stress’ of traditional legal education, which interferes with learn-
ing.”241 It is my thesis that our continued use of C grades to denote
satisfactory performance is a major source of undue and unnecessary
stress. “As professors, we can no longer ignore the psychological dis-
tress that we inflict upon our students by our teaching methods and
our examinations.”242 Consistent with the philosophy of the humaniz-
ing legal education movement, it is time for law schools to substan-
tially eliminate C grades.243
239. LAW STUDENT DIV., AM. BAR ASSOC., TOOL KIT FOR STUDENT BAR ASSOCIATIONS AND
ADMINISTRATORS 1 (2008).
240. Leslie M. Rose, Norm-Referenced Grading in the Age of Carnegie: Why Criteria-Referenced
Grading Is More Consistent with Current Trends in Legal Education and How Legal Writing Can
Lead the Way, 17 LEGAL WRITING: J. LEGAL WRITING INST. 123, 141 (2011).
241. Id. (quoting Barbara Glesner Fines, Fundamental Principles and Challenges of Human-
izing Legal Education, 47 WASHBURN L.J. 313, 314, 318 (2007–2008)); see also Morris, supra
note 147, at 454 n.76 (“Unnecessary psychological distress . . . , especially distress that
debilitates the student or discourages the student from the learning process, should be
addressed and eliminated.”).
242. Morris, supra note 147, at 453; accord Fines, supra note 163, at 641–45 (explaining
the responsibility of faculty to respond to law school stress).
243. I wish to briefly identify one additional point in favor of substantially eliminating
C grades: Grade inflation will improve the operation of grade normalization policies in
some circumstances. For example, many schools exempt selected courses from normaliza-
tion requirements, such as smaller classes, seminars, and clinics. See Silverstein, supra note
79, at 310, 316, 322. This tends to cause grade disparities between regulated and exempt
courses. See id. at 315. Raising the good standing GPA to 2.7 will typically require increasing
the mean in regulated classes, which should close the unfair grading gap between regu-
lated and exempt courses.
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IV. Objections to Substantially Eliminating C Grades
Critics of grade inflation have three principal objections: (1) in-
flation results in the awarding of grades that students did not earn; (2)
inflation causes problematic grade compression; and (3) inflation in-
duces students to study less. I respond to each of these objections in
this part.
A. Objection 1: “Students Should Not Receive B Grades for ‘C
Work’”
Perhaps the most common objection to grade inflation is that it
results in students receiving grades that are higher than they deserve.
Setting the good standing GPA at B- substantially eliminates grades in
the C range. This compels law professors to award B grades for “C
work.” Grades thus become too high in an absolute sense. That, the
objection continues, is pedagogically wrong.244 Such reasoning is fa-
tally flawed at a conceptual level.
To establish that grade inflation bars teachers from awarding the
“correct” grade, there must be an independently valid or shared con-
cept of desert that consistently determines when a student merits an
A, a B, a C, or some other grade. But no such concept exists. In higher
education, professors have substantial disagreements regarding the
standards that should be used to assess student performance. Most
importantly, we have different understandings of what constitutes “A
work,” “B work,” and “C work.” These designations are used in dra-
matically varying ways by (1) different academic fields, (2) different
schools within the same field, (3) different professors within the same
school, (4) different professors within the same department, and (5)
even different professors who teach the same class.245 To illustrate, in
244. See, e.g., Rojstaczer & Healy, Where A is Ordinary, supra note 46, at 13 (“Even if
grades were to instantly and uniformly stop rising, colleges and universities are, as a result
of five decades of mostly rising grades, already grading in a way that is well divorced from
actual student performance, and not just in an average nationwide sense.”); Grade Inflation:
Are academic standards being lowered?, 12 CQ RESEARCHER 505, 505 (2002) [hereinafter Grade
Inflation: Are Academic Standards Being Lowered?] (“[Critics] warn that unjustifiably high
grades mislead colleges and graduate schools, potential employers and students them-
selves.” (emphasis added)).
245. See Paul T. Wangerin, Calculating Rank-in-Class Numbers: The Impact of Grading Dif-
ferences Among Law School Teachers, 51 J. LEGAL EDUC. 98, 99 (2001) (“For years, statisticians
and educational researchers have explored the foregoing grading-differences problem in
complex statistical studies of grading data. These studies have universally demonstrated
that different departments in the overall university grade differently.”); id. at 100 n.1 (iden-
tifying four studies described in the previous parenthetical); id. at 112 (finding that “dra-
matic differences in the definitions of letter grades” existed within the law school that was
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some academic programs, “C” expressly means satisfactory perform-
ance, while in others it denotes failing work.246 Matters are no better
in secondary education. Grades vary by teacher, by subject area, by
school, by district, and over time.247 “Research has demonstrated that
grades are not comparable across courses and that there is considera-
ble variation in grades that different instructors assign for the same
papers.”248
Letter-grade designations clearly lack the objective content neces-
sary to settle such differences. The scale of grades itself is wholly arbi-
trary.249 There are no conceptual dictates preventing us from labeling
“failing” grades “F,” “D,” “C,” or even “B,” as some graduate-level En-
glish departments do.250 Under my proposal, faculty will not be com-
pelled to award B grades for “C work” because there is no such thing
as “C work” independent of the grading system in place.251 If the
faculty at Law School X adopts a grading policy under which “B- work”
is performance that meets minimum competency and “C+ work” is
not, then that will be what those designations mean by definition at X.
Here is another way to think about the issue. Grade inflation is
often labeled as the “artificial” raising of grades. But since the scale of
grades is arbitrary, grades themselves are artificial to begin with. No
the subject of this study, and that the such differences existed “even with different sections
of the very same course” at the law school); Silverstein, supra note 79, at 259–62, 327–31
(same); HU, supra note 146, at 38-39 (summarizing studies of grade disparities across col-
lege departments); see also Fines, supra note 99, at 882 (“However, grades have as many
meanings as the criteria with which we test. . . . In sum, there are too many variations in
teaching and testing to be able to say that grades have a fixed meaning outside the class-
room.”). For an excellent literature review and a separate study of this issue, see JOHNSON,
supra note 159, at 197–209.
246. Compare supra notes 7–22 and accompanying text (C’s are failing), with supra notes
37–40 (C’s are satisfactory).
247. See Camara et al., supra note 175, at 4; id. at 4–5 (surveying the literature).
248. Id. at 5.
249. Stake, supra note 112, at 595; accord Keating, supra note 114, at 178–79 (explaining
that it is a “myth” the grades “A” or “B” or “C” have some “absolute meaning . . . wholly
apart from where that grade places a student within a particular class”); Kohn, supra note
165, at 4–5 (“To say that grades are . . . inflated—and that they are consequently ‘less
accurate now’, as the American Academy’s report puts it—is to postulate the existence of
an objectively correct evaluation of what a student (or an essay) deserves, the true grade
that ought to be uncovered and honestly reported. It would be an understatement to say
that this reflects a simplistic and an outdated view of knowledge and learning.” (quoting
ROSOVSKY & HARTLEY, supra note 7, at 12)). I think Kohn might be misreading Rosovsky
and Hartley, but his point about the problem with “objectively correct evaluation” stands.
250. See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
251. This explains why I did not attempt to justify my grade inflation proposal on the
ground that law students are currently performing work that is inherently of A and B
quality.
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set of labels is any more grounded in the fabric of the universe than
any other set.
Of course, this does not mean that grading is either arbitrary or
wholly subjective.252 There certainly is a great deal of objectivity in
assessment. In clear cases, there is much agreement among professors
about what constitutes “excellent,” “satisfactory,” and “failing” work.
The problem is that there is not enough consensus to establish that
grade inflation bars professors from awarding students the grades they
“deserve” in any absolute sense.253 In sum, terms like “arbitrary” and
“artificial” are apt descriptions for the particular labels we use—such as
“A,” “B,” “C,” “Banana,” “Red,” or “DEFCON 1”—but not for the meth-
ods we employ to assign those labels in particular cases.
Perhaps if we could get law students to understand all of this,
then C’s would not upset them so much, undercutting my second jus-
tification for grade inflation.254 But that goal is likely out of reach.
The faulty notion that grades are an objective measure of absolute
performance is deeply engrained in our society. Indeed, the position
is often embraced by those one would expect to resist it, such as uni-
versity professors working in fields that normally emphasize subjectiv-
ity and ambiguity.255 Given this, I am not hopeful that law students
will ever come to appreciate the artificial nature of grades.
252. See Silverstein, supra note 79, at 273.
253. See also id. at 291–95 (explaining the extraordinary difficulties inherent in devel-
oping the type of grading standards that might bring about the needed intersubjective
agreement).
254. See Zimmerman, supra note 150, at 356 n.218 (“[F]aculty could try to help stu-
dents adjust to the grading standards of law school by letting students know that grades
students might have considered ‘bad’ in their undergraduate experience are not consid-
ered ‘bad’ in law school.”).
255. See Johnson, supra note 159, at 9–10 (observing that the myth that grades “have a
consistent and objective meaning across classes . . . is often advocated most fervently by
individuals who, in most other aspects of their professional lives, reject the notion of objec-
tive, quantifiable, and hierarchical measures of quality”). Professor Johnson submitted a
proposal at Duke University to address grade disparities flowing from inconsistent grade
inflation across departments and among instructors. See id. at 2–3, 218–23. Under the pro-
posal, class rank is computed using a statistical methodology rather than raw GPA. Id. at
218–22. Teachers may still assign grades however they choose, but the impact on class rank
of marks awarded by uniformly high graders is significantly diluted. Id. at 222; see also id. at
209–18 (discussing grade adjustment schemes in general). Recognizing that their grades
would have less weight in class rank calculations, a number of professors challenged the
proposal on the ground that their high marks “represented an objective assessment of stu-
dent performance . . . on some well-defined but unobservable scale. Indeed, by the end of
the debate, several literary theorists had finally identified an objective piece of text: a student
grade.” Id. at 222 (first emphasis in original; second emphasis added). The proposal ulti-
mately was defeated. Id. at 2.
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B. Objection 2: “Substantially Eliminating C Grades Causes
Problematic Grade Compression”
The second objection to eliminating C’s is considerably more se-
rious. When grades increase, they become more concentrated at the
high end of the scale. This is known as “grade compression.”256 Signif-
icant compression can make it difficult for instructors to use grades to
distinguish between variations in achievement.257 Grades thus no
longer signal to students and other constituencies whether academic
performance is exemplary, acceptable, or defective.258 If grades lose
the ability to communicate useful information about achievement,
then critical problems result.
The first problem is that grade compression dilutes the marks of
better students. “If grades are heavily clustered at the top [of the
scale], it is not possible to know which students have done outstand-
ing work and which are just average.”259 Professor Richard Kamber
explains the mechanics of how inflation leads to this result:
When an A is awarded for what was previously B-level work, the
system loses its capacity to recognize the superiority of what had
been A-level work. . . . When Bs, for example, are awarded for what
was previously C-level work, then the only way to differentiate what
was previously B-level work is to award As to that work—which then
deprives the system of its capacity to recognize A-level work.260
When a grading system loses the ability to reward exceptional per-
formance, top students are treated unfairly. George Leef details why:
If all grades are compressed into A’s and B’s . . . then there is little
difference between the grade received by a student who has
worked to achieve a very high degree of comprehension of a sub-
ject, and a student who has exerted minimal effort and is content
with a vague and incomplete understanding of the subject. Just
256. See Alvaro Q. Barriga et al., Dialogue and Exchange of Information About Grade Infla-
tion Can Counteract Its Effects, 56 C. TEACHING 201, 201 (2008) (“With pervasive grade infla-
tion, grades begin to pile up at the high end of the scale, causing a condition known as
grade ‘compression.’”).
257. See William M. Abbott, The Politics of Grade Inflation: A Case Study, CHANGE MAG.,
Jan.–Feb. 2008, at 32 (“As grades become more concentrated in the upper ranges, less
discrimination is possible among the varied levels of student performance . . . .”). Note that
grade compression could also occur with grade deflation. See Kamber, supra note 157, at 47.
258. See Kamber, supra note 157, at 47 (“[G]rade inflation is best defined as a ‘reduc-
tion in the capacity of grades to provide true and useful information about student per-
formance as a result of upward shifts in grading patterns.’”).
259. Leef, supra note 165, at 1; accord Barriga et al., supra note 256, at 201 (“[Grade
compression] does not allow for adequate identification of differences toward the higher
end of the grading scale, and thus excellent performance is no longer differentiated from
good or possibly even mediocre performance.”).
260. Kamber, supra note 157, at 48.
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treatment is denied to high-achieving students when they are not
given grades that reflect their superior work.261
This unfairness is particularly severe when the loss of information
from grade compression prevents employers and graduate schools
from being able to identify the best performers for purposes of job
offers, admissions, scholarships, and other accolades.262 Indeed, if
grades lose their usefulness, these entities might adopt other metrics
for assessing students—such as standardized tests, the “prestige” of a
school, and personal connections—metrics that may have more seri-
ous deficiencies than grades.263
Compression also undercuts the motivational and guiding func-
tions of grading.264 For example, if professors cannot use marks to
distinguish among their students, they cannot signal to the students
whether they are putting in the requisite effort, need to implement
modest adjustments, or must make dramatic changes in their cour-
sework.265 Similarly, “[c]onflated grades can deny students informa-
tion that could be useful for choosing majors and careers . . . .”266 A
student might be significantly better at one subject than another. But
if compression results in the student’s grades across classes being es-
261. Leef, supra note 165, at 16; accord Barriga et al., supra note 256, at 201.
262. See Barriga et al., supra note 256, at 202 (“From a societal perspective, grade infla-
tion prevents universities from fulfilling one of their most useful functions—recognizing
and identifying different levels of achievement for other societal institutions. One aspect of
this function includes the gate-keeping service of blocking unqualified candidates from
certain professions. Another aspect of this function is to recognize outstanding achieve-
ments so that graduate schools and employers may most effectively select prospective can-
didates.”); Leef, supra note 165, at 15–16 (essentially making the same point).
263. See Kamber, supra note 157, at 58 (“Conflated grades can . . . deprive employers
and graduate programs of a counter-balance to standardized test scores or reliance on the
cruelly elitist criterion of institutional prestige.”); Leef, supra note 165, at 16 (“If objective
measures of student achievement fall by the wayside, it will lead to increased reliance on
non-objective ways of evaluating students. . . . [I]f it becomes harder for students to show
excellence because they earn superior grades, then there will be a tendency for business
interviewers and grad school admission committees to rely on ‘connections’ instead.”).
264. See Grade Inflation: Are Academic Standards Being Lowered?, supra note 244, at 516
(“Nonetheless, [Dean] Pederson continued, ‘Many faculty members agreed that the com-
pression of effective grades limited our ability to differentiate among our students’ work
and to motivate our students adequately.’”).
265. This problem should be distinguished from the last objection discussed in Part
IV.C., infra, that students will not work as hard if we substantially eliminate C grades. Here,
the focus is the motivational impact of the grade compression caused by grade inflation. In
Part IV.C., the focus is on the motivational impact of grade inflation per se, independent of
any compression. To some degree, however, the two points overlap, as the reader will see
in Part IV.C.
266. Kamber, supra note 157, at 58.
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sentially indistinguishable, the student may have no way of learning
this fact.
In sum, the second objection is that grade inflation leads to grade
compression, which reduces the capacity of grades to distinguish
among students, causing fairness, motivational, and guidance
problems. On the surface, this appears to be a compelling objection
to my proposal that law schools substantially eliminate C grades. But a
deeper inquiry establishes otherwise.
To begin with, it is important to distinguish between two types of
grade compression that can result from grade inflation. The first is a
reduction in the number of grade intervals. For example, assume that
School X has a traditional 4.0 grade scale that uses letter grades. The
good standing GPA at X is 2.0 (i.e. a C). Under this system, teachers
can award seven different grades that reflect minimum competency or
higher: A (4.0), A- (3.7), B+ (3.3), B (3.0), B- (2.7), C+ (2.3), and C
(2.0). If X inflates grades by raising the good standing line from 2.0 to
3.0 without making any other changes to the system, the number of
available grades that denote basic competency (or above) will drop
from seven to four. Professors will no longer be able to use the B-
(2.7), C+ (2.3) and C (2.0) intervals for satisfactory academic perform-
ance. Thus, all students who meet or exceed the level necessary for
continuation at the school will receive one of four grades rather than
one of seven. This reduction in grade intervals will make it more diffi-
cult for professors to distinguish among the varying degrees of
achievement of their students.267
The second type of compression is a shrinking of the mathematical
range of available grades. Continuing with the same example, after X
raises the good standing line, the GPA of every student qualified to
remain in school will fall between 3.0 (B) and 4.0 (A), whereas previ-
ously the range was from 2.0 (C) to 4.0 (A). This arguably limits the
usefulness of GPA and class rank as metrics for comparing student
performance.
It is possible to have one type of grade compression without the
other. To illustrate, School X could lower the good standing line from
2.0 to 1.0, but eliminate all plus and minus grades. This would expand
267. See Stake, supra note 112, at 607–08 (explaining that “coarse” grading systems—
i.e., those with few grade intervals—unfairly “conceal meaningful differences” in perform-
ance among students); id. at 616 (explaining that “[a]nother problem created by grade
inflation is that it reduces the number of useful grade intervals, turning fine grading scales
into course grading scales,” and that the “coarse grading” that results from grade inflation
causes “ambiguity in communication”).
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the mathematical range of the grades that constitute satisfactory work
from two grade points (4.0 minus 2.0) to three (4.0 minus 1.0), but
reduce the number of grade intervals within that range from seven to
four (A/4.0, B/3.0, C/2.0, and D/1.0). Alternatively, School X could
raise the good standing line from 2.0 to 3.0, but permit teachers to
award number grades at every tenth of a point. This would reduce the
mathematical range of satisfactory marks from two grade points (4.0
minus 2.0) to one (4.0 minus 3.0), but expand the number of grade
intervals within that range from seven to eleven (3.0, 3.1, etc. up to
4.0).
The second example in the previous paragraph illustrates why it
is possible to design grading systems that allow for substantial inflation
without any reduction in the number of grade levels (the first type of
compression): A law school can adopt a fine grade scale with a large
number of intervals, such as a four-point or 100-point scale that uses
number grades instead of letters.268 There are several reasons why
such systems are superior to coarse scales that employ only a small
group of letter marks.269 But for my purposes here, the key point is
that they permit inflation without any interval reduction.
Let me offer a more detailed illustration. Consider an inflated,
number grade scale that runs from 4.0 down to 1.5, where 2.7 is the
good standing GPA, 2.0 is the lowest credit grade, 3.3 is either the
normalized or de facto mean, and grades are awarded to the tenth of a
point. This is essentially the structure that I am recommending to all
268. See, e.g., Grading System, GOULD SCH. OF LAW, UNIV. OF S. CAL., http://lawweb.usc.
edu/why/academics/curriculum/gradingSystem.cfm (last visited Feb. 22, 2013) (grades
are to the tenth of a point and run from 1.9 to 4.4); THE UNIV. OF IOWA COLL. OF LAW,
supra note 59, at 22 (grades are to the tenth of a point and run from 1.5 to 4.3); UNIV. OF
ARK. AT LITTLE ROCK, supra note 44, at 1 (grades are to the tenth of a point and run from
1.2 to 4.0); Explanation of Grading System, WASH. U. IN ST. LOUIS SCH. OF LAW, http://law.
wustl.edu/Registrar/pages.aspx?id=2236 (last visited Feb. 22, 2013) [hereinafter Washing-
ton University Grading System] (grades are to the point and run from 70 to 100).
Note that the lowest grade in each of these systems is well above zero. The reason is
that if the F grade is far below the mean and good standing GPAs, such marks have too
much weight in determining class rank, absolute GPA, and whether a student is eligible to
remain in school. See Stake, supra note 112, at 614–17 (explaining these problems). In-
deed, a single F can cause a student to flunk out who otherwise earned satisfactory marks.
Thus, if an institution inflates grades by adopting my proposed 2.7 good standing GPA, the
lowest possible mark should be raised as well, to something in the 1.5 range. See Silverstein,
supra note 79, at 332 (proposing that F run from 1.9 down to 1.5, with the latter being the
worst possible grade).
269. For a summary of the advantages, see Silverstein, supra note 79, at 333 n.306. For
more detailed discussions, see Stake, supra note 112, at 606–10; William K.S. Wang, The
Injustice of Reducing the Number of Levels in a Grading System, 57 J. LEGAL EDUC. 423, 423-26
(2007); and Keating, supra note 114, at 180–182.
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law schools.270 Under this system, there are fourteen grades from
good standing up to the highest mark (2.7 to 4.0), including seven
above the mean (3.4 to 4.0) and six below (3.2 to 2.7). Compare this
to a more traditional letter system similar to the one used by School X,
involving a 2.0 good standing GPA and a mean of 3.0. Under that
approach, there are only seven or eight grades from the good stand-
ing line to the top of the scale—C, C+, B-, B, B+, A-, A, and sometimes
A+ (valued at 4.3). And among these, there are just three or four
grades above the mean (B+, A-, A, and perhaps A+) and three below
(B-, C+, and C). If the letter scales used by most law schools today have
a sufficient number of intervals, then the same must be true for an
inflated, number system employing substantially more grade levels. In-
deed, because of the greater number of intervals, teachers using the
inflated number scale actually have considerably more ability to distin-
guish among the performances of their students than those working
with the standard letter system, despite the substantial elimination of
C grades.271
Even if a school that adopts the 2.7 good standing GPA retains
letter marks, its grading system can still be designed to include
enough intervals so that faculty can effectively distinguish among the
various degrees of student performance. First, the school can use all
of the available plus and minus marks. This means that the institution
will have at least six grades from the good standing line to the top of
the scale (B-, B, B+, A-, A, and A+). Second, the number of acceptable
marks can be increased to seven by adding an “AB” grade, which is
sometimes used by other graduate institutions and is typically valued
at 3.5 on a 4.0 or 4.3 scale.272 Under such a system, professors can
award (1) A+ and A grades for top performance, (2) A-, AB, and B+
marks for mid-range achievement, (3) B and B- for marginal but satis-
factory work, and (4) C+ or below for performance that fails to meet
minimum competency. This suggests that an inflated grade scale with
seven marks at or above the good standing line is sufficient to make
the distinctions necessary to avoid the fairness, motivational, and gui-
dance problems that can result from a reduction in grade intervals.
To elaborate, by setting the good standing GPA at 2.7, a law
school is telling its students that B- grades demonstrate only minimum
competency, and that marks in the C range are unacceptable. As a
270. See supra note 107 and accompanying text; Silverstein, supra note 79, at 332.
271. See Silverstein, supra note 79, at 333 n.306; Stake, supra note 112, at 606–10; Wang,
supra note 269, at 423-26; Keating, supra note 114, at 180–82.
272. See, e.g., W. MICH. UNIV., supra note 8.
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result, those grades are available to signal to students that their work
product is weak or deficient. This alleviates the concern that inflation
and compression in the form of interval reduction will blunt the tools
needed to warn struggling students of problems with their perform-
ance. Similarly, A+ and A grades can be reserved for the best pupils.
This means that, post-inflation, a school will also have enough grade
levels to allow for the recognition of high degrees of accomplishment.
Note further that inflating schools can still use aggregate GPA
and class rank to distinguish among students.273 As Professor Harry
Brighouse explains, GPA is typically calculated to two decimal
places.274 Thus, “[c]ompression at the top would have to be much
more severe than any of its critics actually claim before it became im-
possible to distinguish between students on this basis.”275 To be sure,
the numerical difference between particular ranks will be smaller
under my system. For example, two students “might be only 0.2 apart,
rather than 0.35 apart.”276 But as long as the students are ranked
ordinally, consumers of transcript data—including pupils, graduate
schools, and employers—will still be able to see where students place
in relation to each other.277 And that is the most reliable information
provided by grades.
Prior to the adoption of our current grading policy, my law
school used only seven intervals from good standing upward.278
Under that system, we were able to differentiate among our students
until significant grade inflation limited use of the lower portion of the
scale. Before the inflation, we had the tools necessary to recognize the
superior achievement of our best students, convey to average perform-
ers their satisfactory status, and warn marginal pupils of their precari-
ous academic standing.
More significantly, systems with six or fewer grade levels reflecting
satisfactory performance have worked throughout the rest of the acad-
emy for decades. One might reply that grades play a more important
role in law school than in some other graduate divisions. Alternatively,
there could be a wider range of abilities in the typical law school than
273. Brighouse, supra note 186, at 76 (“It is worth noting that even if, say, a B- were the
lowest grade that any student received it would still be possible to discriminate between
students on the basis of their entire GPA . . . .”). Of course, this will not work at a school
that does not rank.
274. Id.
275. Id.
276. Id.
277. See id.
278. See UNIV. OF ARK. AT LITTLE ROCK, supra note 78, at 12.
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among, say, the graduate students in a standard English department.
But these responses are unpersuasive. As I explained in Part I, the use
of grading systems with six or less intervals from the good standing
line upward is nearly universal among other graduate programs. This
type of system is employed in business schools, engineering schools,
schools of education, medical schools, nursing schools, and in the lib-
eral arts and sciences, among other fields. Given the global efficacy of
grade scales with a small number of intervals, there is little basis for
believing that such an approach will not work in legal education. To
the extent my opponents contend otherwise, they shoulder the bur-
den of proof to establish that law schools comprise the only sector of
the academy where seven or six “passing” grades is insufficient to
make the necessary distinctions in student achievement.279
As I stated above, the reduction in grade intervals is only the first
type of compression. The second type is a reduction in the mathemati-
cal range of the available marks. Under my proposal, the spread of
grades from the good standing line upward will drop at most law
schools from 2.0 or 2.3 grade points (4.3 or 4.0 minus 2.0) down to 1.6
or 1.3 grade points (4.3 or 4.0 minus 2.7). This could cause two dis-
tinct problems.
The first is that the compression of student GPAs into a tighter
range might make it more difficult for employers to distinguish
among students on the basis of GPA. Top students will not be as far
from the mean. And those in the middle will be more tightly
bunched. There are five reasons why this is not a serious concern.
First, the GPA scale is arbitrary. Thus, there is no per se difference
between a wider spread of absolute GPAs and a narrower spread.
Neither more accurately reflects variations in student performance.
Indeed, a school could squeeze every grade between 3.70 and 4.00,
with teachers awarding grades to the hundredth of a point. Such a
system would ultimately function like a 100-point scale running from
70-100.280 Second, while employers might be accustomed to a particu-
lar relationship between GPA differences and variations in student
achievement, they should quickly adjust to the tighter spread, espe-
cially if law schools publicly explain the new system, and it is widely
279. There is one additional point worth noting: Some first-tier law schools have al-
ready effectively reduced the number of grade levels they award to six. While these institu-
tions still technically use C grades to denote minimum competency, see supra notes 38–40
and accompanying text (explaining that virtually all reporting schools set the good stand-
ing GPA in the C range), a number have all but ceased awarding marks below B-, see supra
notes 49–56 and accompanying text.
280. See, e.g., Washington University Grading System, supra note 268.
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implemented throughout legal education. Third, the decrease in the
grade range will not be that large at many schools. A fair number of
institutions will only drop from a 2.3 or 2.0 grade range of satisfactory
marks down to 1.6. This includes both schools already operating on a
4.3 scale and schools currently using 4.0 as the top grade that will
adopt the A+ mark (worth 4.3) to facilitate their continued use of a
letter grade system. Moving from 2.3 to 1.6 is a decrease of less than
one-third, and a change from 2.0 to 1.6 is only a twenty percent reduc-
tion in the grade range. Such changes should not cause serious
problems for employers.281 Fourth, a more limited range of GPAs has
worked in the rest of the academy for decades. And there is, again,
little basis for believing that what has universally succeeded in other
graduate programs will not be effective in legal education. Fifth, em-
ployers will still be able to differentiate among students using class
rank, which a majority of schools make publicly available. As I ex-
plained above,282 GPA is generally calculated to two decimal places.
Thus, even with more significant GPA compression than will occur
under my proposal, students can still be ranked ordinally, allowing
employers to determine a student’s relative standing within the class.
The second potential problem with a tightening of the GPA
range is that class rank and GPA could become less statistically reliable
indicators. With the students compressed into a tighter range, small
movements in GPA will alter a person’s class rank more than under a
non-inflated system. And GPA will be more variable because the im-
pact of changing a single letter mark will be greater given the nar-
rower scale of grades. Thus, there might be more statistical “noise” in
GPA and class rank, particularly at the center of the bell curve. This
too is not a major concern.
First, the problem can be avoided entirely by adopting a number
grade scale with abundant intervals. Under such a system, GPA and
class rank differences will be at least as statistically meaningful as they
are in a traditional system because the space between the available
grades will shrink by a larger amount than the overall scale does. The
difference between grade levels will drop by two-thirds or more (from
0.4, 0.33, or 0.3 down to 0.1), while the scale will decrease by forty-
four percent at most (from 2.3 down to 1.3). Student GPAs will be
compressed into a narrower band in the inflated system, but it will be
more difficult to move up and down that band since grades will vary
281. Note that my preference is for all schools to adopt number grades and set 4.0 as
the highest mark. But I do not expect that to happen.
282. See supra notes 273–277 and accompanying text.
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by such a small amount. Second, at schools that retain letter marks,
the scale will generally be shrinking from 2.3 or 2.0 grade points down
to 1.6. As I explained above, those are not dramatic changes.283 Third,
smaller grade ranges universally work in other departments of the uni-
versity. Thus, once again, they should be sufficient in law schools.
Fourth, any statistical inaccuracy resulting from the narrower range
will only have important impacts for students at certain class rank cut-
offs—e.g., valedictorian, law review, top ten percent, top half, etc. And
the benefits to the entire school population flowing from inflation
outweigh the harm caused to the small group of students on the mar-
gins of significant rank levels.
There is one last point that addresses the concerns with both
types of compression: Any loss of information resulting from interval
reduction and shrinking of the grade range must be balanced against
the amount of information that will be gained under my proposal.
Recall that to the extent grades are designed to provide information
to students and employers, the status quo is failing in critical ways.
Law schools are using C grades to identify competent work, but large
numbers of students are not getting the message; they frequently per-
ceive such marks to be unsatisfactory.284 And employers are also con-
fused by the inconsistent signals we send via the variation in grading
practices among the schools where they recruit, undermining equity
in the placement arena.285 Such variety will be greatly reduced if law
schools accept my recommendation. Given the problems caused by
the status quo, industry-wide grade inflation should result in law
schools conveying better information overall to students and employers
than we do under our current grading systems.
Inflated marks may be causing problematic compression at the
undergraduate level.286 But there is little reason to fear the same hap-
pening in legal education under my proposal, particularly if the sub-
stantial elimination of C grades is accompanied by the adoption of
number marks. Accordingly, concerns about grade compression do
not weaken the case for setting the good standing GPA at 2.7.
283. See supra note 281 and accompanying text.
284. See supra Part III.B.
285. See supra Part III.A.
286. See Rojstaczer & Healy, Where A is Ordinary, supra note 46, at 2 (“It is likely that at
many selective and highly selective schools, undergraduate GPAs are now so saturated at
the high end that they have little use as a motivator of students and as an evaluation tool
for graduate and professional schools and employers.”); Barriga et al., supra note 256, at
202 (“Unfortunately, there is evidence that employers are beginning to rely less and less on
grades in evaluating their candidates.”).
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C. Objection 3: “Students Will Not Work as Hard if We
Substantially Eliminate C Grades”
The final objection to setting the good standing line at 2.7 is that
substantially eliminating C grades will cause a critical drop-off in stu-
dent effort. This objection has two parts. According to the first, grade
inflation will reduce the commitment of average and marginal
students:
The quest for high grades and the fear of bad ones is a strong
motivator for many students. When it is known that bad grades are
almost never given, the natural tendency among students is to re-
lax. If the hardest of work will get you an A, but the least amount
gets you a B, many students will take the B (along with the great
increase in leisure time).287
This argument has intuitive plausibility. If B grades are qualitatively
different from C grades in the minds of our students, as I contend
above,288 it is not difficult to imagine that some students will settle for
a B or B- under my proposal, even though they would not settle for C-
type grades under a less generous system.
The second part of the objection concerns the best students who
are at the top of the grade scale:
If students work very hard to produce excellent products and
achieve well-earned As, they may become disheartened when other
students receive the same As for mediocre performances. Such a
situation is unfair to students because it does not provide accurate
and differentiated feedback about their performances. Some stu-
dents may become less motivated because the excellence of their
work is not being recognized.289
This reasoning makes sense too. If the best students do not receive
adequate recognition for outstanding achievement, why should they
put in the effort necessary to accomplish it?
This is the most powerful and important objection to my propo-
sal. If grade inflation causes a measurable drop-off in student effort,
then any employment market and mental health benefits arising from
such inflation will come at a steep cost—too high a cost for most law
professors, I suspect. But ultimately, neither prong of the objection
defeats the case for a B- good standing GPA.
287. Leef, supra note 165, at 16; see also Hu, supra note 146, at 25 (“Grade inflation
further undermines the motivational function of grades in the student learning process.”).
288. See supra Part III.B.
289. Barriga et al., supra note 256, at 201; accord Kamber, supra note 157, at 58 (“When
A no longer distinguishes outstanding from good, teachers lack a formal means to inspire
and reward exertion toward academic excellence.”); Brighouse, supra note 186, at 77 (“[I]f
higher grades are the norm, then they cannot be used to encourage students.”).
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Let me begin with the second prong—the part that concerns top
students. The claim here is that better pupils lose motivation when
grades no longer reflect their superior work. This reasoning overlaps
heavily with the grade compression objection discussed in the previ-
ous section.290 And it is invalid on essentially the same grounds. First,
the grading system I propose will not prevent teachers from assigning
marks in ways that meaningfully distinguish between the perform-
ances of their students. This is so whether an inflating school switches
to number grades or maintains letter symbols.291 If eliminating C’s is
no barrier to recognizing the achievements of the best pupils, then
grade inflation should not result in reduced effort from these stu-
dents. Second, my proposal is likely to result in a mean grade in the
3.3 to 3.4 range. Under such a system, A marks should not be so com-
mon as to lose their incentivizing power. Third, grade inflation does
not undercut the importance of class rank.292 Given the role that rank
plays in job placement, law review selection, and scholarship awards,
good students should have ample reason to put in their best effort
after B- is established as the good standing line.
The first prong of the objection focuses on average and marginal
pupils. These students, it is asserted, will lose motivation under my
system because there is little chance of earning a C. This argument
does not overlap with the compression objection discussed previously
because the contention here is that higher grades will undercut stu-
dent work ethic independent of compression. More specifically, the
claim is that higher marks alone disincentivize studying even if teach-
ers are able to make grading distinctions among their students.
I must acknowledge that I think there is some truth to this argu-
ment. I believe that substantially eliminating C grades will cause some
students to cut back on the amount of work they do. The danger of
low marks is an important inducement for these people, and without
it their behavior will change. But this impact will be offset by several
countervailing forces. Indeed, there are good reasons to believe that
law students will put in greater effort overall after grade inflation is
implemented. At the very least the evidence is mixed. And if there is a
drop off in work, virtually all of the data suggests that it will be quite
290. See supra notes 259–263.
291. See supra notes 268–272 and accompanying text.
292. See supra notes 273–277 and accompanying text. Indeed, as I explained previously,
the grade compression caused by grade inflation might increase the importance of class
rank, which would be a positive development by itself, see supra notes 133–135 and accom-
panying text, and would add to the incentive effects of ranking.
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small, and thus the significant benefits resulting from grade inflation
are well worth the cost.
Starting with the countervailing forces, recall that most law
schools use 2.0 as their good standing GPA, while the average grade
awarded is roughly 3.1.293 That is a difference of more than a full
grade point. Under my approach, this gap will tighten considerably:
The difference between the good standing GPA (2.7) and the likely
mean grade (3.3 to 3.4) will be 0.6 to 0.7. Even at fourth tier schools
the gap will be measurably smaller. At present, the mean grade at
those institutions is 2.9, which is almost a full point above the 2.0 good
standing level. In sum, the academic dismissal line will be much closer
to the typical student’s GPA under my proposal than currently is the
case at the vast majority of law schools. That should serve as critical
inducement for many students.
Note that worries about the impact of grade inflation on the work
habits of average and especially marginal students sometimes focus on
the danger of an increase in the mean grade unaccompanied by a
commensurate change to the standard necessary to stay in school.
When the average mark rises with no movement in the good standing
GPA, the odds of flunking out can drop precipitously, causing at least
some loss of motivation. As the prior paragraph illustrates, my recom-
mendation is that we implement the exact opposite of this. I am advo-
cating for a 0.7 increase in the good standing line (2.0 to 2.7) and, at
most, a 0.5 rise in the average grade (from 2.9 to 3.4 at fourth tier
schools). This should moderately boost the chances that law students at
the bottom of the scale will flunk out—a powerful incentive for better
performance. And given concerns about bar passage rates at many in-
stitutions, this increased motivation for marginal students might be a
welcome development arising from my system.294
Next, recall the evidence I presented above that C grades specifi-
cally and low grades generally inhibit learning among law students.295
As outlined by Professor Krieger, low marks “create a sense of resigna-
tion and mediocrity across a large segment of the class” and “en-
courage some students to ‘tune out’ and stop trying, a classic example
of learned helplessness.”296 If my prior discussion is correct, there will be
293. See supra text accompanying notes 40, 87–88.
294. Cf. Downs & Levit, supra note 41, at 843 n.51 (“One concern that appears when
intentional grade inflation is mentioned is bar passage rates. If schools raise the ceiling,
the argument goes, this will also raise the floor, and a school may graduate students who
have difficulty passing the bar.”).
295. See supra notes 147–194 and accompanying text.
296. Krieger, supra note 37, at 301.
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a significant decrease in the number of students who disengage be-
cause of poor grades once we raise the good standing GPA to 2.7.
Which group is larger: The students who will happily coast on B-
marks under my system or the students who are crushed by C grades
under the status quo? If it is the latter, then my proposal will actually
increase the amount of work that law students do in the aggregate.
The last countervailing force is the continued importance of class
rank. As articulated above,297 grade inflation does not change the sali-
ence of rank. In fact, it might make class rank more significant.298 Stu-
dents tempted to slack off because the danger of receiving a C is small
under my system face the risk of hurting their relative class standing.
Given the importance of rank, these students will still have powerful
incentives to work hard even if C’s are a rare occurrence.
Will average and marginal students ultimately do less if law
schools inflate? Frankly, I do not think there is sufficient evidence to
answer that question. Indeed, education professionals are divided on
the subject more generally.299 This calls for further research. But until
the uncertainty is resolved, grading policy should be driven by the
fairer placement market that will result, and the improved psychologi-
cal well-being that should result, from substantially eliminating C
grades.
Finally, assume that law students will in fact do less work if we set
B- as the good standing GPA. Even if this is the case, there are compel-
ling reasons to believe that the drop off will not be so great as to out-
weigh the benefits of inflation. High grades have been standard
practice at first-tier law schools and virtually all other graduate pro-
grams for years or even decades. From all accounts, such marks have
not seriously interfered with the educational mission of these institu-
tions—i.e., their students are sufficiently motivated to work. Conceiva-
bly, the greater importance of grades in legal education might be a
distinguishing feature. But the use of relatively high grading in gradu-
ate schools is so widespread that, yet again, my opponents shoulder
297. See supra notes 273–277 and accompanying text.
298. See supra notes 133–135 and accompanying text.
299. Compare Kohn, supra note 165, at 7 (“Some people might defend that posture on
the grounds that students will perform better if As are harder to come by. In fact, the
evidence on this question is decidedly mixed. Stringent grading sometimes has been
shown to boost short-term retention as measured by multiple-choice exams—never to im-
prove understanding or promote interest in learning.”), with HU, supra note 146, at 25
(“Empirical studies suggest that student achievement increases as standards for grading
rise, suggesting that students respond favorably to higher academic standards. . . . If they
find that they do not have to exert much effort to receive satisfactory grades, students tend
to invest less time and effort in their academic work.”) (collecting authorities).
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the burden of proof to establish that second-, third-, and fourth-tier
law schools are the only subset of the academy where grade inflation
will have truly deleterious effects. Until they proffer such evidence, I
am comfortable recommending that all schools eliminate C grades.
The placement and mental-health benefits of such a change are sim-
ply too great to ignore.
Conclusion
The common thread running through both of my justifications
for setting B- as the good standing GPA is this: Low grades generally
and C grades specifically create critical perception problems. They
confuse employers by making it hard for them to accurately assess job
candidates from different law schools. And they confuse students by
inaccurately conveying to them the quality of their performance. The
former corrupts the distribution of employment opportunities in the
legal market, causing considerable unfairness. The latter damages our
students’ learning and psychological well-being. If all law schools
adopt B- as the good standing GPA, this will remedy both communica-
tion problems without undercutting any critical educational interests.
And such grade inflation will bring law schools into line with other
graduate programs throughout the academy. It is time we substantially
eliminated C grades.
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Appendix: Transitioning to a Grading System that Involves
Higher Marks
The adoption of a B- good standing GPA and the resulting grade
inflation raise certain administrative complications. These complica-
tions are caused primarily by the fact that law students enrolled dur-
ing the transition period will be graded and ranked using two
different grading systems. This appendix presents some thoughts on
how to address the four principal complications: (1) calculating grade
point average and class rank during the transition period, (2) deter-
mining the grades necessary to remain in good standing during the
transition period, (3) determining graduation honors during the tran-
sition period and subsequently, and (4) transcript clarity during the
transition period and subsequently.300
Before discussing the four issues, a preliminary note is in order.
One might argue that if it is impossible to develop a completely fair
transition scheme, then the grading system should not be changed at
all. There are two problems with this contention. First, it means that a
law school can never modify its grading practices if transitioning to the
new system will cause any unfairness. That makes no sense. Second,
the transition process will only harm (at most) a small number of stu-
dents—some percentage of those enrolled at the time the school
changes the grading policy. The new system with higher grades will
benefit all (or virtually all) future students. Since the latter group is far
larger than the former, it is easy to conclude that the benefits of
adopting a new grading policy like the one I recommend outweigh
the costs—assuming, of course, that I am correct about the benefits
that will result.
1. Grade Point Average and Class Rank
During the transition period, a law school should calculate a stu-
dent’s GPA in exactly the same way it did prior to adopting the B-
good standing GPA. All grades under both the old and new systems
should be compiled into a single GPA. And this GPA should be used
to set class rank, just as under the old policy. Such a protocol will treat
the vast bulk of students equally even if no special transition mecha-
nisms are adopted. That is because, at most institutions, students pass
through school at roughly the same rate. Thus, those graduating in a
300. There will, of course, be other issues, such as updating the GPAs necessary for
readmission and scholarship eligibility.
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given year will earn substantially the same number of credits under
both grading systems.
However, the above protocol will not always treat students equally
because there are circumstances in which students do not pass
through school at the same pace. As a result, a student might graduate
in the same year as another student who spent more or less time
under the new grading system. This creates unfairness. For example,
assume Student X started at Hypothetical Law School in the fall of
2007 and enrolled in the school’s part-time, evening program. During
X’s first year, Hypothetical Law School adopted a 2.7 good standing
GPA, effective in the fall of 2008. Student Y started in the fall of 2008
and enrolled in Hypothetical Law School’s full-time, day program.
Student X takes four years to complete school and Student Y takes
three years. X and Y thus graduate in the same class (2011) and are
ranked against each other. In this case, Y has an advantage over X: Y
received all of his grades after the school implemented the new,
higher grading system, while X’s first year was governed by the old
system. X’s class rank is thus somewhat lower vis-a`-vis Y’s because of
Hypothetical Law School’s adoption of the new grading policy. X is
suffering a penalty in relation to Y for reasons entirely beyond X’s
control.
There are two general options for dealing with this type of situa-
tion. First, Hypothetical Law School could do nothing. At many insti-
tutions, there will be relatively few students in X’s position. Moreover,
the GPA and class rank impact on X will be small in most cases. For
example, suppose Hypothetical Law School had a mandatory mean of
3.0 on a 4.0 scale under the old system. When it adopted the new
good standing GPA, it raised the required mean to 3.3 on the same
scale. The fact that X spent the first year of school under the 3.0 pol-
icy may only shift X’s class rank by a few places. That harm is arguably
not great enough to warrant a remedy.
Second, Hypothetical Law School could give students in X’s situa-
tion a “GPA adjustment.” For example, the school could raise the GPA
value of all classes taken prior to the adoption of the new system by 0.3
points, since that is the difference between the mean GPAs under the
old and new systems. This second approach can become complicated
if Hypothetical Law School tries to get too detailed with the adjust-
ments. But, if the school makes a basic 0.3 adjustment, that will get the
school awfully close to a fair resolution. Note that grades earned
under the old system would not be changed on a student’s transcript.
B’s would still be B’s, for example. If the school uses number grading,
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3.0s would still be 3.0s. The grades would only have a different value
for purposes of calculating GPA and class rank.301 Between doing
nothing and a GPA adjustment, I favor the latter. While the quantita-
tive impact of the new grading system on X’s class rank might be small,
the qualitative impact could be significant if it moves X across one of
the critical rank thresholds—for example, the ninetieth percentile,
the sixty-seventh percentile, or the fiftieth percentile. Given this possi-
bility, the adjustment is warranted, at least at schools with full-time
and part-time programs.
2. Good Standing
A majority of law schools currently use a good standing GPA of
2.0. Raising the good standing level to 2.7 creates another transition
issue. However, there is an easy solution to this problem: The law
school can simply average a student’s grades under the old system
against the student’s grades under the new system.
To elaborate, the only time the transition will present a problem
is if a student is above 2.0 under the old system and subsequently earns
a GPA below 2.7 under the new system. Suppose a current 2L—Student
M—finishes this school year with 60 credits and a GPA of 2.1. Then, as
a 3L, under the new system, he earns a 2.5 GPA in 30 credits. We
average the grades as follows. First, under the old system, M earned “6
GPA points” above the good standing line (60 credits x 0.1 above the
good standing line = 6 GPA points). Second, under the new system, he
earned “6 GPA points” below the good standing line (30 credits x 0.2
below the good standing line = 6 GPA points). We then subtract the
GPA points below the good standing line from those above. If that
total is under zero, then the student is no longer in good standing. If
the total is at or above zero, then the students remain in good standing.
In the hypothetical, Student M is at zero. Thus, M is in good standing
and may graduate. If M’s GPA under the new system were below 2.5 by
even a tiny amount, his GPA point total would be less than zero. In
that case, he would not be in good standing.
301. Note that a student’s GPA could still be reported in unadjusted form. This will
avoid the problem of having some students with GPAs higher than the top of the scale—
i.e. over 4.0 or 4.3. However, it might create anomalies where Student 1 has a lower re-
ported GPA but a higher class rank than Student 2. Between these two largely administra-
tive problems, I think the former is the greater concern. But neither is terribly significant.
And another alternative would be to report two GPAs—adjusted and unadjusted.
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3. Graduation Honors
If a law school awards graduation honors based on class rank,
then no additional adjustment is necessary beyond that discussed in
section 1 of this appendix. However, if graduation honors are deter-
mined via GPA, then two more adjustments are required. First, a new
GPA level must be established, taking into account that higher grades
are now awarded. For example, suppose all students with a 3.5 GPA on
a 4.0 scale receive graduation honors at Hypothetical Law School.
When the new system is adopted, the mean grade moves from 3.0 to
3.3. If the goal is to award honors to the same number of students,
then the GPA cutoff must be raised. However, simply shifting the stan-
dard from 3.5 to 3.8 probably will not work because of the 4.0 ceiling.
As a general rule, more students will achieve a 3.5 GPA on a 4.0 scale
with a 2.0 good standing level and a 3.0 mean than will achieve a 3.8
GPA with a 2.7 good standing line and a mean of 3.3. So the new
honors GPA should be lower than 3.8—roughly 3.7.302
Second, a mechanism is necessary to determine whether a stu-
dent with grades under both systems has met the honors threshold.
This should be done in precisely the same way it was for good stand-
ing. The student’s grades under the old system should be averaged
against the student’s grades under the new system. For example, as-
sume a current 2L—Student X—finishes this school year with 60 cred-
its and a GPA of 3.7. Then, as a 3L, under the new system, she earns a
3.3 GPA in 30 credits. We average the grades as follows. First, under
the old system, X earned 12 GPA points above the honors line (60
credits x 0.2 above 3.5 = 12 GPA points). Second, under the new sys-
tem, she earned 12 GPA points below the honors line (30 credits x 0.4
below 3.7 = 12 GPA points). GPA points earned below the honors level
are treated as negative numbers. We then add the two numbers to-
gether. If the total is under zero, the student does not graduate with
the honors. If the total is at or above zero, the student does graduate
with honors. In this hypothetical, Student X is at zero. Thus, X quali-
fies for honors.
4. Transcript Clarity
Changes in grading systems can create confusion for employers
and other consumers of transcript information. Confusion is particu-
larly likely with respect to students who attend school under two dif-
302. Assuming a normal distribution of GPAs under both frameworks, a good estimate
would be 3.65. Thus, either 3.6 or 3.7 would work.
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ferent grading regimes and thus have two different types of marks on
their transcripts. The most effective way of dealing with this problem
is by placing a notation on the bottom or back of all transcripts that
(1) summarizes the old and new grading system, (2) summarizes the
transition mechanisms, and (3) directs the reader to the school’s web-
site for additional information where these items are explained in full.
